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CHAPTER 1 
The Introduction 
 
 
 
The Micro Informs the Macro   
 If a democratic government and a democratic society are mutually reinforcing and 
reflective,1 then what conclusions can be drawn from how society practices democracy 
with how that society practices government?  The preceding macro level question refers 
to societies, governments, and the people who live in them.  Social scientists commonly 
agree that a democratic government and its society reflect one another and reinforce one 
another.  Theda Skocpol’s research on American Federalism, political development, and 
the growth and development of national organizations demonstrate how social 
organizations mirror the United States system of government.2  Theories of social capital 
are founded on the idea that participation in social organizations is necessary for citizens 
to develop the skills and ideology necessary to support a strong democratic government.3  
Robert Dahl’s work on pluralism, polyarchy, and democracy are strongly based on how 
different types of social institutions and government strongly reflect one another.4  In a 
more critical vein of democracy in the United States, the application of an elitist model 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Dahl 1971, Lindblom 1977, Tocqueville and Bradley 1980, Putnam 2000   
 
2 Skocpol 1992, Skocpol, et al. 2002  
 
3 Putnam 2000, Garcia 2001 
 
4 Dahl 1971, 1989  
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points out how elitism plays out at different levels of government and society.5  
Comparative research using network theory argues that in the United States, Germany, 
and Japan a “blurring” occurs between state and society relations in broad policy-making 
domains.6 
In Communication Cadres, Leaders, and Co-optation, the title of this dissertation, 
I address three macro points.  First, how individuals organize and govern themselves in 
small organizations.  Second, how these organizations reflect society and government; 
and, finally, how society relates to government.  In essence, this dissertation explores the 
implications of how social organizations in the United States practice democracy with 
how the federal system of U.S. government practices democracy.    
The macro concerns of Communication Cadres, Leaders, and Co-optation 
emerged from initial micro observations of how individual leaders within organizations 
communicated information to their followers in both large bureaucratic organizations and 
very small organizations practicing participatory democracy.  I noticed a recurring pattern 
at the organizational level, organizational leaders selectively presented organizational 
members information that included and excluded information and available alternatives.  
In studying the history of social movements and individual unions, I began to see 
references by both leaders of organizations and the rank-and-file that pointed to their 
experiences with similar occurrences.7  Consequently, I moved from observing individual 
organizations and institutions to hypothesize that organizational leaders rise to power 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Gaventa 1980, Dye 1995 
 
6 Knoke 1996 
 
7 Piven and Cloward 1977, Acuña 1988, Walton 1988, Hero 1992, Smith 1996, Collier and Collier 2002 
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and stay in power by controlling communication and information flows, which creates an 
environment conducive for co-optation to occur.   The resulting dissertation turned from 
micro level observations and analysis to their macro level implications.   
Critical case studies of three small organizations with politically experienced 
members dedicated to participatory democracy and open communication and information 
flows test the argument.  The critical case studies do more than test the theory; they allow 
us to see the ideals of democracy and political participation put to work and to move from 
microanalysis to macroanalysis.  
 
The Theory 
 Communication Cadres, Leaders, and Co-Optation, theorizes that leaders rise to 
power and stay in power by controlling communication and information flows, which 
creates an environment conducive for co-optation to occur.  I refer to the leader(s) who 
control organizational communication and information flows as a communication cadre 
(CC).   
The Communication Cadre Theory (CCT) deserves to be studied for several 
reasons.  First, the CCT identifies how and why communication and information 
networks are important for political power.  Second, the CCT defines co-optation and 
explains the danger co-optation poses at the organizational and individual level.  Third, 
the theory offers an explanation for how and why oligarchy occurs. 8  Fourth, it explains 
why the Iron Law of Oligarchy occurs. Fifth, the Communication Cadre Theory identifies 
how and why a communication cadre develops and forms   an organizational elite.  Sixth, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Michels 1962  
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the CCT identifies obstacles to an individual’s freedom of choice in organizations.  
Seventh, the theory identifies how and why the control of communication and 
information networks creates an obstacle to democracy and democratization.  The 
Communication Cadre Theory identifies organizational obstacles to communication and 
information sharing.  This dissertation, also, demonstrates how the current conceptual 
stretching of key political science terms related to democracy, representation, 
accountability, and cooperation muddies and biases political analysis and interpretations.9 
The following chapters develop the Communication Cadre Theory, critically test 
the theory, and discuss the theory’s significance for organizations and institutions, as well 
as the implications the Communication Cadre Theory holds for society and government. 
  
Defining The Problem 
The control of communication and information is a problem for several reasons.  
The case studies in this dissertation demonstrate entrenched leadership, which will later 
be related to the communication cadre concept, relies heavily on its control of 
communication and information.  Furthermore, this control yields an organization 
increasingly dependent on the communication cadre for information the organization’s 
members need to make informed decisions.  The control of communication and 
information forms the basis for political power within an organization and provides a 
resource and mechanism for organizational leaders to become entrenched.  The result of 
these several points is a decrease in a leader’s accountability and representation, and the 
creation of an environment that is less conducive for democracy.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Sartori 1970, 1984 
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Leaders of organizations rise to power and stay in power by controlling 
communication and information flows, which result in an environment conducive for co-
optation.  The Communication Cadre Theory highlights several consequences resulting 
from the control of communication and information flows.  The Theory Chapter and 
Case Study Chapters explore these consequences in greater detail.  Briefly stated here, 
the consequences resulting from the control of communication and information flows are: 
 
1. The options available for an organization’s members to choose from may 
be reduced, 
2. The reduced options available for members to decide between limits their 
free choice (results in limited free choice), 
3. The limits on free choice reduces the power of an organization’s members, 
because an individual’s free will to decide cannot make up for a lack of 
free choice, 
4. Limited free choice limits democracy and democratic action,  
5. An organizational elite that takes over the organizational function of 
controlling communication and information flows, 
6. Creates an environment conducive for the entrenchment of organizational 
leaders (oligarchy), 
7. Creates an environment conducive for co-optation to occur, and  
8. Undermines the political power of the organization’s members. 
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The options available for an organization’s members to choose from may be 
reduced.  Olson wrote in The Logic of Collective Action that the great are often exploited 
by the weak in referencing the Free Rider Problem faced by all organizations.10  While 
this occurrence is well documented, leaders who control communication and information 
flows are strategically placed to be less than forthcoming to their organization’s members 
without those members knowing.  For example, a person who controls communication 
and information flows may know that the organization has options 1, 2, 3, and 4, but only 
tell the broader organization that options 1, 2, and 3 exist.  The censorship in the 
preceding example limits the free choice of organizational members.  The reduction of 
free choice then reduces the power of an organization’s members, because an individual’s 
free will to decide cannot make-up for the lack of free choice.  Limited free choice limits 
democracy and democratic action.   
Organizational needs pressure an organization to appoint or elect someone(s) to 
oversee or manage communication and information flows within the organization and 
with external organizations.  An organizational elite forms that takes over this 
organizational function of controlling communication and information flows.  As it will 
be explained in the Chapter 2, control over communication and information flows (or 
those who manage communication and information) are the necessary condition to both 
hold and use power.  Controllers of communication and information flows are 
strategically positioned to become entrenched leaders within their organizations, because 
they exercise considerable control over the information organizational members possess 
when they decide who they want to lead their organization.  Furthermore, when 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Olson 1971 
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communication and information flows are controlled, an environment conducive for the 
organization or organizational leader(s) to be co-opted exists.  In the previous example of 
organizational members believing they have 3 choices, when in fact they have four 
choices, an Organization B opposed to the withheld fourth option only needs to convince 
the person(s) who controls their organization’s communication and information to 
withhold option #4 for his/her personal interests over the organization’s interest.  If this is 
the case, organizational members are structurally hampered from discovering this and 
their political power is undermined.  
The Communication Cadre Theory is important for the study of organizations and 
institutions.  The theory highlights several key factors and their impact.   
 
1. Identifies the importance of communication and information for political 
power, 
2. Explains the danger of co-optation at an organizational and individual level,  
3. Explains how and why oligarchy occurs, 
4. Identifies a reason for the creation of an organizational and communication 
elite,  
5. Identifies obstacles to an individual’s freedom of choice, 
6. Identifies an obstacle to democracy and democratization, and  
7. Identifies organizational obstacles to communication and information sharing. 
 
The Communication Cadre Theory provides insight into other theories on 
organizations, bureaucracies, social movements, interest groups, political participation, 
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political development, democracy, representation, and legitimacy.  The Communication 
Cadre Theory provides answers to how and why leaders become entrenched in 
organizations, bureaucracies, and social movements.  The arguments advanced in this 
dissertation aid to increase the clarity of such central concepts in Political Science as 
democracy, representation, and legitimacy.  The role the control of communication and 
information flows played in determining the political development of organizations, 
communities, institutions, and government in the United States provides an alternative to 
understanding political struggle. 
The Communication Cadre Theory is important to study for normative reasons, 
primarily free will and free choice.  The corner stone of democratic theory and 
participation are rooted in the concepts of free will and free choice.  The later two 
concepts subsequently rely on access to communication and information to be realized.  
Consequently, people cannot make informed choices or form opinions about individual 
issues, strategies, or leaders without receiving the information that they need to make an 
informed decision.  
The control of communication and information is not restricted to elected and 
known leaders, but also appointed and unknown leaders.  Similarly, The communication 
cadre may encompass known and unknown leaders or elected and unelected leaders.  For 
example, unknown or non-elected leaders may encompass secretaries, technocrats, 
bureaucrats, or a political entrepreneur within the group or organization.  The ability of 
bureaucrats to achieve administrative autonomy in the Department of Agriculture during 
the Progressive Era stands, stand as a case in point.11  In another example, Registered 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Carpenter 2001 
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Nurses working in hospitals are seldom considered to have much political power by 
outsiders, but it is common knowledge among medical professionals working in hospitals 
that Registered Nurses “run” hospitals, because they are at the nexus of communication 
and information networks for patient care.  The result is an environment that increases the 
probability that a communication cadre will use the control of communication and 
information for personal gain.  
The Communication Cadre Theory described in this dissertation highlights the 
important distinction between official and unofficial leaders.  The difference between 
elected and appointed leaders is one of elected leaders possessing greater legitimacy and 
a greater likelihood of representing their constituencies, because of their need to be re-
elected. Conversely, appointed officials, such as bureaucrats or technocrats, possess less 
legitimacy and a decreased likelihood of representing a constituency, because they are 
insulated from the mechanism of public elections.12  The distinction between these 
different types of leaders clarifies the influence, power, and legitimacy of official and 
unofficial leaders.  Consequently, researchers can more accurately distinguish different 
types of political participation and representation, as well as the difference between co-
optation, cooperation, and compromise. 
 
Communication Cadres, Elected and Non-Elected Leaders 
 A communication cadre always forms an organization’s leadership.  The 
communication cadre may or may not be the official leaders of an organization because 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12  Skowronek 1982, Wilson 1989 
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their power is strongly derived from their control of communication and information and 
not just holding an elected or appointed position. 
One way of determining the official and unofficial leadership of an organization is 
to look at formal, official, and public relationships both inside that organization and 
between that organization and other organizations to determine who forms the public 
leadership of an organization.  One then must map the official relationship between the 
public leaders to an organization.  The official relationship is then used as a starting point 
for determining if an informal relationship exists between or within organizations.  If 
both formal and informal relationships exist then the two types of relationships must be 
compared to determine which relationship holds dominance and under what conditions 
that relationship holds dominance.  
The Communication Cadre Theory helps to explain what organizations do, how 
organizations do it, and the results of organizational actions.  Social, economic, and 
political variables shape the Communication Cadre Theory. How social, economic, and 
political variables shape the Communication Cadre Theory is important to explore.  In 
this dissertation, I study the Communication Cadre Theory by focusing on how it is 
created by communication and information flows, organizational needs, politics, and 
society, as well as how it is influenced by these variables.  I also focus on how and why 
the Communication Cadre Theory impacts what organizations do and how organizations 
do it.  
Economies of scale increase the probability of the Communication Cadre Theory 
being present and that a communication cadre exists. The political and social implications 
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of the Communication Cadre Theory increase as we move from smaller to larger 
organizations and institutions.   
 
The Secretary Question 
 If the control of communication and information networks is so important and 
produces the communication cadre, then why are secretaries, bureaucrats, technocrats, 
and other controllers of communication and information not routinely part of the 
communication cadre?  While the analysis in Communication Cadres, Leaders, and Co-
Optation is not designed to address this specific question, the results yield potential 
reasons for this occurrence.  The primary reason that controllers of communication and 
information (like secretaries, bureaucrats, and technocrats) do not exercise greater 
political power is that they do not choose to use this control for power.  Another reason 
that appears in this preliminary analysis of the secretary question is that the role of a 
person’s position in a hierarchy dramatically determines whether or not they choose to 
become part of the communication cadre.  Also influencing whether or not a person 
chooses to seize power is the role that gender, race, ethnicity, and class play for the 
individual and within the organization.  More information on the “Secretary Question” 
may be found in Chapter 2 and Chapter 6: Summary and Conclusions. 
 The dissertation looks at how and why the control of communication and 
information flows is a political resource for organizational leaders to gain and stay in 
power.  The case studies provide insight into why leaders and some professions (e.g. 
administrative assistants and registered nurses) who possess considerable access to 
information and play key roles as communicators in organizations are generally viewed 
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as politically powerful or not politically powerful players.  I refer to this issue of people 
with considerable access to information and key roles as communicators who are 
generally not viewed as powerful (even by themselves) as the “Secretary Question?”  In 
addressing this problem, the key question asked is, “Why and under what conditions do 
individuals employ or not employ their political power?”   
How do organizational leaders become entrenched and unreflective of their 
constituency’s beliefs?  If the control of information and communication is so central to 
political power than why are certain professionals like administrative assistants not 
acknowledged as powerful political players more often?  What is co-optation and how 
does it occur?  Why should scholars and laypersons be concerned with these issues?  My 
research offers answers to these questions by focusing on who controls communication 
and information networks within an organization and with outside organizations.  
Communication Cadres, Leaders, and Co-Optation, elaborates and tests the 
preceding and following questions.  How is the social and political environment within 
and between organizations affected?  What impact does an environment of inclusive and 
exclusive communication and information flows have on the participation of an 
organization’s members and leaders, or those who are included or excluded in the 
communication and information flows?  
 
Communication and Information Networks  
Communication and information networks are crucial in determining who has 
power.13  Whoever controls the flow and content of information and communication 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Knoke 1990 
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within an organization shapes opinions within that organization and with the external 
groups they interact with.  Research on the mass media and public opinion provide strong 
evidence to support this.14   
A communication cadre always develops unless it’s vigorously guarded against.  
Communication, relationships, and pact-making with other groups increases the 
probability that a communication cadre will form.  Basically, any event that requires an 
individual or individuals to communicate between two or more sub-groups or groups 
works as a potential catalyst for a communication cadre to form.  Also increasing the 
probability that a communication cadre will form is limiting the amount of members or 
leaders who participate in communication or negotiations with other groups.  The 
communication cadre’s importance increases as organizational members interact less 
often with one another or other groups because more individuals rely on fewer and fewer 
individuals for their information and to communicate their needs or objectives.  As 
Chapter 2 and the case studies demonstrate, an organization’s need to manage its 
communication and information requirements provides an environment conducive for a 
communication cadre to exist.  Whether an organization appoints or elects an individual 
or individuals to control the organization’s communication and information networks 
does not decrease or eliminate a favorable environment for a communication cadre to 
exist.  What impedes an environment conducive for a communication cadre are 
organizational oversight, open access, and turnover.  Organizational oversight enables 
organizational members access to the actions of key individuals who control 
communication and information flows.  Open access to communication and information 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Parenti 1993 
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flows for organizational members and turnover of personnel who control communication 
and information networks.   As it will be shown in this dissertation, the election of leaders 
or individuals to communication and information positions, per se, does not effect an 
environment conducive for communication cadre.  What matters are oversight, open 
access, and turnover.    
The Communication Cadre Theory proposes that communication and information 
networks are mechanisms for the development of entrenched leadership (i.e. oligarchy) 
and create an environment conducive for co-optation to occur.  Throughout this 
dissertation one question that continually lingers in the background is to what extend can 
democracy and representation exist in the presence of communication cadres?   
Robert Michel’s Iron Law Of Oligarchy describes entrenched leadership in 
organizations, but he does not provide explanations for its occurrence.  The main pieces 
missing from the Iron Law of Oligarchy are the variables that influence the creation, 
maintenance, and effects of oligarchy, (the mechanisms leaders use to become 
entrenched).  The Communication Cadre Theory provides for these mechanisms, as well 
as ways to test for their presence. 
 
Methods 
The critical question that will be asked of my research design and analysis is 
whether or not my biases influenced the research design and analysis enough to find 
evidence of the communication cadre and the importance of communication and 
information for political power.  Other possible explanations that may be offered to 
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explain the events that occurred and the case studies reflect dominant theories within the 
field of political science.   
The Communication Cadre Theory tests other theories of organizations, interest 
groups, democracy, political participation, pluralism, and elitism.  The Communication 
Cadre Theory tests these theories from a different perspective and offers supporting and 
conflicting arguments for prevailing beliefs about organizations, interest groups, 
democracy, political participation, pluralism, and elitism.  
The goal of comparing and contrasting the Communication Cadre Theory with 
other political theories is to test what happens when commonplace assumptions are not 
taken as assumptions, but as questionable tenants to be tested.15  Some of the key 
assumptions to be tested are first, the assumption that democratic elections of leaders 
yield leaders who represent the interest of their constituency.16  Second, the American 
democratic character is reflected in social and political organizations, interest groups, and 
the American federal system of government.17  Third, that co-optation occurs rarely in the 
United States and that co-operation and compromise best define political negotiations 
between political actors.18  Fourth, the limited political participation of individuals in the 
United States is not a threat to the democratic character of this country or to political 
representation.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Dye 1976 
 
16 In two classic studies, Warren E. Miller and Donald E. Stokes concluded that constituencies elected 
representatives who best represented them, while Christopher H. Achen used Miller and Stokes data set to 
demonstrate that constitutencies did not elect the candidates who best reflected their interests.  See, Miller 
and Stokes 1966, Achen 1978 
 
17 Tocqueville and Bradley 1980, Putnam 2000 
 
18 Perrow 1986, Scott 1998, Putnam 2000  
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Putnam’s work on the differences between bridging and bonding social capital 
activities points to the differences they create.19  While bridging social capital actions 
serve to form connections across class, ethnicity, race, and religious identities, bonding 
activities reinforce those exclusive identities.  Consequently, both types of social capital 
activities may increase the accumulation of social capital, but their inclusive and 
exclusive natures may result in very different effects on individuals, organizations, 
organization members, leaders, and the communication cadre.  At the organizational level 
the difference between bridging and bonding activities and who engages in them 
highlight the driving question of the Communication Cadre Theory.  Namely, what 
affects do communication and information flows that are inclusive or exclusive of group 
members have on organizations, organizational members, and organizational leaders, and 
their actions? 
The organizational need to limit the amount of leaders has been supported by 
research.20  The tendency of leaders to stay in power or become entrenched goes back to 
the early work of Mosca, Pareto, and Michels.21  
The three faces of power (power, mobilization of bias, and the culture of 
powerlessness) manifest themselves differently among the rank-and-file, leaders, and the 
communication cadre.22  While the third face of power argues that a culture of 
powerlessness yields individuals and organizations that do not realize they have power or 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 Putnam 2000 
 
20 Michels 1962, Olson 1971   
 
21 Pareto, et al. 1935, Mosca, et al. 1939, Michels 1962 
 
22 Schattschneider 1960, Dahl 1961, Walker 1966, Gaventa 1980   
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how to use their power.23  The mobilization of bias results in individuals not knowing that 
they have choices.24  
The question, “Do elected or appointed officials represent the views of their 
constituency and act in their best interest?” has long driven the field of Political Science.  
Elitism initially emphasized the paternalistic and/or necessary role of an elite class.25  
Pluralism countered elitism’s claim by arguing that the creation of multiple elites with 
multiple spheres of influence, in order to argue that democracy existed through pluralism 
and the varied interests of the populace were represented.26  Pluralism’s critics argued 
that pluralism was still elitist in its approach, did not account for class issues, the 
mobilization of bias, or how people develop a culture of powerlessness.27  Critics of 
pluralism in the fields of American political development, race and politics, and social 
movements documented groups whose interests were not represented by pluralism or 
federalism.28   
 
Organizational Obstacles to Rank-and-File Participation 
How does the rank-and-file identify with their leaders, organizational factions, 
and parties within the organization? Entrenched leaders who do not embody the goals and 
ideologies of their organization’s membership and the co-optation of leaders pose two 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 Gaventa 1980 
 
24 Schattschneider 1960 
 
25 Pareto, et al. 1935, Mosca, et al. 1939, Hunter 1953, Michels 1962 
 
26 Truman 1951 
 
27 Schattschneider 1975, Gaventa 1980, Manley 1983, Mendel-Reyes 1995 
 
28  Woodward 1974, Bridges 1984, Montejano 1987, Foner 1988, Guinier 1994 
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obstacles that prevent members from advancing their issues and concerns in 
organizations.  Furthermore, the preceding obstacles limit organizational members 
democratic participation, political influence, and power.29  In such cases, critics easily 
point out that a group’s membership is free to leave and join or form another organization 
that meets their needs.  The freedom to leave an organization in order to join or form 
another group, however, is not a viable choice for most people, because the costs of 
overcoming those obstacles discourage individuals from doing so.30  
 The relationship between entrenched leaders, their control of communication and 
information, and their co-optation is repeatedly alluded to during my conversations with 
leaders and members of advocacy, community, and labor organizations.31  A cursory 
examination of the literature on advocacy, community, and labor organizations mentions 
this relationship between entrenched leaders, their control of communication and 
information networks, and an environment conducive for co-optation.32  Unfortunately, 
the political science literature seldom develops the relationship between the control of 
communication and information networks with entrenched and/or unresponsive 
leadership.  The concept of co-optation is seldom defined and even less likely to be 
operationalized for useful analysis, (Phillip Selznick and Robert C. Smith are two 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29  Michels 1962, Bridges 1984   
 
30  Olson 1971 
 
31  Former SNCC Chairman Charles McDew and Communications Director Julian Bond; various local, 
regional, and national union leaders of the AFL-CIO, Teamsters, SEIU; African American, Asian 
American, Latino, and Native American community and advocacy organizations;  
 
32 Piven and Cloward 1977, Acuña 1988, Walton 1988, Hero 1992, Smith 1996, Collier and Collier 2002 
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exceptions).33  Consequently, the relationship between co-optation and the control of 
communication and information is seldom explored in the literature. 
Defining co-optation and separating it from cooperation and compromise is 
crucial in determining which has occurred.  This dissertation separates co-optation from 
cooperation and compromise based on power to make decisions and the responsibility for 
decisions made.   
Co-optation occurs when an individual or organization moves away from their 
founding ideology or membership’s ideology and towards another individual’s or 
organization’s ideology for personal gain.  Co-optation continues to occur when leaders 
remain in power and shift their organization's focus.  For example, a group's leader acts in 
their personal interest and not in their organization's interest to accept a specific political 
compromise with another organization.  In the previous example, the leader’s actions are 
not a political compromise reached with another organization, but co-optation.   
Co-optation does not always occur under the Communication Cadre Theory.  
Variables that increase or decrease the probability of co-optation occurring in a Group A 
are:  
 
1. Pact-making, relationships, or communication with other groups. 
2. Limiting the amount of membership and leader participation and communication 
or negotiations with other groups. 
a. The appointment or election of individuals to these positions does not 
matter. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 Selznick 1966, Smith 1996   
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3. When GROUP A opposes GROUP B’s policy or position. 
4. GROUP A is deficient in resources vis-à-vis GROUP B that a leader or 
communication cadre craves or fears. 
5. Patronage exists. 
6. The organization is dependent on other groups or individuals for crucial 
resources. 
7. A leader or communication cadre member is also in control or oversight of an 
influential subgroup or sub-function of GROUP A. 
8. Static or entrenched leaders, communication cadre, or controllers of 
communication and information. 
9. A dedicated, charismatic leader. 
10. Term limits. 
11. The oversight of communication and information controllers. 
12. The presence of an environment open to ideological or practical change and 
evolution. 
13. Organizational size. 
 
Even though this dissertation focuses on organizations with members who care 
tremendously in building a democratic organization, a participatory democracy, and 
working diligently to limit the communication cadre and its effects with various levels of 
success, I believe that Americans care strongly about democracy and participating 
democratically in the organizations they care about.  The problem for Americans is how 
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to move past the hurdles created by organizations, and social and government institutions 
to create and nurture more democratic organizations and institutions. 
The Communication Cadre Theory originally developed in an attempt to explain 
the history of the labor movement in the United States and Mexico, as well as the history 
of communities of color organizing for economic, social, and political change.  Mexico 
witnessed different periods of expansion in the labor movement’s membership, power, 
and influence during the 19th and 20th centuries, while the U.S. labor movement saw 
similar periods of growth during the same time period.  Both nations experienced efforts 
by the business community and the State to halt the creation and expansion of the labor 
movement.34   
The Communication Cadre Theory provides a substantial explanation for the lack 
of greater political power by labor, community and advocacy groups.  The theory 
explains how leaders come to power in labor, community and advocacy groups.  Why 
oligarchy develops in organizations and how a favorable environment develops for co-
optation.  The Communication Cadre Theory accounts for why elite groups seek to co-opt 
labor, community and advocacy groups;  why leaders are in a position to be co-opted;  
and, several methods elite groups use to accomplish co-optation.  The findings in this 
dissertation also hold relevance to the interaction of one group with another, no matter 
the group’s size, membership, goals, or ideology.  The relationship between the control of 
communication, leaders, communication cadres, oligarchy, and co-optation must be 
understood for an organization to avoid oligarchy and co-optation. 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 Collier and Collier 1991, 2002 
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Chapter Summaries 
Chapter 2 develops the Communication Cadre Theory, defines key terms, 
addresses conceptual stretching, and presents the research methodology.  The chapter 
explains why the control of communication and information is crucial for leaders to rise 
to power and stay in power.  The problem of conceptually stretching the terms 
“democracy, representation, accountability, legitimacy, co-optation, cooperation, and 
compromise” is addressed.  Finally, the chapter presents a framework for reducing the 
conceptual overlap of co-optation, cooperation, and compromise.  Chapter 3 provides a 
literature review and begins to develop the Communication Cadre Theory.  
Chapter 4 provides a case study of a Mexican American Employee Organization 
over twenty years.  The organization critically tests the Communication Cadre Theory 
and demonstrates how co-optation differs from cooperation and compromise.   
Chapter 5 presents two more critical case studies and analyzes how organizations 
that are sixteen and twenty-three years old deal with their communication cadres, while 
struggling to maintain open and free communication and information flows. The two 
organizations demonstrate how vigilant and active members dedicated to participatory 
democracy and free and open communication and information flows can neutralize an 
environment conducive for co-optation.   
Chapter 6 summarizes the findings and discusses the implications the 
Communication Cadre Theory and case studies present for the study of politics, 
organizations, and democracy.    
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Closing Thoughts 
This dissertation started out by looking at the control of communication and 
information in organizations that advocated for disadvantaged groups.  Why such control 
occurred and the impact it caused on organizations, an organizations’ policies, and 
organizational members.  During the course of my dissertation research, I met with 
leaders and members of grassroots, community, and labor organizations.  They took the 
time to share their organizing experiences, as well as the political and social environment 
that they operated in.  Several themes developed over the course of these discussions.  
The themes covered organizational, political, and social topics within and external to 
their respective organizations.  The topics ranged from the need for strong central 
leadership and the bureaucratic needs of their organizations to the need for greater 
member participation (i.e. increased democratization of their organization) and rank-and-
file leadership.   
Communication Cadres. Leaders, and Co-optation offers an alternative 
explanation of American political life based on the Communication Cadre Theory.  
Briefly stated here and elaborated in greater detail in Chapter 2, the theory argues that 
leaders rise to power and stay in power by controlling communication and information 
flows, which creates an environment conducive for co-optation to occur.  Information 
gained from three critical case studies provide insight into: 
 
1. How social organizations in the United States are organized and practice 
democracy, and  
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2. How social organizations and government in the United States reflect one 
another. 
 
 At a minimum, a communication cadre threatens participatory democracy, 
democracy, representation, and accountability.  At a maximum, a communication cadre 
works against participatory democracy, democracy, representation, and accountability.  
The structural conditions that encourage a communication cadre to develop continue to 
exist and increase as the organization grows or ages.  It must be noted, however, that a 
communication cadre does not decrease organizational power and may, in fact, actually 
enhance organizational power. 
I hope that this dissertation challenges the reader to look at their ideas about 
government, democracy, and representation as they are practiced in the United States of 
America.  The reader should not interpret this challenge as condemning or endorsing 
American government or political and social life.  Rather, the reader should use the ideas 
and argument in the following pages to help them define what representation, democracy, 
and government means for them. 
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CHAPTER 2 
The Communication Cadre, Leadership, and Co-Optation 
“It is organization which gives birth to the 
domination of the elected over the electors, of the 
mandataries over the mandators, of the delegates 
over the delegators.  Who says organizations says 
oligarchy.”  Robert Michels in Political Parties 
(p72) 
 
 
How do organizational leaders become entrenched and unreflective of their 
constituency’s beliefs?  If the control of communication and information is so central to 
political power, then why are certain professions, like administrative assistants or 
registered nurses, not acknowledged as powerful political players more often?  What is 
co-optation and how does it occur?  Why should scholars and laypersons be concerned 
with these issues?  My research offers answers to these questions by focusing on who 
controls communication and information networks within an organization and with 
outside organizations.  Furthermore, I will demonstrate that key concepts in the field are 
conceptually stretched.35  The terms “co-optation, cooperation, and representation,” are 
stretched because they include aspects of one another.   
The relationship between entrenched leaders, their control of communication, and 
their co-optation is repeatedly alluded to in personal discussions I've had with organizers 
and group members.  A cursory examination of the literature on advocacy groups for the 
disadvantaged supports this relationship between entrenched leaders, their co-optation, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 Sartori 1970, 1984 
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and their control of communication.36  This chapter identifies the critical role that the 
control of communication plays in the development of oligarchy and the manifestation of 
co-optation.  Specifically, I am proposing a mid-range theory that will link the iron law of 
oligarchy, network theory, and the concept of co-optation.  I call my conceptualization 
the Communication Cadre Theory.   
Through the use of critical case studies, the dissertation focuses on my theory that 
leaders rise to power and stay in power by controlling communication and information 
networks and that this creates an atmosphere conducive for co-optation. 37  I call my 
theory the communication cadre theory. 
 
The Communication Cadre Theory 
 Let's assume that as a Group A develops and communicates or engages in pact-
making with other groups, a small circle of individuals develops within Group A that 
gains control over Group A by controlling internal and external communication and 
information networks.  I call this small circle of individuals the communication cadre 
and they comprise the most influential leaders in Group A.  The communication cadre 
entrenches itself by maintaining control of communication and information networks.  
The communication cadre may or may not be the official leadership of elected or 
appointed leaders, because their power is derived from the control of communication and 
information and not an election or appointment.  Consequently, the communication 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36  Rudolfo Acuna, Occupied America: A History of Chicanos, New York: Harpers and Row Publishers, 
1988.  Ruth Berins Collier and David Collier, Shaping the Political Arena, Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1991.  Francis Fox Piven and Richard Cloward, Poor Peoples' Movements: Why They Succeed and 
How They Fail, New York: Vintage, 1977.   
37  Co-optation is defined in the following section titled Conceptualizing Co-Optation. 
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cadre’s identity may or may not be known or realized by Group A’s members or official 
leadership.   
 The development of a communication cadre results in a favorable environment for 
Group A to be co-opted by a given Group B, if Group B desires to co-opt Group A and 
possesses the resources to use patronage or force to co-opt Group A's communication 
cadre.  Group B seeks to co-opt Group A's communication cadre when Group A can 
potentially, or in reality, opposes Group B's policies.  A favorable environment for co-
optation exists, because Group A’s communication cadre are the only people who need to 
be co-opted, because they control Group A through their control of communication and 
information.   
 The communication cadre exerts their greatest influence on Group A by 
controlling what information members receive and what is communicated to and from 
outside groups.  Group A's communication cadre may be co-opted by Group B, if Group 
B can offers more resources than Group A to Group A's leaders.  For example, the 
resources Group B might offer include jobs, higher wages, insurance benefits, capital, 
security, or social standing.  A favorable environment for co-optation exists, because 
Group A's communication cadre is positioned to accept patronage without Group A’s 
members finding out.  Consequently, the communication cadre decreases their 
accountability to Group A’s members, because they may prevent or limit the information 
that Group A’s members receive. 
 In the following section, I outline the close relationship between the 
communication cadre’s control of communication and information with an environment 
that is conducive for co-optation.  I then operationalize co-optation and begin to 
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conceptually separate the concepts of co-optation and cooperation, as well co-optation 
and representation. 
 
Conceptualizing Co-Optation 
 Co-optation is a normative property that occurs when a group's leaders move 
away from their founding ideology or the membership’s ideology and towards an 
opponent's ideology or goals for personal gain.  Co-optation occurs when these leaders 
remain in power and shift their organization's focus.  In this scenario, a policy shift for 
the organization may not be a political compromise reached by leaders, it may be co-
optation.  The group's leaders act in their personal interests and not in the organization's 
interests.  An environment conducive to co-optation exists in organizations, because an 
entrenched communication cadre controls communication and information, which 
reduces their political accountability to Group A’s members.   
 As previously stated, co-optation is used to decrease the threat a Group A poses to 
a given Group B's policies by bringing Group A under Group B's influence.  Group B 
seeks to co-opt Group A's leaders when Group A can potentially, or in reality, opposes 
Group B's policies.  Group A's leaders are the only people who need to be co-opted, 
because they control the organization.  In this scenario, Group A's leaders may be co-
opted, if Group B can offer more than Group A to Group A's communication cadre.   
 A successful co-optation relies on Group B's ability to use force or to selectively 
distribute resources to Group A's communication cadre and on Group A’s communication 
cadre’s ability to selectively distribute force or resources to their organization’s members.   
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 As Van de Walle and North have noted,  
 "The person or group in a position to hand out rewards for service or punishment 
for disobedience will control the political landscape.  When [elites] suppress labor 
demonstrations with force and provide... subsidies for unions that follow the 
party's platform [patronage is involved]."38 
 
And, 
 
“[Organizations] are perfectly analogous to the rules of the game in a competitive 
team sport…  They consist of formal written rules as well as typically unwritten 
codes of conduct that underlie and supplement formal rules…  the rules and 
informal codes are sometimes violated and punishments are enacted.  Therefore, 
an essential part of the functioning of institutions is the costliness of ascertaining 
violations and the severity of punishment.”39 
 
 Selectively distributing patronage is an attractive political option, because it is 
relatively cheap.  For example, in an employee union which advocates for employees 
who exist in a less powerful position vis a vis their employer, the union requires 
compulsory membership and selectively distributes benefits to their members, in order to 
overcome the dominant position an employer holds over an employee.40  Olson’s work 
acknowledges that the selective distribution of benefits (i.e. patronage) affects an 
individual’s actions.  The Communication Cadre Theory’s focus on co-optation extends 
Olson’s argument of selective benefits by operationalizing co-optation as an efficient 
method for affecting an oppositional organization, through the selective distribution of 
benefits.  The argument for operationalizing co-optation as a useful analytical tool 
acknowledges that a more powerful organization might use co-optation of a competing 
organization’s leaders as an efficient method for affecting the actions of the competing 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38  Van de Walle 2001   
39 North 1990   
 
40 See Chapter 3 of Olson 1971 
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organization.  In exchange for buying-off a handful of leaders, the communication cadre, 
the actions of an opposition group can be affected.  I contend that the presence or absence 
of patronage and co-optation must be accounted for when:    
 
1. A power differential exists between two or more players and one player changes 
their opinions or actions, or  
2. An organizational leader or communication cadre member changes their opinion 
or actions, which shifts an organization’s action 
 
 I also contend that the presence or absence of patronage and co-optation should be 
accounted for when a relatively little power differential exists between two or more 
players and one player changes their opinions or actions.  Patronage and co-optation are 
political tools and every person possesses resources that are of potential interest to 
another person.   
 Patronage and co-optation involve a stronger Group B selectively distributing 
benefits to a weaker Group A's representatives, so long as they support Group B's 
policies.  The representatives then control the distribution of resources to the members of 
their group who support them.  In a society experiencing shortages and where Group B 
controls the distribution of benefits unavailable to the general public, access to resources 
becomes tantamount and increases the likelihood of patronage and co-optation increases.  
When an individual, organization, or society is not experiencing shortages, the likelihood 
of patronage and co-optation decreases.   
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  Once a leader is co-opted by a stronger Group B, the weaker Group A is 
controlled through the selective distribution of resources or force.  Through patronage, a 
stronger Group B can selectively distribute limited resources to members of the 
communication cadre who do not create dissension with Group B's policies.  The 
communication cadre can then distribute the limited resources to their supporters.  Group 
B can also punish opponents in Group A by not distributing limited resources to them, or, 
Group B can use force to neutralize opponents.  A relatively efficient method for buying-
off the masses can then be institutionalized, because the cadre is positioned to enter the 
chain of patronage.  An examination of literature on the underclass indicates how elite 
groups selectively distribute benefits to supporters of their policies or use force to 
eliminate opposition.41  For these reasons, the presence of patronage indicates a favorable 
environment for co-optation.   
 
Operationalizing Co-Optation 
 Why should we be concerned with co-optation as a political concept and tool?  
Ideologically, co-optation is a powerful word, which is commonly used to describe 
organizations or individuals placing another party’s interests over their constituency’s 
interests.  In contrast, the 10th edition of Merriam Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary, the 
definition of co-opt is:  1a) to choose as a member, 1b) to appoint as a colleague or 
assistant, 2a) to take into a group, 2b) take over, appropriate.  The basic definition of co-
opt and how the term is commonly used have resulted in co-optation being confused with 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41  Key 1949b, Selznick 1966, Piven and Cloward 1977, Gaventa 1980, Carson 1981, Bridges 1984, 
Montejano 1987, Acuña 1988, Collier and Collier 1991  
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cooperation and representation.  I make co-optation a useful tool for analyzing how two 
groups or individuals relate by eliminating the confusion and overlap of co-optation with 
other concepts, such as cooperation and representation. 
The following conceptualization of co-optation expands Philip Selznick’s model 
of co-optation in TVA and The Grass Roots.42  His work represented the conceptual 
development of co-optation and, to date, no one has improved upon his model to make it 
a more useful analytical tool for looking at how individuals and organizations relate to 
one another.  The most recent work on the topic, by Robert C. Smith, uses Selznick’s 
same definition and model of co-optation.43  
 Selznick’s model of co-optation was limited to two types:  formal and informal 
co-optation.44  His categorization of co-optation was based on the power to make 
decisions and responsibility for the decisions made.45  According to Selznick’s model, co-
optation occurred when one organization absorbed new elements [i.e. new organizations] 
into its leadership or policy-making structure to avert threats against its stability or 
existence.  His conceptualization of co-optation defined two types of co-optation: formal 
and informal.  Formal co-optation indicated that an absorbed organization lacked power 
(i.e. it was not part of the central decision-making process), but it was still held 
responsible for the decisions made by the absorbing organization.  Informal co-optation 
indicated that an organization possessed power (i.e. it was part of the central decision-
making process), but was not held responsible for decisions made.  By conceptualizing 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42 Selznick 1966 
 
43 Smith 1996 
 
44 Selznick 1966 
 
8 Selznick originally operationalized power as the “capability” to make decisions. 
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co-optation in this manner, his model resulted in a duality where only a single actor can 
possess power and no responsibility, while the other actor must possess no power and 
bear all of the responsibility (see Table A).   
 
TABLE A.  SELZNICK’S MODEL OF CO-OPTATION 
FORMAL CO-OPTATION INFORMAL CO- OPTATION 
No Power & Responsibility For Actions Power & No Responsibility For Actions 
 
 
Selznick argued that cooperation between organizations influenced all of the 
parties involved and that power differences between organizations affected how those 
groups cooperated and interacted.  By engaging in co-optation with external groups, 
organizations trade power in the decision-making process for the external group’s 
support.  The relationship and influence went both ways between the groups.  Selznick 
used the term co-optation to account for how organizations absorbed or were absorbed by 
other organizations and the dynamics this created.  Namely, whether an organization 
gained power in the relationship or was saddled with responsibility for decisions they did 
not make.  Unfortunately, he did not account for the different combinations of power and 
responsibility, or how relationships between organizations could be affected by public 
and official relationships or by private and unofficial relationships. 
If researchers use Selznick’s definition of co-optation, they face severe 
limitations.  Selznick’s definition of co-optation does not account for five important 
factors: 
 
1) The many ways that power and responsibility can combine, 
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2)  The role that publicized, official, and institutionalized rules for inter-
organizational relations play,  
3) The role that non-publicized and unofficial rules for inter-organizational 
relations play,   
4) How co-optation differs from cooperation and representation, and  
5) Individuals and organizations changing their ideology. 
 
By neglecting these five crucial features, Selznick’s definition of co-optation provides 
little more than a blunt tool to categorize if one group holds all of the decision making 
power and no responsibility for the decisions made, while the other group must possess 
no power and bear all the responsibility. 
To overcome the flaws in Selznick’s model, I define co-optation and develop 
methods for distinguishing between co-optation and cooperation or representation.  Co-
optation is a normative property that occurs when a group’s leader(s) moves away from 
the group’s founding ideology (or the position of the membership) and towards another 
individual’s or organization’s ideology or position for personal gain.  For example, Group 
A’s leader acts in his/her personal interests to accept a political compromise with another 
Group B.  In this scenario, the leader of Groups A’s actions are not a political 
compromise reached between two organizations, it is co-optation, because Group A’s 
leader acts on behalf of his/her personal interests and not in the interests of the 
organization or its membership.  In my model of co-optation, I distinguish between co-
optation and cooperation based on power in the decision making process, responsibility 
for decisions made, the presence of public, official, and /or institutionalized relations 
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between organizations, and individuals placing their interests above the group for 
personal gain.   
The presence or absence of power in the decision making process and 
responsibility for decisions made is important for establishing what occurs when two 
actors interact with one another and the consequences of that interaction.  Identifying the 
basis of power, who holds it, how they use it, and the consequences of how power is used 
or not used is central to the study of politics.  Responsibility establishes what the stakes 
are in political interactions by identifying who gains or looses from the exercise of 
power.  How power and responsibility are defined and used establish what the concepts 
of co-optation, cooperation and representation mean.  By defining power as the ability to 
make and enforce decisions and defining responsibility as the actor who bears 
responsibility for the decisions made and enforced, the foundation is established for 
distinguishing between co-optation, cooperation, and representation (see Table B).  
In my model, formal co-optation represents co-optation in the context of 
publicized, official, and/or institutionalized relations between organizations.  Informal 
co-optation, however, represents co-optation in the context of the lack of public, official, 
and institutionalized relations between organizations.  The need for two types of co-
optation is to contrast events and relationships that are both public and private, to help 
distinguish between an illusion and reality.  By conceptualizing co-optation in this 
manner, it is possible to have a relationship between actors categorized under both a 
formal and informal relationship that may or may not be the same.  For example, a formal 
relationship where power is shared between actors and an informal relationship where 
power is not shared.  My model of co-optation in Diagram A accounts for this 
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possibility.  Please note all of my models of co-optation model the relationship between a 
Group A and a Group B. 
Method for Indentifying Formal and Informal Co-Optation 
1. There may be a formal relationship that is illusionary and an informal 
relationship that captures the real relationship between organizations. 
2. Start by looking for a formal relationship between organizations. 
3. Map the formal relationship. 
4. Use the formal relationship as a place to begin looking for an informal 
relationship between organizations. 
5. If a formal and an informal relationship between organizations are found, then 
the two types of relationships need to be compared to determine which 
relationship has the greatest effect. 
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DIAGRAM A.  MY CO-OPTATION DIAGRAM MODEL 
X = Responsibility for Decisions Made, 
Y = Power in the Decision-Making Process, 
Z = Formal and Informal Relationship (height) 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Power  
	  Level	  of	  
Formalization	  
Yes	   Formal	  
Cell	  #4	   Cell	  #1	    Responsibility Yes	  No	  	   Cell	  #3	   Cell	  #2	  
No	  	  	  Informal	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TABLE B.  MY TABLE MODEL OF COOPTATION46 
 
FORMAL CO-OPTATION 
No Power & Responsibility For Actions Power & Responsibility For Actions 
No Power & No Responsibility For  
Actions 
Power & No Responsibility For Actions 
 
 
INFORMAL CO-OPTATION 
No Power & Responsibility For Actions Power & Responsibility For Actions 
No Power & No Responsibility For  
Actions 
Power & No Responsibility For Actions 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46  Please note all of my models of co-optation model the relationship between a Group A and a Group B. 
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TABLE C.  DIFFERENTIATING BETWEEN CO-OPTATION and 
COOPERATION IN GROUP A’s RELATIONSHIP TO GROUP B47 
 
Cell #1 No Power-Responsibility 
“Group A The Co-opted” 
 
Co-optation because Group A does not have power 
in the decision-making process and bears 
responsibility for decisions Group A did not make. 
 
Not Cooperation because power is not shared in 
the decision-making process between Group A and 
Group B. 
 
Cell #2 Power-Responsibility 
“Group A The Co-opter?” 
 
Co-optation because Group A has taken all of 
Group B’s decision making power and accepted all 
of the responsibility for decisions made. 
 
Cooperation because Group A and Group B share 
decision-making power and responsibility for the 
decisions made. 
 
No Relationship between Group A and Group B, 
each group is autonomous. 
 
Cell #3 No Power-No Responsibility 
“Group A The Co-opted?” 
 
Co-optation Group A has been co-opted out of 
existence or barely exists. 
 
 
Not Cooperation because power and responsibility 
are not shared. 
 
No Relationship between Group A and B. 
 
Cell #4 Power-No Responsibility 
“Group A The Co-opter” 
 
Co-optation because Group A has decision-making 
power and Group B is forced to accept 
responsibility. 
 
Not Cooperation because responsibility is not 
shared for decisions made, Group B is forced to 
accept responsibility for the decisions made. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47  Please note all of my models of co-optation model the relationship between Group A to Group B. 
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 One of the main critiques leveled against the use of co-optation is that it does not 
adequately address how it differs from cooperation.  Selznick’s definition of co-optation, 
also, suffers from the same critique.  By not distinguishing between cooperation and co-
optation, researchers rely too heavily on their own biases to determine which term they 
use.   
Differentiating between co-optation and cooperation is difficult, but the following 
method aids the scholar to untangle the two concepts.  First, we must acknowledge that 
the two terms will encompass aspects of one another.  Second, we must acknowledge that 
co-optation and cooperation possess normative properties.  Third, we need to define how 
co-optation differs from cooperation.  What aspects are unique to co-optation and 
cooperation?  Co-optation is more likely when there is a power differential between 
groups or individuals interacting with one another and the likelihood of co-optation 
increases as the power difference between the groups increase.  We can further 
hypothesize that when an individual, organization, or society experiences shortages a 
more favorable environment for co-optation occurs.   
Co-optation differs significantly from compromise.  Table C models how to 
distinguish between co-optation and cooperation by using the presence of power and 
responsibility.  In TABLE C, Power represents power in the decision-making process, 
while Responsibility represents responsibility for the decisions made.  When two groups 
interact: 
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1. Cooperation can only occur in Cell #2 (power and responsibility) in TABLE C, 
where both groups share in making decisions and responsibility for those 
decisions.  
2. Co-optation can occur in any of the Cells in TABLE C. 
A. Co-optation is more likely to occur in Cell #1 (no power-responsibility) and 
Cell #3 (no power-no responsibility), both of which represent where Group A 
is cop-opted by Group B. 
B. Co-optation can, also, occur in Cell #2 (power and responsibility) and Cell #4 
(power and no responsibility), both of which represent where Group A co-
opts Group B.  
 
While more conceptual work needs to be done to distinguish “co-optation” from 
“cooperation.” In this section, I have outlined one method that begins to do this and 
which can serve as a basis for eliminating the conceptual stretching of these two terms.    
The method I use to distinguish co-optation from cooperation will serve as the basic 
framework to distinguish co-optation from the democracy and representation.   
 
 Theoretical Foundations 
 The communication cadre theory is based on the iron law of oligarchy and social 
network theory.  In this section I briefly review these two theoretical bases before 
explaining the communication and information components of the communication cadre 
theory and how they create an environment conducive for co-optation to occur.  Chapter 
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3 contains more in-depth analysis of the theoretical bases and theoretical implications of 
the Communication Cadre Theory.  
 
The Iron Law of Oligarchy 
 I draw upon two theories to develop the communication cadre theory, the iron law 
of oligarchy and social network theory.  In his book, Political Parties, Michels states that 
the roots of oligarchy exist in the necessity of organizations to delegate responsibility to a 
cadre of leaders.  The cadre then becomes the entrenched leadership of the organization,48 
because the oligarchic tendencies of organizations result from, 1) the nature of human 
individuals, 2) the nature of the political struggle, and 3) the nature of organization.49  
According to Michels, organizations give their leaders a near monopoly of power due to 
the leaders: 1) superior knowledge, 2) control over the formal means of communication 
within the organization, and 3) skill in the political arts.50  Over time, leaders use this 
power to become entrenched through a sense of tradition, cartel forming, and political 
influence.  Leaders are then in a position to manipulate or ignore the opinions of the 
group's members.51  Michels, also, identifies several key tendencies of organizations, 
among these are: the autocratic and conservative tendencies of leaders, organizational co-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48 Michels 1962 
49 Ibid. 
50 Ibid. 
51 Ibid. 
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optation by elites, the struggles between the leaders and the masses and among the 
leaders themselves, and the reasons for bureaucracies to centralize and decentralize.52 
 While Michels' book, Political Parties, is descriptive it does not provide a theory 
for how oligarchy occurs.  Furthermore, the polemical nature of the iron law of oligarchy 
limits its application and use.  By coupling social network theory's emphasis on social 
networks with the role of communication and information networks, a mechanism for 
oligarchy to occur that is theoretical, instead of polemical, provides a more useful and 
less dogmatic analytical tool. 
  
Social Network Theory 
 Network theory is the second basis for the development of the communication 
cadre theory.  Network theory argues that social, political, and economic relationships 
manifest themselves through networks.53  According to this theory, social networks 
determine key political paths and points of power between actors and groups.54  Social 
networks are important, because they structure the political landscape.  In the 
communication cadre theory, communication and information networks operate like 
social networks. 
 A group becomes dependent on a communication cadre (which controls 
communication between and within groups), because the cadre knows and has access to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52  Michels 1962   
53  Bridges 1984, Knoke 1990, Padgett and Ansell 1993 
54 Marsden 1982 
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the social and political structure.55  Therefore, the cadre is positioned to strongly 
influence a group's political direction by controlling the flow and content of 
communication and information.  Consequently, as the members of different groups 
interact less often, they rely more on communication cadres to manage their 
communication and information needs. 
  
Why Communication and Information? 
 The rise and entrenchment of group leaders depends on the control of 
communication and information for one important reason: whoever controls the flow and 
content of communication and information shapes opinions within the group they 
represent and the groups they interact with.  The communication cadre may provide full, 
incomplete, or false information to their organization and influence the decisions 
individuals and the group make.  The communication cadre is also in a position to portray 
themselves as indispensable communicators with other groups or within their 
organization.  Due to their control of communication, the cadre can blame other groups 
for personal failures or errors in deals between groups.  Furthermore, the communication 
cadre's importance increases as group members interact less often with other groups. 
 In organizations, the communication cadre always forms the group's leadership.  
The communication cadre and the group's leaders are the same, because organizational 
leaders provide the greatest influence on the actions of their membership.  The 
communication cadre, however, may or may not be the official organizational leadership 
of elected or appointed leaders, because the cadre’s power is derived from the control of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55 Bridges 1984, Padgett and Ansell 1993 
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communication and information and not an election or appointment.56  The researcher 
must determine if the communication cadre represents the official or unofficial 
leadership.  Consequently, the communication cadre’s identity may or may not be known 
or realized by Group A’s members or official leadership.  It is highly likely, though, that 
the communication cadre comprises their organization’s official leadership, because the 
organization usually entrusts their organization's leaders, through organizational rules, to 
engage in pact making and coalitions with other groups.  By controlling communication 
between their group and other groups, the communication cadre establishes relationships 
with other groups.  Over time, the cadre will see themselves as part of another group they 
communicate with, if that group is more privileged than their own, and begin to associate 
more with that group.57  Roberto Michels argues that this results from people's 
psychological need to feel important and to belong to a higher socio-economic standing 
(e.g. a cadre from a union identifies more with their employers).58  When two groups are 
equal, though, the cadre's members choose to associate and work for the group that can 
provide them with the most benefits or privileges.  
 The communication cadre theory integrates the iron law of oligarchy and social 
network theory.  Network theory's reliance on social networks, to explain political 
structures and who group leaders are, provides the mechanism for explaining why 
oligarchy develops.  The paper now moves on to discuss the creation and evolution of the 
communication cadre. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
56 Knoke 1996   
  
57 Ibid. 
58 Ibid. 
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Stabilizing the Communication Cadre  
 The communication cadre emerges over time and changes in response to four 
factors: 1) the organization's size and age, 2) increased relations between groups, 3) 
successive rounds of negotiations between groups, and 4) internal group conflict.  As it 
will be shown in the next paragraph, the four factors affect the communication cadre's 
size and change its composition.  Furthermore, the four factors influence each other.   
 For example, as an organization grows in size, the communication cadre may 
increase, remain the same, or decrease in size.  As the organization ages, however, the 
size of the communication cadre should decrease.  As it will be shown, the decrease 
results from the influence of increased relations between groups, successive rounds of 
negotiations, and internal group conflict.  While internal group conflict may yield an 
increase in the amount of communication cadre members, the increase will be temporary 
as one communication cadre replaces another or an individual displaces and replaces a 
communication cadre member.  Increased relations and negotiations between groups 
influence the communication cadre's size and composition.  The cadre decreases because 
official meetings and relations between two groups are simplified when fewer people are 
involved (i.e., transaction costs are decreased).  Two reasons account for this 
phenomenon.  First, a group might develop bureaucratically to where increased 
specialization decreases the communication cadre, or other groups may insist on a 
decrease in the communication cadre to facilitate inter-group meetings.   
 Internal group conflict, also, accounts for the communication cadre's change in 
size and composition.  Internal group conflict occurs between group leaders with their 
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group members and other group leaders.59  The conflict between group members and 
leaders occurs because the group can use their collective strength to dismiss leaders who 
do not represent their interests.  The conflict of interests usually centers on the leaders 
being more conservative than the group.  Very rarely, though, the conflict of interests 
may rest on the leaders being more radical than the group.  While intra-group conflict 
may temporarily increase the communication cadre's size, due to conflict negotiation and 
resolution, the long-term result is a decrease in the cadre's size as both factions struggle 
to control the organization.   
 The conflict among leaders begins during the foundation of an organization, when 
leaders struggle to gain and retain control of the organization.  As an organization 
becomes established, the communication cadre is developed and oligarchy is established.  
The struggle at this stage occurs between entrenched leaders and new, aspiring leaders.  It 
is through intra-group conflict that the group's members exert their greatest influence.  
The struggle between entrenched and aspiring leaders forces them to meet the needs of 
the masses, in order to gain political power and support.  True representation will not be 
realized, however, because the structure and conditions that gave rise to the prior cadre's 
misrepresentation continues to exist.  An environment conducive for co-optation and 
manipulation, as outlined in the next subsection, continues to exist and threatens 
representation. 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59  Michels 1962  
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Methodology 
Critical Case Studies 
 The critical case study method was chosen to rigorously test the communication 
cadre theory.  By choosing case studies that logically contradict the theory’s assumptions 
and critical components, if the data supports the theory, then a strong argument exists that 
the theory applies in other cases.  Once the theory passes or fails the critical tests, further 
theoretical testing using other methods may be used to test the theory’s validity.   
 Three critical case studies that challenged the communication cadre theory’s basic 
assumptions and components were chosen.  The testing method required determining the 
theory’s assumptions and critical components, in order to decide which case studies 
posed critical tests.  The theory argued that a cadre controls communication and 
information flows.  Consequently, organizations that claimed no cadres controlled 
communication and information flows posed an initial critical test.  Organizations 
without hierarchical structures posed another critical challenge.  Without elected or 
appointed positions responsible for running the organizations or managing 
communication and information, no corresponding cadres can exist.  Organizations with 
small, highly active members, should limit the free rider problem and the “exploitation of 
the strong by the weak.”60  The case studies came from the Midwest, a region commonly 
considered to be less corrupt than other regions of the country.61 
 Consequently, the case studies selected fit the following criteria:   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
60 Olson 1971 
 
61  Chicago was eliminated from the areas of study.  Consequently, Illinois was eliminated. 
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1. Organizations where no individual(s) controlled communication and information 
within the organization, 
2. Organizations with no hierarchical structures,  
3. Organizations dedicated to participatory democracy, 
4. Small organizations with less than 20 members,  
5. Highly active member participation, and 
6. Located in a midwestern state where politics are commonly perceived to be less 
corrupt than other regions of the country. 
 
Identifying Critical Studies 
 Identifying organizations, which met the critical case study criteria, framed the 
data collection.  The search for critical case studies occurred in a major midwestern 
metropolitan area where established and new community contacts identified potential 
case studies.  I contacted professors who specialized in local politics, unions, and 
community organizing, as well as grassroots leaders and members of community non-
profits and neighborhood organizations from the area.  The people contacted were 
familiar with a large and diverse group of organizations spanning different races, 
ethnicities, and genders.62   
 Community contacts received a brief presentation about the dissertation’s topic, 
as well as the case study selection criteria.  The community contacts and I then discussed 
the research topic in greater detail, before they recommended organizations and provided 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
62 To protect the confidentiality of the people I interviewed, specific information that might identify them 
or their organization was deleted. 
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me with the organizations’ contact information.  I received permission to use the 
community contacts as references.   
 I contacted the recommended organizations, told them who referred me, and 
briefly described my research.  I answered any questions the organizational contact had 
and verified that the organization met the selection criteria.  Organizations that self-
identified themselves as not having a hierarchical structure or not having a person, 
persons, or office controlling or handling communication and information were 
questioned further to verify this information.  Several potential organizations were 
eliminated after further questioning, because a Board of Directors governed them.  
Finally, three organizations were identified that met the selection criteria.   
 The three organizations chosen as critical case studies were the Mexican 
American Employee Organization (MAO); United Labor Activists (ULA), a group 
composed of labor activists; and Northstar (Nstar), a small business collective.  The 
selected organizations were chosen for four reasons.  The organizations met the critical 
case study selection criteria.  The organizations shared similarities in their interest of 
promoting labor issues, worker equality, fair wages, improved working conditions, and 
eliminating on the job discrimination.  The organizations granted me access to interview 
their members.  Finally, my connections to leaders and members of organized labor, 
diverse racial and ethnic communities, the non-profit sector, and local communities 
provided a basis for the people interviewed to trust me and aided to increase the response 
rate.   
 For each case study, confidential interviews were conducted with as many of the 
organizations’ members as possible.  The case studies then discussed their participation 
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in my research among their membership and consented to participate in the research 
study.63  I then confidentially interviewed the organizations’ members. 
 The interview questions were highly structured to ask different thematic questions 
about a person’s background, work environment, organization, organizing tactics, 
personal and group views, leadership, conflict, as well as communication and information 
flows.64  Due to differences in the work shifts and personal activities of group members, I 
scheduled all interviews at the most convenient time and location possible for each 
interviewee.  For two case studies, I conducted telephone interviews of two members per 
organization to increase the response rate.  Northstar had a participation rate of 100% (6 
of 6 members).  United Labor Activists had a response rate of 80% (12 of 15 members), 
while the Mexican American Employee Organization had a participation rate of 75%  (12 
of 16 members). 
 
Identifying Communication Networks 
Communication Cadres, Leaders, and Co-Optation uses a method common in 
network theory for determining communication and information flows between 
individuals in organizations, as well as determining who occupies peripheral and central 
positions within communication networks.  To determine the structure of the 
communication and information networks in the case studies, I interviewed 
organizational members using semi-structured interviews.  A central interview theme was 
asking who group members interacted and communicated with, i.e. whom they talked 	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with and who talked with them.  The communication network was then constructed using 
confirmed communication relationships, i.e. both the person receiving and the person 
giving the information agreed on the type of relationship.65  Furthermore, when possible, 
information was collected on exchange offers that organizational members did not accept 
for their cooperation or service.66    
The most important determinant of network power is not the official or public 
position of the person involved, rather a person’s ability to exert greater control over the 
behavior of another determines a person’s power.67  Consequently, this dissertation uses 
the concepts of formal and informal to acknowledge that other political actors play a role 
in the political arena, than those with official titles.  The terms formal and official, as well 
as informal and unofficial are used interchangeably. 
 
Conclusions 
 My dissertation breaks new ground on issues of representation and accountability that 
have been ignored in the American sub-field.  First, my research advances the current 
work on social capital to highlight how issues of representation and accountability need 
to be addressed between the government of society’s organizations and the government 
of the United States.  Second, I test the critical importance that communication and 
information play as a political resource for organizational leaders to gain and stay in 
power.  Third, I clarify why some professions (e.g. administrative assistants and 
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registered nurses) have considerable access to information and possess crucial roles in 
organizational communication, but are seldom acknowledged in the political science 
literature as powerful political players.  I refer to this problem as the “Secretary 
Question?”  The key questions to answer here is why and under what conditions do 
individuals (e.g. administrative assistants) employ or not employ their political power, 
which is based on their access to and control of information and communication.  Fourth, 
my research has huge implications for the study of democracy, representation, 
participatory democracy, and social capital.  The communication cadre raises the issue 
that most people participate in less than democratic institutions.  If democracy is based on 
how citizens participate in society and democratic institutions, then democracy faces stiff 
challenges.  Fifth, the concept of co-optation has been overlooked and neglected in 
scholarly research for too long.  The result has been key terms in the study of politics 
have been conceptually stretched (e.g. co-optation, cooperation, representation, and 
democracy).  The conceptual stretching of the previous terms obscures their meanings 
and analysis that rely on them. 
 
Implications for Labor, Community, and Advocacy Groups  
 The Communication Cadre Theory proposes that communication networks are 
mechanisms for the development of oligarchy in organizations and create an environment 
conducive for co-optation.  Throughout the process of supporting the communication 
cadre theory, a question continually lingers in the background, “To what extent can 
democracy and representation exist in the presence of communication cadres?” 
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 The Communication Cadre Theory provides a substantial explanation for the lack 
of greater political power by labor, community, and advocacy groups.  The theory 
explained how leaders come to power in labor, community, and advocacy groups and 
why oligarchy and a favorable environment for co-optation develop.  The communication 
cadre theory accounts for why elite groups seek to co-opt labor, community, and 
advocacy groups, why leaders are in a position to be co-opted, and the various methods 
elite groups use to accomplish co-optation.  The relationship between the control of 
communication, leaders, oligarchy, and co-optation must be understood for an 
organization to avoid oligarchy and co-optation.  If labor, community, and advocacy 
groups want to prevent leaders from "selling them and their goals down the river," 
opening the communication and information process within the organization and with 
outside organizations is essential. 
 The huge normative concern with this research is the need for labor, community, 
and advocacy groups to implement organizational rules that insure a communication 
cadre does not develop.  The alternative is to follow a strong, charismatic leader and risk 
the danger that a successful organization will terminate or become unsuccessful with the 
leader's co-optation or departure.  The implementation of rules that prevent a 
communication cadre from developing will aid an organization or movement in 
maintaining their goals.  For example, rotating leaders and communicators cultivates new 
leaders who will (hopefully) stay true to the organization's or movement's ideals and 
goals. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
Assessing the Literature and the Field 
 
“In reality men of ability, and substance, and of 
sharp wit assume leadership and manage the affairs 
of the state with the consent, with the tolerance, or 
simply by the acquiescence of those who have to 
earn a living and cannot afford to devote their time 
to politics.”  V.O. Key’s, Southern Politics (p489)  
 
 
 
Certain studies of political parties offer insights into organizational behavior.  
V.O. Key offer us insight into the why organizations behave the way they do.  V.O. 
Key’s classic study of Southern politics provides great insights into the behavior of 
southern political parties.  Do organizations that are organized against a particular 
interest, organization, or institution face a similar problem that V.O. Key noticed in 
Southern Politics?68  Namely, that the organization prioritizes unity towards a particular 
goal over all others.  A priority that results in the leadership viewing any dissension from 
the party line as a threat to the organization’s leadership and organization, a point 
supported in research on organizations and social movements across time, regions, and 
countries.69  V.O. Key concluded that the two faces of the Old South’s politics were its 
relation to the United States and state intra-party competition.  In a manner-of-speaking, 
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when organizations are aligned against a particular interest, do they react like the 
traditional political party system of the Old South and view unity as the priority?  
The communication cadre theory helps us in identifying processes that occur within 
organizations. 70  
 
1. The identification of organizational problems through members and leaders 
demands for action, 
2. The formulation of solutions through policy initiation and development, 
3. The legitimation of those policies, 
4. The implementation of the chosen policies by the organization, and  
5. The evaluation of the implemented policies by organizational leaders and 
members.  
 
We will now focus on identifying processes within organizations and the role 
organizational members, leaders, and the communication cadre have.  Organizational 
processes and members are looked at from the perspective of the Communication Cadre 
Theory, organizational studies, elitism, pluralism, hegemony, social network theory, 
social capital, and rational choice.  Thomas R. Dye’s work points to the overwhelming 
constraints that economic environmental conditions exert at the macro level, which affect 
the options available at the micro level of organizations and individuals.71  While the 
field is filled with scholars who argue that macro level conditions at the international and 
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national level influence the opportunities, actions, and outcomes available to a nation’s 
inhabitants,72 the work often ignores the role and influence of the individual.73 
 
Organizational Studies 
 The Communication Cadre Theory builds upon organizational studies and 
informs organizational studies.  The Communication Cadre Theory focuses on 
organizations for the macro and micro reasons listed in Chapter 1: Introduction.  
Briefly stated, micro observations by this researcher and conversations with members of 
activists organizations directed attention to how the control of communication and 
information flows effected the actions of organizations and their members.  I then took 
the next step and looked at what the control of communication and information at the 
individual and organizational level revealed about behavior at the societal and social 
institutional level.  As I moved from a micro to a macro perspective, the following 
question emerged.  If a democratic government and a democratic society are mutually 
reinforcing and reflective,74 then what conclusions can be drawn from how society 
practices democracy with how that society practices government? 
Historically, the importance of studying organizations result from their prevalence 
in society; the dominance of organizations over important societal functions from the 
family to the economy; the criticisms that increasing organization leads to negative 
consequences and unanticipated consequences; and, finally, to the organization as a 
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political actor.75  While organizations come in a wide range of sizes, shapes, and 
characteristics, overall, organizations share common characteristics.76  For purposes of 
this dissertation, I define organizations as social structures created by people to support 
the pursuit of common goals.  The definition of organizations results in a common set of 
problems for groups to overcome.  First, members of an organization must define their 
goal or goals.  Second, the organization must persuade their members to participate.  
Third, the organization must control and coordinate the contribution of their members.  
Fourth, the organization must get resources from the environment it operates in and 
dispense a product for its members.  Fifth, people who participate in the organization 
must be selected, trained, and replaced.  Sixth, the organization needs to determine its 
relationship to other organizations and individuals outside of the group.77  The case 
studies chosen for Communication Cadres, Leaders, and Co-Optation (the title of this 
dissertation), met these common characteristics to qualify as case studies.   
 Different levels of analysis are employed in this dissertation.  I primarily use 
structural and ecological approaches for the analysis of the data.  I am interested in the 
structural features that describe how communication and information networks operate in 
organizations.  The subsequent impacts these communication and information networks 
exert on how organizations relate to other organizations comprise the ecological 
approach.  To a lesser extent, the consequences that communication and information 
networks cause for members of organizations encompass individual behavior.   
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 Many methods exist for identifying the elements of organizations.  For purposes 
of this dissertation, I am using the elements that W. Richard Scott uses in Organizations: 
Rational, Natural, and Open Systems.78  Social structures, participants, goals, technology, 
and environment are the five different elements of organizations.  Social structures are 
broken down into formal and informal structures.  Scott identifies formal structures as the 
relationship between explicitly specified positions independent of the personal 
characteristics of the person holding that position.  He, also, identifies informal structures 
as the inability to distinguish the individual characteristics of the position holder and the 
characteristics of the positions.  My definition of formal and informal is slightly different.  
I argue throughout this dissertation that formal structures are clearly defined, like Scott 
does, and that these structures are publicly known.  Informal structures, however, are not 
publicly known.   
 Participants, i.e. organizational members, contribute to an organization in return 
for inducements.  The impact different organizational members’ exert on their 
organization vary from person to person and from organization to organization.  An 
awareness shared by organizational members that their organization exists to achieve a 
desired purposes comprises the organizational goals.  An organization’s technology 
encompasses the skills and knowledge of its members, as well as the physical and 
mechanical inputs, that are used to support the organization and help the organization 
achieve its goals.  The organizational environment acknowledges the larger system the 
organization and its members exist in.   
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Rational Systems View 
 Simon’s theory of organizational decision-making argues that a formal structure 
exists to support rational decision-making organizational members make.79  The formal 
structure separates member responsibilities and provides members with the resources, 
information, and tools necessary to make decisions.  This model of organizational 
decision-making emphasizes the unobtrusive control of participants by teaching and 
controlling information and attention that play a larger role in producing dependable 
behavior than orders, rewards, or punishments.80  By controlling the information 
organizational members receive and directing their attention, the options an 
organization’s members may choose between become restricted.  The process resembles 
the mobilization of bias (to be discussed shortly), wherein power relations and structures 
limit the choices an organization and its members may address.81  As it will be shown in 
proceeding sections of this chapter, the mobilization of bias provides one mechanism for 
a communication cadre to direct and limit the power of organizational members.   
 Simon’s work represents the rational systems view of organizations, which views 
organizations as highly formalized groups in the pursuit of specific goals.82  Under this 
view, goal specificity provides unambiguous criteria for members to select alternatives 
for action and formalization provides standards regulating the behavior of organizational 
members.  Other scholars representative of this view include Max Weber and the early 	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work of James G. March (with Simon), 83 which incorporated the idea of bounded 
rationality.84  
 Several criticisms challenge the rational systems view of organizations.85  The 
definition of rationality is limited, as it is in rational choice theory.  Rationality exists so 
long as clear criteria exist for making decisions and exterior environmental forces, which 
effect individual decision-making by structuring the value systems they base their 
decisions on, are ignored.86  The rational system’s approach focuses on the normative 
belief that organizations must focus on goal specificity and formal rules governing 
behavior, while ignoring the role of individual behavior.  The possibility that individuals 
or groups might develop and reinforce hierarchies for personal gain does not enter into 
their analysis of organizations.  
 The rational systems view of organizations corresponds with the functionalist 
period of social inquiry.  Both of the preceding views, hold that the roles of individuals 
and exterior variables do not effect an organization or its parts, as much as the structure 
and function of the organization being studied or the organization’s substructures.  The 
consequence of such a view led to the belief that people follow rules blindly, an idea that 
has become unacceptable today.  Even the Structuralist School, which intellectually grew 
from the early Functionalist School, does not take such a narrow view of what 
independent variables affect the dependent variable. 
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 The Communication Cadre Theory does not hold such a limited view of what 
variables influence the actions of individuals, organizations, and institutions.  In the 
preceding chapter, Chapter 2, the Communication Cadre Theory lays out how an 
exterior environment influences how organizations and organizational members act.  The 
Communication Cadre Theory, also, does not focus on the normative at the expense of 
the behavioral, it does both.   
 
Natural Systems View 
Moving from the rational systems view, the natural systems view offers a 
different perspective on organizations.  The natural systems view emphasizes goal 
complexity, the behavioral or individual role, the belief that organizations seek to 
survive, acknowledges the existence and role of informal networks, and the internal 
organizational need to induce individuals to participate.87   
Stated goals are not the only goals an organization may have, nor are they the 
only goals that organizational members believe in or work towards.  The natural systems 
view recognizes that a difference exists between the public or official goals and the actual 
goals the organization or members of the organization pursue.  Even when the 
organization and its members pursue the public goals, other goals still influence 
members’ actions.  In the open systems view, members of organizations may form 
personal hierarchies for power or pursue an individual goal that differs from the 
organization’s goal.  Consequently, their behavior reflects these different possibilities.  
For example, a political entrepreneur may desire to shift his/her college from being a co-	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educational facility to an exclusively women’s college and act to gain the power and 
influence to change his/her college’s mission.  Conversely, an employee of a small 
company may seek to work as little as possible and do the minimal amount of work 
possible.   
The Communication Cadre Theory incorporates the variables identified by the 
natural systems view as influencing the actions of individuals, organizations, and 
institutions.  In the preceding chapter, Chapter 2, the Communication Cadre Theory lays 
out how these variables influence how organizations and organizational members act.  
The Communication Cadre Theory, also, does not focus on the normative at the expense 
of the behavioral, it does both.   
Of related interest, is the organizational need to survive.  Many scholars explained 
this by accounting for how and why so much organizational behavior and resources are 
directed at the organization’s administrative functions.88  Perrow explains this with a 
functional analysis that organizations have needs that must be filled in order to survive.89  
Reaching further back in the literature, Robert Michels argues that some organizational 
members have a vested interested in the organization’s survival, because it is their source 
of economic, political, or social power.  Consequently, these members will place the 
survival of the organization as their primary, personal goal and act accordingly.90   
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Identifying Organizational Problems 
 What are the opinions and ideology of an organization’s membership?  Does an 
organization’s membership elect members who represent them and their views?  How 
does one determine what the opinions and ideology of the rank-and-file are?  Are non-
majoritarian views protected or enacted?  The answer to these questions brings us once 
again to the competing schools of elitism and pluralism.  Several influential and 
controversial studies have attempted to answer the previous questions from the level of 
the individual to the level of nations.  While it is not the goal of this dissertation to 
explore the entire literature that addresses the previous questions, a sampling of relevant 
literature will be done.   
In Communication Cadres, Leaders, and Co-optation, I address three macro 
points.  First, how individuals organize and govern themselves in small organizations.  
Second, how these organizations reflect society and government; and, finally, how 
society relates to government.  In essence, this dissertation explores the implications of 
how social organizations in the United States practice democracy with how the federal 
system of U.S. government practices democracy.    
The macro concerns of Communication Cadres, Leaders, and Co-optation 
emerged from initial micro observations of how organizational leaders communicate 
information to their followers in both large bureaucratic organizations and very small 
organizations practicing participatory democracy.  I noticed a recurring pattern, in which, 
organizational leaders selectively presented organizational members that included and 
excluded information and available alternatives.  In studying the history of social 
movements and unions, I began to see references by both leaders of organizations and the 
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rank-and-file that pointed to their experiences with similar occurrences.91  Consequently, 
I argue that organizational leaders rise to power and stay in power by controlling 
communication and information flows, which creates an environment conducive for co-
optation to occur.   
Critical case studies of three small organizations with politically experienced 
members dedicated to participatory democracy and open communication and information 
flows test the argument.  The critical case studies do more than test the theory; they allow 
us to see the ideals of democracy and political participation put to work and to move from 
microanalysis to macroanalysis. 
 We can view the process of identifying problems in and by organizations as 
similar to the identification of public policy problems.  Elitism and pluralism offer 
competing views on whether public opinion drives public policy.  Elitists believe a small 
group of elites in various sectors drive public policy92 or believe a smaller group of elites 
shape public opinion through their control of the mass media.93  Pluralists argue that the 
many varied interests of the public help shape public policy through the multiple 
channels available to the public.  Furthering complicating this issue is the ongoing debate 
between the methodological individualists and the structuralists about how much control 
individuals exert over their behavior and their environment.94     
Determining the relationship between public opinion and public policy becomes 
further complicated when competing studies provide contradictory conclusions or no 	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conclusion.  V.O. Key, Jr. argued about the difficulty of determining if public opinion 
drives public policy, because we cannot determine if public opinion shaped public policy 
or public policy shaped public opinion.95  To quote Key, “perfect congruence between 
public policy and public opinion could be government of public opinion rather than 
government by public opinion.”96  Key’s statement points to the difficulty of determining 
the causal relationship between public policy and public opinion.  Since Key published 
his findings in 1967, before substantial consolidation in the mass media,97 arguments for 
the media’s independence and ability to remain unbiased find less and less support.   
The identification of problems and their possible solutions are the most important 
part of the policy-making process.  In an ideal democratic society, the population would 
know all of the problems and the range of solutions that they are facing.  Considering the 
many possible problems that face a society and the combined range of solutions, the 
sheer number of possibilities precludes a person from being fully informed.  In such a 
reality, the determination of what problems and solutions will be considered and 
publicized to the greater society becomes of critical importance.   
In a diverse society, such as the United States of America, the multiplicity of 
organized interests is daunting, even without considering the even greater number of 
unorganized interests.  The multiplicity of problems and solutions makes the greatest 
challenge facing organized interests one of getting their problem on the agenda of policy 
makers of problems to be solved.  If a problem never reaches the agenda setting stage, the 
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likelihood of that problem gaining enough public attention to be forced onto the agenda is 
unlikely.  People of color labored for centuries to have their lack of political, economic, 
and civil rights addressed by a political and economic system that ignored their concerns.  
Only after major social movements by these groups and their supporters reached critical 
levels of support and action, which threatened the dominant social order, were their 
concerns addressed.98  As Jack Walker and Michael Lipskey argued, it took major social 
movements to break the society’s logjams and start the process of change,99 a process that 
resulted in the concerns of racial and ethnic minorities being put on the agenda of 
problems to be addressed. 
According to the pluralist view, any problem may be discussed and placed on the 
policy-making agenda at any of the various levels of our federal system.  Individuals and 
groups are free to organize themselves and define their issues.  After they define their 
issues they are free to mobilize support for their issue and press government from the 
local to the national level to have their issues addressed.  Several scholars even define the 
lack (of success?) of such political activity as an indicator of satisfaction, ignoring such 
historical evidence as the Populist Movement, the Civil Rights Movement, the American 
Indian Movement, or the internment of Japanese Americans during World War II.  
Researchers often conveniently forgot historical examples of racial and ethnic minority 
groups or groups of the working-class and the poor petitioning for their unmet policy 
needs in the streets through so-called Bread Riots or the withholding of their labor.100 
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The power to decide what problem will be put on the agenda to be addressed is 
crucial to the policy-making process.  As Schattsneider argued in The Semi-sovereign 
People, the ability to define the alternative is the supreme instrument of power, because 
the definition of the alternatives is the choice of conflicts that allocates power.101  The 
ability to determine the agenda, referred to as the mobilization of bias, is of tremendous 
significance and political power.  The main power of the mobilization of bias lies in the 
ability to keep particular issues from being discussed as policy problems at the political 
decision-making levels of local to national government.102   
Bachrach and Baratz refer to results of the mobilization of bias as non-decision 
making.  “A non-decision… is a decision that results in the suppression or thwarting of 
latent or manifest challenge to the values and interests of the decision-maker.”103 They 
refer to the method of non-decisions as the suppression of demands to alter the current 
system of benefits and privileges.  The method relies on preventing discontent from being 
publicized to the general population or governing body.  If the issue is voiced, the goal is 
one of keeping it suppressed or weakening it in the decision-making stages or 
implementation stage.104  The famous parliamentary maneuvers of tabling an issue, 
filibustering, or assigning the issue to committee provide classic examples of suppressing 
an issue, while using the power of the purse-strings to undercut policy implementation or 
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eliminating the policy’s enforcement provide two classic parliamentary maneuvers to 
sabotage policy implementation.105   
 Non-decision making, also, occurs when dominant elites or subordinants act 
openly or privately to stem an issue.  The motivation for this behavior by dominant elites 
is that if attention is focused on the issue, than something might be done that will not be 
in their best interests.106  In the case of subordinants, the results are seen in self-
censorship, because the subordinants fear that if they bring up an issue, than an elite who 
holds power over them will react in a punishing way towards the subordinants.  An 
example of this, are employees who are afraid to unionize or voice their support of 
unionizing, because they fear retaliation by their employer.107  In the case of journalist, 
Michael Parenti writes about how and why journalists censor themselves.108 
 Pluralists argue that the interest group system provides the means for how issues 
are identified, which solutions are offered, and what policies are adopted.  The 
predominant literature in the field argues, however, that the political system responds 
better to organized, large-scale groups with good access to financial resources and 
government officials.109  Schattsneider noted, the interest group system works, but it has a 
definite upper-class accent.110 
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The recent work of Richard Hall on lobbying as legislative subsidy,111 however, 
notes that relatively small groups with limited resources have been much more successful 
in having their issues addressed than the literature on the mobilization of bias and 
hegemony predicts or can account for.112  Lobbying as legislative subsidy refers to 
lobbyists subsidizing the work of legislators by providing resources and aid to a legislator 
in exchange for a legislators support.  Furthermore, while the process might be corrupt, 
the individual is not corrupt.   
The work of Adams and Balfour contradicts and clearly lays out how the 
argument that bureaucracy protects a bureaucratic member from culpability of the wrongs 
perpetrated by the bureaucracy are false.113Adams and Balfour 1998  The 
Communication Cadre Theory argues that organizational tendencies for a communication 
cadre to control communication and information flows exist, but communication cadre 
members are not individually absolved of their responsibility and accountability to their 
organization.  Within organizations, I take the position that the political process merely 
enhances an individual’s nature toward placing their own interests above the group they 
represent.   
 Richard Hall’s argument lays out several logical possibilities and, depending on 
your experience or background, several counterintuitive arguments to explain several 
persistent problems in the field of American politics.  Namely, that money does and does 
not matter when it comes to influencing the behavior of the Legislature.  His theory goes 
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a long way towards explaining the relationship between lobbyists and legislatures, but the 
dilemma remains that lobbyists make contributions to members of the Legislature who 
are neutral (at best) or who are antagonistic (at worst) towards the lobbyist’s position.  A 
solution for this dilemma is found in the theoretical work of this dissertation that supports 
some of Rick Hall’s arguments, while contradicting several others. 
Lobbying as legislative subsidy seeks to account for why lobbyists apply their 
resources to their strongest supporters and not swing votes or opponents.  Yes, lobbyists 
give more money and support to their strongest supporters, but it might not be just for the 
marshalling of a lobbyist’s supporters.  According to the Communication Cadre Theory, 
lobbyists give money to those who are neutral or even antagonistic to their position, 
because they are searching to see who may be interested in moving towards the lobbyist’s 
position.  Anyone who accepts money could be flagged as a new legislator who is testing 
the possibility for a positive relationship with the lobbyist.  In my work, the process of 
providing limited money to those who are neutral or opposed to one’s position occurs to 
determine who can be co-opted under the guise of support.   
What about trust and compromise?  Yes, there is a need for trust and compromise, 
but the co-optation and compromise intersect, as laid out in Chapter 2.  The overlap of 
compromise and co-optation provides opportunities for both sides to co-opt the other 
through the leverage.   
Hall does not incorporate how money or other political resources have historically 
been used to influence or attempt to influence people’s actions.  If we look at the basic 
perspectives in political science on what power is and how power is defined, categorized, 
and observed we can gain additional insight into how political resources such as money, 
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time, labor, communication, and information influence the behavior of individuals and 
organizations.   
  
Elitism and Pluralism 
 Pareto, Mosca, and Michels all classical political theorists who argued that, in any 
society, a small circle of elites exercise great power and control over that society and its 
people.114  While the three authors disagreed on why and how a ruling elite comes to 
power, stays in power, or falls from power, they agreed on the basic concept that a ruling 
elite wields power over society and the masses.  They broadly defined elites as the few 
who held power in society and the masses as the many who did not.  Pareto referred to 
the elite as the chosen few who governed the population.115  In Mosca’s concept of the 
ruling class, he developed Pareto’s idea of elites.  Mosca argued that all societies could 
be divided into two classes, a class that rules and a class that is ruled.  A smaller ruling 
class that performed all of the political functions, monopolized power, and enjoyed the 
benefits of power, while the much more numerous ruled class was directed and controlled 
by the ruling class.116  
Robert Michels, a disillusioned socialist, came to see elitism as a universal 
phenomenon that was not isolated to specific economic or social systems.  He argued that 
all large organizations from political parties to governments were oligarchies, which 
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resulted in a small ruling elite that stayed in power.117  Other scholars mirror Michels 
famous quote, “He who says organization, says oligarchy.”  Harold Lasswell and Daniel 
Lerner wrote, “Government is always government by the few, whether in the name of the 
few, the one, or the many.”118  The philosopher Colin Blakemore wrote, “The dream of 
every leader, whether a tyrannical despot or a benign prophet, is to regulate the behavior 
of his people.”119   
Mancur Olson provides a different view on the need and reason for elitism, as 
well as the ramifications of elitism in organizations.  He argued that the necessity of 
leadership in organizations resulted in the domination of the great by the weak.  He 
further argued that organizational elites and special member benefits were necessary for 
organizations representing the economically, politically, and socially disadvantaged to 
compete against more powerful interests.120 
 
Democracy and the Constitution 
The work of Madison, Dahl, and Carey121 provide the basic foundation for our 
understanding of tyranny.  The Communication Cadre may be thought of as a faction 
within an organization and when it abuses its control of information and communication 
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it may be thought of as a tyrant.  In the worst-case scenario under the communication 
cadre theory (when the communication cadre abuses its power by deceiving their 
organization’s members, limiting democratic participation and undermining the 
members’ goals for personal gain), the communication cadre (CC) becomes a tyrant (as 
Madison defined) at the organizational level.  As Madison, Dahl, and Carey argued, 
tyranny can and does occur among both majorities and minorities.  These scholars saw 
the tyranny of a majority as the greatest danger to democracy and designed and 
interpreted the Constitution to protect minority rights.  The perspective of the 
Communication Cadre Theory (CCT) is that organizational tyranny is conducted by a 
communication cadre that, by definition,122 is a minority.  Exceptions to the previous 
view obviously occur, where majorities tyrannize a minority.  During the 1900’s White 
domination over people of Mexican heritage in the Southwest and Blacks in the South 
exhibited similar characteristics in state laws and social mores that required racial 
separation excluded non-whites from voting and holding government office.123  The 
internment of Japanese Americans during World War II provides further evidence of 
majorities tyrannizing a minority.  The impact of local policies rippled into national 
policies, as the national government refused to step in to enforce equal rights and equal 
access for all of its citizens.124   
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 The communication cadre theory benefits from previous work in the field of 
American politics, addresses many disciplinary shortfalls, and represent an important step 
forward in the field.   
To start with, in the field of democracy and the U.S. Constitution the 
communication cadre equates to Madison’s concept of faction in the Federalist Papers 
#10.125  The communication cadre faction becomes a tyrant126 when the communication 
cadre attempts to manipulate its organization for personal gain.  The manipulation occurs 
when the communication cadre censures the information it gives to the rank-and-file, 
public leadership, or the outside organizations it interacts with.  While Madison 
preoccupied himself with majority tyranny, the manifestation of tyranny in organizations 
is more likely to be minority tyranny due to the communication cadre’s nature.  While 
many people may point to cases of majority tyranny in organizations or institutions (e.g. 
radical labor, community, or political organizations, the strong enforcement of norms in 
workplaces, communities or schools), what at first appears to be majority tyranny can 
usually be traced to the information communication cadres selectively communicate to 
their respective organizations or institutions.   
In Judith Shklar’s presidential address to the American Political Science 
Association in 1990, she discussed how American political theory has long “been 
charged with an obsessive and unconscious commitment to a liberal faith that prevents it 
from asking profound and critical questions.”127  She persuasively argued that the United 
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States embarked a democratic and tyrannical experiment, as evidenced by four 
phenomena.128  First, the early realization of white male suffrage; second, federalism; 
third, judicial review; and, finally, constitutional slavery.  The existence of these four 
phenomena laid the groundwork for our current democratic institutions and practices, 
while supporting tyranny.   
 A White majority tyrannized a Black minority in the U.S.A., since the slaves first 
arrived to the colonies.  The tyranny continued virtually unchecked for almost 300 years, 
with the possible exceptions of the American Civil War, Reconstruction, and the Civil 
Rights Movement.  Southern Whites eliminating Black voting rights constituted majority 
tyranny from 1877 to 1964, the years between the end of Reconstruction under President 
Grant and the Civil Rights Act of 1964.129   
 Majority tyranny and government tyranny existed in a symbiotic relationship that 
allowed Black voting rights to be usurped.  The White majority needed government 
powers to undermine Black voting rights, and the legislative and executive branches 
needed majority support to win office and implement policies against Blacks.  Majority 
tyranny occurred because a majority faction acted to harms a minority faction.  The 
second section considers the related issue of government tyranny, the concentration of 
government power.  The Third section critically analyzes two competing interpretations 
of Madison by Robert Dahl and George Carey.130  
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 In the Federalists #10 and #47 Madison addressed the tyrannies of a majority and 
government.  In the Federalist #10, Madison defined majority tyranny as a faction that could 
decide an issue through superior force, even if that decision disregarded minority rights.  
Evidence of majority tyranny exists in the seizing of Black voting rights by a White majority 
in the post-Reconstruction South.  V.O. Key's Southern Politics and Doug McAdam's 
Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency, 1930-1970, provided evidence 
for how a White majority prevented Southern Blacks from voting by establishing restrictive 
voter registration laws designed to undermine Black political power.131  Consequently, 
Southern Whites violated Black rights guaranteed by the 14th and 19th Amendments.  
 Critics might argue that a rural, landed elite usurped Black rights and not a Southern 
White majority.  While the political origins of a Black backlash centered on the landed elite, 
the Southern, White majority supported the landed elite.132  
 Southern Whites designed restrictive voting laws preventing Blacks from voting.  
Literature tests, White primaries, and Grandfather Clauses explicitly prevented Blacks from 
voting.  Restrictive laws, while not explicitly preventing Black voting (poll taxes, limited 
registration sites and hours, periodic re-registration requirements, and White social norms 
condemning Black voting), served to prevent Black voting.  The restrictive laws raised the 
costs of voting to discourage Black voters, a concept explained by Anthony Downs.   
 Downs' theorized that citizens vote if voting costs do not exceed voting benefits.  
Blacks faced severe financial, legal, and personal voting costs.  Financial costs included poll 
taxes and loss of income or credit by retaliating Whites.  Legal costs included possible arrest 
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for violating state or local laws. Finally, White social traditions sanctioned beating or 
lynching Blacks who tried to vote.  Even if Blacks voted, the White primary, outright 
election fraud, or the one party, southern political system rendered their vote useless.133  For 
southern Blacks, voting costs far exceeded voting benefits.   
 Formal studies further support the negative effect of high voting costs on voting.  G. 
Bingham Powell, and Raymond Wolfinger and Steven Rosenstone found the depressing 
effects of voter registration laws to be roughly 14% and 9% respectively.134  Although the 
data for the two studies were collected after the Civil Rights Movement, we can easily infer 
from them, Downs' theory, and Black history that Blacks were seriously impeded from 
voting prior to the Civil Rights Movement.   
  It could be argued, however, that a Southern, White majority took the voting 
franchise from Blacks, in a phenomenon isolated to the South.  Consequently, this would 
represent a regional, not a national, incident of majority tyranny.  The criticism is wrong. 
 Vann Woodward and Key addressed a crucial point often ignored by history and 
government textbooks.135  The Southern, White majority could not have usurped Black 
voting rights without national support as seen by the origin and widespread use of Jim Crow 
Laws in the North and Southwest.  Jim Crow Laws developed in the North as social 
measures to control interactions between Whites and Blacks.136  In the Southwest, 
registration laws and violence electorally disenfranchised Americans of African and 
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Mexican descent, which predated its use in the South.137  Unfortunately, this field of inquiry 
requires more research to analyze the relationship between Jim Crow and voting laws in the 
Southwest and North to the South.  One possible explanation for the seeming relationship 
could be through close family ties between Southern emigrants to the Southwest and the 
relatives they left in the South.138   
 In sum, an overbearing, national majority eliminated the rights of a minority.  To 
further defend this proposition, the following section addresses the tyranny of concentrating 
all formal political power under a single majority.   
 In the Federalist #47, Madison equated tyranny with the concentration of the 
Legislative, Executive, and Judicial branches in the same hands.  The Black voting rights 
loss after Reconstruction was highly correlated with a Southern White majority regaining 
control of the government.  Without the ability to elect representatives, Blacks could not rely 
on the legislative or executive branches to curb government tyranny against Blacks.  
Completing the triad of government tyranny, the Courts provided no protection for Black 
voting rights.   
 Robert Dahl argued that the Supreme Court formed part of the national ruling 
coalition and reinforced majority policy.139  From 1876 to 1930, Supreme Court decisions 
involving Blacks eroded earlier constitutional provisions protecting civil rights,140 consistent 
with Dahl's theory.  Jonathan Casper contested Dahl because he selected out cases that 
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presented problems to his theory (e.g. majorities existed only for four years) and the data 
was based during the politically less turbulent 1950s.141 
 Casper's research was biased, too.  He based his data on cases selected between 1958 
and 1974, when the Court engaged in more policy making behavior related to civil rights 
and the politically active 1960s and early 1970s.  Casper's research does point out, though, 
that the Court is capable of policy making.  While the Judiciary eventually engaged in policy 
making to restore the Black vote, the Court waited almost 70 years to take action.142  Placing 
faith in the Court to protect minority rights appears to be a long term commitment that is 
dependent on the Justices' ideologies.   
 In the South, government tyranny is easily seen in government actions.  White 
legislatures passed laws to restrict Black rights, White governors refused to veto those laws, 
and the White courts supported the restrictions under the rubric of state rights.143  Without 
the ability to vote, Southern politicians were not accountable to Blacks and the government 
eliminated Black rights.  
 Government tyranny is also seen at the national level.  The President had no 
incentive to aid Blacks, because the Southern block could prevent candidates from winning 
the presidency and Blacks couldn't vote.144  Southern Senators filibustered to death any bill 
that threatened White dominance in the South.  Finally, the federal government failed to 
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to be reduced in proportion to the population denied the vote.  By not enforcing the 14th 
Amendment, the federal government contributed to Southern Whites eliminating Black 
voting rights.145   
 Contrary to pluralism, federalism provided no defense for Black rights against 
government and majority tyranny.  Dahl argued in Who Governs? that Federalism provided 
many access points for people to influence policies from the local to national level.146  The 
South's treatment of Blacks graphically contradicts his argument about the influence of 
multiple access points.   
 George Carey and Robert Dahl provide two competing interpretations of Madison 
that are unsupported by the loss of Black voting rights.  In Preface to Democratic Theory, 
Dahl argued that the Madison model sought to curb people and the effects of tyranny.147  
Considering how Southern Whites seized Black voting rights, Dahl's model is inadequate.  
First, Dahl's belief that frequent popular elections check tyranny found no support in the 
history of Black voting rights.  Blacks weren't even allowed to vote.  Second, he concurred 
with Madison that the country's large size checked the effects of faction, a position that lacks 
credibility considering that it took 90 years for a new faction to restore Black voting rights.  
Third, Dahl argued that Madison ignored how socialization could check tyranny in a 
pluralistic society.  In counterpoint, the socialization of Southern Whites did not prevent 
them from taking away Black voting rights, nor did the socialization of non-Southern 
Whites lead them to defend Black rights.   
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 In the "Separation of Powers and the Madisonian Model," Carey argued that 
Madison sought to prevent government tyranny and, consequently, did not adequately 
address majority tyranny.148  Carey's stance that Madison's model sought to curb 
government tyranny received little support from the Southern example.  The South 
epitomized government tyranny and checks against government tyranny didn't prevent the 
government from eliminating Black voting rights.  Furthermore, the  South usurped national 
jurisdiction and power by preventing Black citizens from voting and met no federal 
resistance.  Non-southern states contributed to the problem by not defending Black voting 
rights.  Consequently, the lack of outside intervention to defend Black voting rights 
constituted government tyranny against Blacks. 
 Carey's argument about a majority being able to form social policy against 
minorities is supported by Jim Crow Laws in the South.  The elimination of Black voting 
rights, however, was a political policy, not, a social policy.  In light of Blacks  loosing their 
voting rights, Carey's policy-making argument should not be limited to only social policies.   
 Government tyranny occurred concurrently with majority tyranny, both existed in a 
symbiotic relationship.  The White majority needed government powers to undermine Black 
rights, and the legislative and executive branches needed majority support to win office and 
implement policies against Blacks.  The policy implications extended beyond the right of 
African Americans to vote and hold office in the South 
 Pluralist arguments find little support.  Truman's concept of potential groups and 
overlapping group membership protecting group interests finds no support.149  The 
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phenomenon refutes Truman's concept of potential groups and overlapping group 
memberships protecting the unorganized interests of people.   
 Tyranny of the majority against the minority cannot be limited to the elimination of 
black voting rights.  The internment of Japanese Americans during World War II, easily fits 
the mold of majority and government tyranny.  The loss of land rights in the Southwest for 
the newly Americanized Mexicans living in the region is another case in point.  Mycarthism 
also serves as an example of majority tyranny.   
 In all of these cases race played a key role, for example, why were German 
Americans not interned during World Wars  I and II?  Why did land holders of non-
Mexican descent in the newly acquired Southwest not loose their land rights?  Based on 
empirical evidence, even McCarthyism negatively and disproportionally affected minority 
organizations that advocated for equal rights and treatment.  Ironically, except for the case 
of McCarthyism, corporate America was seldom affected, (McCarthy targeted Howard 
Houghs for investigation).   
 A critic might point out that Federalism provided relief to Blacks, because the 
Supreme Court and national government forced the South to grant Blacks the right to vote.  
The criticism is false, however, because it took nearly 90 years for Blacks to regain their 
voting rights after Reconstruction's end and the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.   
One would think that more than 200 years is enough for society to reflect the 
national, democratic system of government and for the national system of government to 
reflect the democratic character of society.  For example, the practice of female genital 
mutilation by women on girls in several African nations with large Muslim populations 
continues despite the Koran’s strong and explicit language that condemns any such 
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contact.  The local populations believe this is an acceptable Islamic practice and common 
among all women, because it is sanctioned by local clerics and strongly advocated by 
mothers and grandmothers.  In reality, female genital mutilation predates Islam by several 
hundred years and has been condemned by all of the major universities that train Islamic 
clerics.150  The fact that female genital mutilation continues, speaks to several points.  
First, tradition is strong.  Second, tradition is hard to change (or end), even when a very 
religious community’s religion dictates a cultural change.  Finally, the society and a 
major institution, religion, began to reflect and reinforce one another.  In this example, 
clerics who are not trained at the official religious schools sanction female genital 
mutilation to retain political and religious power within the community.   
 Putnam’s Bowling Alone addresses the close relationship between social capital, 
society, and government.151  One of his arguments is that society needs to have a high 
level of social capital to support political participation and democracy.  The normative 
concern behind the book rests on his fear that society’s social capital is decreasing and 
threatens democratic society.  Meanwhile, Theda Skocpol ‘s, Protecting Soldiers and 
Mother and her recent work, Diminished Democracy, on the rise, growth, and spread of 
national organizations, supports how national organizations in society and the Federal 
system of government govern themselves in a similar manner.152 
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 Elitists argue that the elitist nature of institutions and organizations is due to the 
elitist nature of all societies.  The elitist character of American society is not uniquely due 
to capitalism, conspiracy, or any specific malfunction of democracy.153  The demands of 
large institutions necessitate the concentration of power by a small group at the 
institutions’ upper levels.154 
 In modern, complex societies, power concentrates in large institutions155 and the 
people who control those institutions.  The truly powerful are not individually powerful 
unless they possess access to and control over large organizations or institutions.156  
Individual wealth does not equate with economic power.  A government bureaucrat who 
earns a salary of $80,000 a year can control government expenditures of $50 billion a 
year.157 
The powerful occupy positions of authority and control, whether they act to 
influence decisions or not.158  Control over large organizations and institutions.  In a 
study on why the Medici where so powerful in Renaissance Italy, Padgette and Ansell 
found that the Medici’s power stemmed from their control of the communication flow 
between the other ruling families.159  Thus, the Medici extended their institutional base 
from their family, to control the communication between other families.  In Renaissance 	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Italy, the control of communication between ruling families became a crucial power 
basis, because the political environment and culture family politics discouraged them 
from communicating with one another.   
 The previous discussion focused on elitism as institutionalized power, power 
derived from positions of control or influence in institutions or large organizations.  
Under institutional power, individuals may exercise power whether they act to influence 
particular decisions or not.160  In effect, A exercises power over B when A succeeds in 
preventing B from raising issues that are detrimental to A or that A does not want raised.  
 Pluralism contests the elitist interpretation of politics and believes that power 
embodies decision-making.  Pluralists object to elitist’s beliefs that a small group of elites 
control power and that elites exert power through non-decision making.  Pluralists, 
instead, argue that we can only observe actual power (direct and observable actions) and 
not potential power (indirect and unobservable phenomenon, e.g. non-decision making).   
Pluralists argue that potential power and actual power are not equivalent.  
Potential power based on a person’s position of institutional control over economic, 
political, or social institutions is not power until a person actually uses their power.  
Nelson Polsby lays out pluralism’s critique of the elitist concept of non-decisions.  He 
argument has two points.  First, we cannot determine if a political actor is powerful 
without witnessing some sequence of observable events, which attest to the actor’s actual 
power.  If these events do not occur than we do not have the grounds to determine the 
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actor’s power.161  In other words, “A has power over B to the extent that [s/he] can get B 
to do something that B would not otherwise do.”162  
Pluralism originated in the need to describe the American political system as 
democratic.163  The rising criticisms about the lack of America’s democratic character 
created the need for a theory to reconcile the differences between the classic definition of 
democracy and the reality of America’s political system.  A political system in which 
relatively few people exert direct impact on national decision-making.164  Pluralist argue 
that the democratic nature of the American political system is maintained through: 
 
1. Individuals can join groups to influence political decisions, 
2. Interest groups compete to influence politics, which protects the individual 
3. Individuals can choose between competing groups in elections, 
4. New interest groups are free to form, 
5. Interest groups do not possess a monopoly of power and influence in all areas, 
and  
6. Federalism allows individuals and interest groups multiple access points to 
influence American politics, and  
7. Public policy may not be majority preference, but minority interests are protected, 
which ensures the protection of individual rights and freedoms. 
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Three Faces of Power 
While I view the political world as largely a world of elite interactions, I do not 
subscribe to the belief that the masses do not have power, influence, or impact.  Nor, do I 
accept that there is a single dominant elite that exerts hegemonic control of power and 
over ideology.  The numerous historical examples from American history contradict the 
existence of hegemony and lack of political power by the masses.  Even in the face of 
overwhelming economic, political, and social force disadvantaged groups exhibit a long 
history of political participation.  Bread riots in the 18th and 19th century, slave uprisings, 
coalminers unionizing in the 19th century, Native Americans embracing the Ghost Dance 
Movement in the late 1800s, women unionizing California’s canning industry in the early 
20th century, the Civil Rights Movement, and the unionization of farm workers provide 
just a few examples contradicting the lack of political participation by disadvantaged 
groups.165 
I do believe that a communication cadre exists in any organization, a cadre 
controlling internal and external communication and information flows, which creates an 
environment conducive for co-optation to occur.  The extent that an organization’s 
membership participates in their organization’s communication and information network 
and how the communication cadre controls that network depends on both the members 
and the communication cadre.  The rank-and-file decides how much they participate in 
the communication and information network and how much control and trust they allow 
the communication cadre to possess.  The communication cadre decides how open the 
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communication and information network is to the rank-and-file and how much they honor 
the trust bestowed to them by the organization’s members.   
In organizations aspiring to democratic participation, ultimately determine their 
own level of involvement in both the communication and information networks, as well 
as the amount of control and trust they bestow to individuals over these networks.   
Pluralism and elitism provide different interpretations for what politics is, who 
participates in politics, and how they participate in politics.  All of the previous literatures 
exhibit points of contention about politics, power, and democracy. 
The communication cadre theory provides insights about the concepts of power, 
false consciousness, and hegemony.  Research by pluralists and elitists continues to 
address the on-going question of how to interpret the seemingly accepting and compliant 
behavior by the less economically, socially, or politically powerful when the use of force 
or coercion is not observed.  The community power literature in the United States focuses 
on low levels of orthodox political participation (e.g. working in a campaign, voting, 
contacting a congressperson, etc.) despite marked inequalities and a relatively open 
political system.166  The elitist literature explains the lack of greater political participation 
by the less powerful because a dominant or hegemonic ideology pervades society.   
Hidden Transcript 
 James C. Scott developed a concept called the hidden transcript to describe how 
the powerless express independent opinions in areas where the powerful are not 
present.167  The hidden transcript is not isolated to the powerless, as the powerful often 
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develop their own hidden transcript when the powerless are not present.  By comparing 
the hidden transcripts of both groups to their public transcripts, a new way to understand 
resistance to domination is created.168  Social science focuses primarily on the public, 
official, and formal relations, which hardly exhausts what we might know about power 
and political relationships.169 
 The public transcript alerts us to power relations that revolve around the fact that 
public transactions (what is said in public), is not the whole story.  While, “the public 
transcript creates the appearance of unanimity among the ruling groups and the 
appearance of consent among subordinates.”170 The public transcript is an indifferent 
guide to the opinion of subordinates or of elites, when one does not contrast the public 
transcript with the hidden transcript.   
James C. Scott is not alone in his use of the hidden and public transcript.  Robin 
Kelley uses a similar approach to identify political actions by African Americans in the 
South.171  Adams and Balfour moved beyond the euphemisms the German bureaucracy 
used to describe the Holocaust, while the fields of critical, comparative, literature and 
clinical psychology assumed the presence of a sub-text or subconscious.172  
In Chapter 2 I introduce the concepts of official and unofficial, which is similar 
to Scott’s hidden and public transcripts concept.  I then offer a method for determining if 
the public or hidden transcript better describes the relationship or issue being studied.  	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When the hidden transcript is used by organizational members and organizational leaders 
the impact on organizational politics and representation provide a disproportionate 
opportunity for leaders to benefit vis-à-vis the rank-and-file.    
 
 
Third Face of Power, Hegemony, and False Consciousness  
 
The Communication Cadre Theory is not an argument that hegemony or false 
consciousness exists.  If we take James C. Scott’s categorization of hegemony or false 
consciousness as “thick” or “thin” the reasons for this stance become clear. 173  The thick 
version claims that dominants persuade subordinants to believe in the values that justify 
and explain their subordination, (i.e. subordinants consent to their social position).174  The 
thin version claims that subordinants believe that their subordination is natural and 
inevitable, (i.e. subordinants resign themselves to their subordination, but they do not 
believe in the values that justify their subordination). 
Readers of this dissertation might believe that I advocate a thin hegemony,175 as 
opposed to a thick hegemony.  The dissertation does not advance an argument for thick 
hegemony, because nothing in the CCT argues that dominants persuade subordinants to 
believe in the values that justify and explain their subordination or their consent.  The 
CCT argues that organizational pressures create an environment conducive for a 
communication cadre to not inform organizational members of all their options or give a 
full explanation of relevant issue(s).  Consequently, the rank-and-file lacks the 	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information to make informed decisions.  Furthermore, the hidden transcripts that 
organizational members, leaders, and the communication cadre voice in the case studies 
provide evidence that is not consistent with thick hegemony.   
Arguing that this dissertation does not support the thin hegemony or thin false 
consciousness theory is more difficult.  Gaventa argued the third face of power resulted 
in powerlessness producing a consciousness of powerlessness (and power producing a 
consciousness of power).176  Gaventa argues that his thin false consciousness predates 
thick hegemony and provides a mechanism for thick hegemony possible.  Similarly, the 
Communication Cadre Theory predates thin false consciousness and provides a 
mechanism for false consciousness to occur. 
Pluralism professes the reasons groups do not articulate their grievances occurs 
because those groups do not have any grievances.  Ironically, pluralism’s strong 
argument against the concept of hegemony does not provide solid reasons that account 
for the lack of disadvantaged groups pressing or voicing their grievances.   
Economic Power 
Traditionally pluralism viewed economic interest groups as just another interest 
group in a system of interest groups.  Elitism views interest groups as distinctly powerful 
in shaping the political and economic environments.177  Robert Dahl, whose early work 
theoretically developed the field, revised his original opinion of the influence of 
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corporate power.  In two separate works he argued that business groups play a distinctive 
and much more powerful role than other interest groups.178  
Corporate interests effect more than the political world, they directly influence the 
work world, which directly affects the lives of almost the entire population.  In the United 
States, a democratic ideology for government competes with a capitalistic ideology that is 
non-democratic in organization and culture.179  Further complicating this mixture is the 
non-democratic nature of virtually all organizations and non-governmental institutions, 
which are hierarchical.  All of the major institutions in America are non-democratic in 
theory and practice.  The family, education, religion, non-profit organizations, and labor, 
unions are hierarchical and not governed by democratic principles with how they are 
overseen by non-elected or non-democratic leaders.180  Many cultural institutions in the 
media, arts, foundations, and education, do not exhibit democratic practices due to their 
board of directors and the hiring practices used to appoint institutional leaders.181  The 
prevalence and the power board of directors possess is increasingly evident within social 
work and community organizations.  The government requirement for organizations to 
have board of directors in order to qualify for tax-exempt status and funding foundations 
requirement for funding provide increasing pressure for community organizations to 
switch to board of directors.  In Polyarchy, Dahl provided convincing proof that the link 
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between democracy and capitalism is not a causal relationship, because many nations fall 
outside of this relationship.182   
Economic power is highly concentrated in the United States and that 
concentration is increasing.  In 1995, 4,300 individuals possessed authority over more 
than half of the nation’s industrial assets, two-thirds of all banking assets, half of all 
assets in communications and utilities, and more than two-thirds of all insurance assets.183  
As the concentration of corporate assets continues, the political problem of capital 
mobility increases because of a corporation’s political power increase with its assets.184  
Capital mobility refers to the ease and ability of corporations to rapidly move their capital 
investments from one place to another, even across the world.  As the capital assets of a 
corporation increase they can more easily use the threat of withdrawing their capital 
investments from a particular place.  The threat of capital flight forces the political 
system to respond to the interests these groups place on the political system.  
Consequently, both nationally and internationally there has been an increase in the 
amount of tax-free business zones at the local to national level.  The need and demand for 
nation-states to develop their economies force them to be responsive to interests 
possessing investment capital or risk loosing investment in their economies.   
 The underlying value of pluralism rests on individual rights; however, modern 
pluralism recognizes that in a modern or industrialized or large society huge 
concentrations of power are inevitable.  The pluralist believes that competing, organized 
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interests will prevent any one organized interest from dominating the political field, 
thereby, protecting individuals.  The United States of America’s federal system of 
government provides multiple access points for people to have their interests heard and 
individuals participating in organized interests present the best way for their interests to 
be heard.  Individuals are free to join or form organized interest groups to represent them, 
which allows for any interest to be represented.  Pluralism then argues that power is 
spread across many interest groups, which protects individuals and other organized 
interest groups from arbitrary use and abuse of power by a dominant interest group.  
Organized interests (e.g. political parties) hold the United States’ government 
accountable.  Consequently, the working foundation of the United States’ government is 
transformed from the individual’s participation in their government to the individual’s 
participation in an organized interest group and competition between organized interest 
groups.   
 The pluralist ideology characterizes the vast majority of textbook on American 
government.185  Thomas Dye’s, Irony of Democracy, provides a notable exception by 
explaining American political life from an elitist view of democracy.  Elitist theory 
argues that a small group of an organization’s membership controls that organization.  
Furthermore, the background and values of these leaders tend to be the same across all 
groups.  The characteristics of these leaders are viewed as being so similar that they form 
a sociopolitical elite, an elite that controls society’s resources and forms society’s values.  
The elites are bound more to their elite identity than they are to the groups they control.  
Consequently, elitists argue the pluralist view, that a system of balances exists in 	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American social and political life, cannot exist because a relatively small group of elites 
control these organizations and collectively govern the country.  The elites value the need 
to maintain the social and political system.  The results are elites who are not accountable 
to the organizations they represent or lead and elites who influence organizational 
members more than organizational members influence them.  The end result is a social 
and political system that leaves organizational members with very little influence over the 
formation and implementation of policies that affect them. 
 
Social Network Theory 
Network theory provides the second basis for the Communication Cadre Theory’s 
development.  Scholars use network analysis for analyzing the exchange of key resources 
in organizational and institutional settings.186  The disparity in how resources, physical or 
informational, move between individuals or groups within the network identifies power 
differences.  Classically, the relationship between an actor’s (defined as an individual or 
organization) position within this network transfers into power differences between the 
actors.187  In, Communication Cadres, Leaders, and Co-Optation, networks are defined as 
communication and information flows within Organization A and between Organization 
A and Organization B.   
 The decisions democratic organizations make involve multiple exchanges.  
Organizational members and leaders gather information to make decisions and 
communicate with one another, as they work out their position on a policy or seek to 
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influence one another’s policy position.  Financial, political, or social resources may be 
exchanges.  The exchange of tangible and non-tangible resources allows the organization 
to be viewed as a network of exchange.  Within an organization, resource rich members 
exchange their resources for the support or obstruction of their colleagues.  Actors who 
occupy central positions within this exchange network possess political advantages over 
other actors who do not occupy central positions.  Political advantages that aid them in 
achieving their preferred policy ends, through their access to resources.188  In the case of 
the Communication Cadre Theory, the key resource is communication and information 
flows.    
The Communication Cadre Theory approaches organizational politics from the 
perspective that formal and informal relations and networks exist within any 
organization.  As the Theory Chapter elaborates, which network best describes the 
political landscape must be determined.  The dominant criteria for determining whether 
the formal or informal network best describes the organization is if organizational 
members routinely cast their votes based on information or communication they receive 
from specific individuals within the organization.189  One factor that emerged from the 
case studies is that members of the communication cadre possessed the greatest 
knowledge of the informal network that operated within their organization.  Furthermore, 
the more active organizational members possessed greater knowledge of the informal 
network.  While a person’s perception of informal networks is not a determinant of power 
or influence within an organization, the communication cadre (power holders) all 	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possessed high perception of their organization’s informal networks.  While some 
scholars have tried to link knowledge of informal networks to organizational power,190 as 
this dissertation argues in the Theory Chapter and the case studies evidence, knowledge 
is only power if it is used.191  Consequently, the Communication Cadre Theory 
hypothesizes that an organization’s real leaders (the communication cadre) are the people 
who most strongly influence the actions and opinions of their fellow members and 
organization.192  As the Theory Chapter argues and the case studies support, the control 
and dissemination of communication and information provides the greatest resource for 
individuals to shape the opinions and actions of their fellow organizational members.   
Of particular relevance for this dissertation is Knoke’s research on the “blurring” 
of state and society relations in the United States, Germany, and Japan in broad policy 
domains, specifically labor issues.193 In each labor domain studied, organizations that 
comprised the core of the communication networks enjoyed high reputations and actively 
engaged in policy events.  Knoke’s results recall Floyd Hunter’s work on reputation and 
power in Community Power without suffering from Hunter’s methodological 
weaknesses.194   
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Communication Cadres, Leaders, and Co-Optation uses network theory’s method 
for determining communication and information flows between individuals in 
organizations to determine who occupies peripheral and central positions within 
communication networks.  To determine how the communication and information 
network worked in the case studies, I interviewed organizational members using semi-
structured interviews.  A central interview theme was asking who group members 
interacted and communicated with, who they talked with and who talked with them.  The 
communication network was then constructed using confirmed communication 
relationships, i.e. both the person receiving and the person giving the information agreed 
on the relationship.  Furthermore, when possible, information was collected on exchange 
offers that organizational members did not accept for their cooperation or service.195 
The most important determinant of network power is not the official or public 
position of the person involved, rather a person’s ability to exert greater control over the 
behavior of another determines a person’s power.196  Consequently, this dissertation uses 
the concepts of formal and informal to acknowledge that additional political actors play a 
role in the political arena, than only those with official positions or titles.  
 Following the work of David Knoke, influence and domination networks play a 
similar role as communication networks and patronage in this dissertation.197  Influence 
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networks involve persuasive communication to shape another persons opinions regarding 
possible choices and their outcomes.  In this dissertation, I use communication networks 
to describe interactions similar to influence networks.  Knoke’s domination networks 
refer to actions people take to assist or obstruct another person’s actions according to the 
desires of the initiator.  In this dissertation I use the term patronage to describe a similar 
process of an actor who seeks to hand out rewards for service or punishments for 
disobedience.  Communication networks and patronage are elaborated in greater detail in 
the Theory Chapter. 
 Network theory argues that social, political, and economic relationships manifest 
themselves through networks.  According to this theory, networks determine key political 
paths and points of power between individuals and groups.  Networks are important, 
because they structure the political landscape.198  In the communication cadre theory, 
communication and information networks operate like networks. 
 A group becomes dependent on a communication cadre (which controls 
communication between and within groups), because the cadre knows and has access to 
the social and political structure.  Therefore, the cadre is positioned to strongly influence 
a group's political direction by controlling the flow and content of communication and 
information.  Consequently, as the members of different groups interact less often, they 
rely more on communication cadres to manage their communication and information 
needs.   
 The Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee of the Civil Rights Era under 
the guidance of Ella Baker created an organization that opposed hierarchical control and 	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a limited lifetime for the organization in an effort to avoid the problems of co-optation 
and subversion by older civil rights leaders or outsiders.199  Prior to the formation of 
SNCC, Baker worked for the Southern Christian Leadership Council, the NAACP, and as 
a community organizer in New York during the Depression.  While SNCC avoided an 
official hierarchical structure and maintained that they did not control local groups.200  
The initial belief was that decentralized control encouraged sustained action, while 
decentralized control and a limited organizational lifetime discouraged the development 
of a controlling elite within the organization and the threat of co-optation by outside 
forces.201  The strength of SNCC’s organizational approach was the avoidance of co-
optation, but the lack of a strong centralized office resulted in a loss of focus and 
momentum when the sit-ins ended.   
 
Asymetric Information 
Of particular relevance to the Communication Cadre Theory is the work of 
Krehbiel and Gilligan, because their research focuses on the effect of asymmetric 
information on distributional benefits and information efficiency using game theory.  
They focus on Legislatures when asymmetric information exists between heterogeneous 
committee members with superior information and legislators under open, modified, and 
closed rules.202  Gilligan and Krehbiel argue that under closed rules distributional benefits 	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are gained by the proposing committee member at the expense of legislators and 
information efficiency is greater than under open or modified rules.203   
Gilligan’s and Krehbiel’s focus on the Congress necessarily requires a theoretical 
leap to apply their results to smaller organizations or institutions that lack more than one 
organized preference group or are less bureaucratized.  Nevertheless, applying their 
findings to small organizations provides a method to analyze the data and interpret the 
results of this dissertation.  Furthermore, the macro concern of this dissertation with how 
the state and society are mutually reinforcing and reflective, as well as the micro level 
concern on the role the control of communication and information plays, are relevant for 
applying and interpreting the results of Gilligan and Krehbiel to smaller settings.   
The Communication Cadre Theory fulfills a need to delve into the tension 
between information efficiency and distributional effects in collective decision-making 
under conditions of uncertainty.204  The relationship of the communication cadre (CC) to 
organizational members reflects the relationship between committee members to 
legislators.  Asymmetric information between the communication cadre and 
organizational members provide opportunities for the communication cadre to 
strategically use information.  The strategic opportunities available to the communication 
cadre to strategically use information was exploited most often in the first case study of 
the Mexican American Employee Organization (MAO).  While the other two case studies 
of United Labor Activists (ULA) and Northstar did not exhibit the use of this strategy, the 
strategic opportunity existed and was commented on by a few members within each 	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group.  MAO differed from ULA and Northstar, because MAO was experiencing an 
active internal power struggle between two identifiable groups with different beliefs, a 
scenario that more accurately reflects Congress’s dominant two party system.   
The reason for asymmetric information occurs because of the strategic use of 
information by committee members, who “cannot be induced to divulge all of their… 
information even under the most informationally efficient rules.”205  The case studies in 
this dissertation, face a similar problem as the Congress.  While the case studies in this 
dissertation are small, democratic organizations dedicated to open communication and 
information flows, the communication cadre(s) that arise (even in these small 
organizations) face similar and different problems for divulging all of their information.  
First, the difficulty of realizing symmetric information among all organizational members 
faces the free rider problem.206  Why should organizational members continually feel 
compelled to acquire all of the information they need?  Adding to the free rider problem 
is the issue of trust.  When organizational members trust their leaders and the people who 
provide them with information (e.g. the communication cadre), members must first 
believe that the very people they trust to keep them informed are not keeping them fully 
informed, especially on critical issues.  Next, organizational members must decide how to 
act and then act to get the information they need.207  Finally, if the communication cadre 
chooses to engage in a strategy of limited or false disclosure, organizational members 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
205 Gilligan and Krehbiel 1989 
 
206 Olson 1971 
 
207 Michels 1962, Gaventa 1980, Parenti 1993, Mendel-Reyes 1995, Carpenter 2001 
  
	   104	  
must first determine that there is a problem, then find a way and act to get the information 
they need.   
While the two party system in the U.S.A. provides the basic condition necessary 
for a legislature to have informational and distributive benefits,208 organizations often 
lack more than one, organized, preference group (especially, smaller organizations).  
Further complicating the picture, is the tendency for organizations to increase in 
complexity as they age and to fall under the control of a single, organized preference 
group.209   
The necessity of Gilligan’s and Krehbiel’s model on having a heterogeneous 
committee, applying their model outside of the Congress, poses significant problems.  
The tension that exists in a heterogeneous committee is often absent at the organizational 
setting, except when an internal power or leadership struggle is occurring.  When 
organizations lack competing groups, the dependency of organizational members on the 
communication cadre for their information is extremely high.  In this scenario, the 
organizational members do not have perfect information and the signaling that would 
occur among committee members is absent from a unified communication cadre.  The 
result is that organizational members must choose from the options the communication 
cadre provides them, which may or may not yield a pareto optimal solution for members.    
Normatively, Gilligan and Krehbiel believe that “the informational role of 
committees in legislatures is to facilitate the choice of policies based on the maximum 
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amount of available information and consistent with majority rule.”210  While they are 
explicit in applying this belief to committees in legislatures,  
While the Committee System works for Congress in Gilligan’s and Kriehbel’s 
model, that does not mean that it represents and works for people living in the United 
States.  The Communication Cadre Theory raises questions of applicability outside of 
Congress and a normative concern that citizen representation [democracy] occurs.  While 
a two-party system provides the basic condition necessary for Congress to have 
information and distributive benefits,211 the reality of social organizations or other 
institutions having exactly two organized opposition groups is not a reality.  If 
organizations have only one organized preference group, which are especially common in 
smaller organizations, the information and distributive benefits in Gilligan’s and 
Kreihbel’s model change.  In these organizations, the applicability of the Communication 
Cadre Theory outweighs Gilligan’s and Kreihbel’s model, because the incentives for 
informational and distributive benefits, are lost and an the incentives for a 
communication cadre to form are greater.   
If two organized preference groups exist, the Communication Cadre Theory agrees 
with the Gilligan’s and Kreihbel’s model, because the incentives for information flagging 
allows the rank-and-file to maximize their information and distributive benefits.  
However, two additional factors cause their model to falter.  Namely, the communication 
cadre’s presence is not known, or patronage of an organization’s leaders and 
communication cadre members provide too large of an incentive for the information and 	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distributive benefits discussed by Gilligan and Kreihbel.  The great benefit of Gilligan’s 
and Kreihbel’s model to the Communication Cadre Theory lies in the strong argument 
they provide for the organizational need to have two opposition preference groups to 
destabilize an environment conducive for co-optation and patronage to occur.  
Unfortunately, there appears to be a strong organizational tendency for organizations to 
increase in complexity as they age and for a single preference group to dominate an 
organization.212  
If organizational members are not receiving the information that allows them to 
know what their options are or how to choose between their options an environment 
conducive for a mobilization of bias or the 3rd face of power occurs.  Congress and 
committee members engage in the mobilization of bias or the 3rd face of power to limit 
what policies are discussed and made; or what options are believed possible.  Kriehbel’s 
and Gilligan’s model then serves as a representation for how Congress operates, but not 
participatory democracy. 
 
Social Capital 
 The concept of social capital describes the social connections between people, 
which joins them in a community and ties them to a larger society.  Social capitalists 
propose that the accumulation of social capital benefits civic society, democracies, and 
individuals economically, socially, and politically.213   
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The study of social capital includes three broad perspectives focusing on the 
individual, social structures, and environment.  The three broad perspectives include the 
basic variables of social norms, social networks, and organizations.  The way that these 
basic variables interact in networks and organizations strongly influence people’s access 
to power, decision-making, and policy implementation, as well as effecting how people 
organize.214   
At the individual level, Putnam (2000) defines social capital as horizontal 
linkages between people through social networks and the establishment of common 
norms, which affect the results of a community’s activities.  The main characteristic of 
Putnam’s concept of social capital is that the accumulation of social capital assists in the 
cooperation, planning, coordination, and implementation of policies or actions that 
benefit the community and community members.  From the social structure perspective, 
James Coleman used a broadened concept of social capital to include social structures 
that assist the actions of community members and communities.215  Consequently, social 
institutions that govern interpersonal behavior and establish community and social norms 
could be more closely studied for their effect on social capital.  Finally, Bourdieu and 
Coleman sought to create a more inclusive and expansive view of social capital by 
including the study of social and political environments.216  Social and political 
environments shape social structures and permit the development of societal norms, 
through formalized institutions.   
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Conclusions 
To paraphrase V.O. Key, I believe in people’s great capacity for self-
government.217  V.O. Key argued that the best government was one with free and 
vigorous electoral competition, including defined, genuine issues, candidates that take a 
stand, and two political parties to represent citizens.  As the section on asymmetric 
information points out, there are normative reasons for organization to have two 
opposition groups.  What earlier sections on the media and government point out is that 
even two opposition parties do not eliminate massive barriers for representative 
democracy and citizen participation, nor the incentives the Communication Cadre Theory 
identifies in the preceding chapter for an environment conducive for patronage or co-
optation to exist. 
The reader is probably aware that the biases I approach this dissertation with are 
based on a fundamental belief in the democratic process where individuals are free to 
make informed decisions in the social organizations that they participate in.    
Historical events that lead to the creation of organizations and provide individuals 
with the experiences that shape their decisions cannot be ignored when studying 
organizations.  A diverse array of political science scholars acknowledges this point in 
their writings.218 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
Protest and Organize: 
The Case of a Mexican American Employee Organization 
 
 The following chapter focuses on a small, Mexican American, employee 
organization located in a large metropolitan region of a Midwest state.  While this chapter 
focuses on a Mexican American employee organization, the experiences shared by 
members of this organization are not limited to Mexican Americans or employees.  The 
chapter focuses on how the control of communication and information flows influence 
organizations, their members and leaders.  The Communication Cadre Theory identifies 
this influence as leaders rising to power and staying in power by controlling 
communication and information flows, which creates an organizational environment 
conducive for co-optation to occur.   
By focusing on the control of communication and information within 
organizations, a broad basis for comparison between different populations and 
organization types is created.  After all, all organizations and their members must deal 
with communication and information needs, which transcend race, ethnicity, gender, or 
class.  Readers may also find common experiences based on ethnicity, class, or gender.   
In sum, individuals, specific communities, and organizations may share similar 
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experiences, but possess different backgrounds based on race, ethnicity, class, or 
gender.219 
 The Mexican American Employee Organization (MAO) provided an excellent 
critical test of the Communication Cadre Theory.  Located in a large metropolitan region 
of a  midwestern state, the organization was small with only 16 members.  MAO had no 
elected or appointed leaders and practiced participatory democracy.  Members claimed 
that no individual or groups controlled internal or external communication and 
information flows.  The members actively participated in organizational affairs.  The 
preceding factors critically tested the theoretical foundation of the relationship between 
the control of communication, information, leaders, and co-optation, as outlined in 
Chapter 2’s Methodology section.    
 Additional factors increased the rigor of the test.  MAO’s members were 
politically aware and experienced individuals who consciously strived to create an 
organization that prevented leader(s) from controlling the organization.  The majority of 
group members were active in the Chicano Movement and/or in community politics.  
Second, members structured MAO to foster open and easy information and 
communication access for all members.  Third, the group was politically informed and 
committed to increasing Mexican American opportunities and decreasing discrimination 
at their company, called Urban Inc.  Urban Inc. was a state-owned, urban, utility service 
provider.  Fourth, members readily remarked on newspaper and television reports about 
the status of Mexican Americans and Latinos in the United States and Midwest.  Fifth, 
the organization existed off-and-on for 20 years and the members believed they avoided 
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the problem of an entrenched leadership.  I expected the members of MAO, who were 
politically experienced, committed to a cause, and dedicated to creating a non-
hierarchical organization to be less likely to allow the development of entrenched leaders 
and an environment conducive for co-optation.  Finally, the following events took place 
in the Midwest, a region whose politics are generally viewed as being less corrupt than 
other regions of the United States.  Consequently, oligarchy and co-optation should be 
less prevalent in the Midwest than in other regions, because oligarchy and co-optation are 
corrupt forms of politics.   
 I initially gained access to the Mexican American Employee Organization (MAO) 
through a friend who knew members of the group.  He arranged for me to meet with an 
active member of the organization.  Access to other group members was gained through 
each successive interviewee providing me with new contacts.  I interviewed eleven of the 
sixteen group members (69% of the members).  The five members who were not 
interviewed either declined to be interviewed or did not respond to interview requests.  
Finally, I interviewed a lawyer who was working on behalf of the organization.   
 Information gained through the interviews, established that the people interviewed 
formed the group's more active members.  The eleven interviewed members and lawyer 
confirmed that I had interviewed the more active members, and that only two of the five 
non-interviewed members were active in the group.  According to the interviewees, the 
five people not interviewed did not differ significantly from those interviewed in their 
socio-economic standing or ideologies.  The validity of this belief by the interviewees 
was increased by the information obtained through the interviews.  All of the interviews 
confirmed that two competing factions existed within MAO and all of their supporters 
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held similar views as the non-interviewed members.  Therefore, the exclusion of the five 
non-interviewed members of MAO should not significantly alter the study's findings.   
 I conducted informal interviews and structured them to ask different sets of 
questions.  To encourage full and truthful answers, all of the people interviewed were 
guaranteed anonymity and confidentiality.220  The interview questions were designed to 
solicit information on their work environment, MAO, their organizing tactics, personal 
and group views, leadership, communication and information flows, and problems they 
had with their job and MAO.  
 In summary, this critical case study analyzed the communication and information 
flows in a small, non-hierarchical, Mexican American Employee Organization (MAO).  
The case study relied on interviewing MAO’s members and a lawyer counseling the 
group in a civil rights lawsuit.  In the following case study, MAO corresponded to 
Group A and Urban Inc. to the stronger Group B of the Communication Cadre Theory  
discussed in Chapter 2.    
 The following case study of the Mexican American Employee Organization 
provides a critical test of the Communication Cadre Theory advanced in this dissertation.  
The critical conceptual elements of Political Science center on the concepts of power, 
political processes, and decision-making.221 Due to this specific case study’s focus on a 
male ethnic minority (predominantly, Mexican Americans) organizing in the workplace, 
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the analysis requires the need for the political analysis to be complemented by studies on 
Latinos, ethnicity, race, class, and gender. 
 Studies that combine the concepts of race, ethnicity, class, and gender are 
becoming more common.222  Racial and ethnic conceptualizations in the social sciences 
are generally limited to race or ancestry.  Political Science appears more limited than 
other social sciences in using two-dimensional definitions of race and ethnicity, namely, 
Black or White.223    Latino American, Asian American, and Native American Studies 
expanded race and ethnicity conceptually and operationally to include culture(s) as 
attitudes, values, and practices, in addition to bi-culturalism, social networks, and 
identity.  While the conceptualization and operationalization of race and ethnicity has 
increased, the inclusion of multiple racial and ethnic groups as units of analysis or areas 
of study is still rare.  Fortunately, exceptions do exist that expand the common two-
dimensional use of race (i.e. Black and White) to be more inclusive of other racial and 
ethnic groups (i.e. Asian, Latino, and Native American).224  While this case study focuses 
specifically on a male, Mexican American, employee organization, the second case study 
focuses on a mainly Caucasian organization, while the third case study focuses on an 
organization that is diverse across racial, ethnic, and gender groups.   
 The role of gender is less explored in this and the following case studies.  The 
limited use of gender analysis should not, however, be misconstrued to mean that gender 
did not exert an influence on the events that occurred.  Indeed, the lack of women’s 	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membership in the Mexican American Employee Organization reflected the lack of 
women employed in the traditionally male dominated labor fields at Urban Inc..  As 
Montoya’s work has pointed out, social roles and structural relations affect gender.225  
The members of MAO, all male, identified strongly with their ethnicity (i.e. Mexican), 
pan-ethnicity (i.e. Latino), and historical working class background, however, they still 
reflected the predominant and dominant male environment at Urban Inc.. 
Considering that Midwest State owned and operated Urban Inc., the state 
definitely played a role in defining power relations within a gendered context.  As 
African Americans, Asian Americans, and women made inroads into Urban Inc.’s 
workforce, Latinas were not included among the increasing population of female 
workers.  Through hiring, the role of culture, race, and ethnicity effects how the state 
defines what is gender appropriate labor.226   
The members of MAO were not free from this bias either, interviews with 
members of the Mexican American Employee Organization (MAO) indicated that very 
few of the people they recommended for jobs at Urban Inc. were women.  The result of 
these forces combined and created multiple obstacles of gender, ethnicity, and class, a 
“triple oppression”, for Latinas at Urban Inc..227   
 John A. Garcia has noted that Latino “political mobilization and/or social 
involvement can be initiated or enhanced by the salience of race/ethnicity, class, and/or 
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gender among Latinos.”228  In the case study of MAO, ethnicity played a crucial role in 
politically mobilizing the Mexican American population at Urban Inc..  MAO’s members 
felt that they were being ethnically discriminated against by Urban Inc. and their 
representing unions.  The perceived discrimination in treatment and wages resulted in a 
core group of five people who organized and formed the foundation of MAO.  The 
founding five members were then able to recruit almost all of the Mexican employees at 
Urban Inc. by stressing the need and possibility of overcoming on-the-job discrimination.  
Initially, MAO organized and formed a loose coalition with African American and Asian 
American groups to address their collective concerns of racial and ethnic discrimination.  
As it will be explained in this chapter, MAO’s members changed their organizing tactics 
from a loose coalition across racial and ethnic groups, to one of organizing along ethnic 
lines in order to have their interests and grievances represented and heard.  Consequently, 
MAO’s ability to overcome the first order problem of organizing a new group, as well as 
overcoming the free-rider problem was enhanced by the role of ethnicity. 
Historically, Latino studies focused on ethnic and racial identity as a prime area of 
research.229  In their interviews, the members of the Mexican American Employee 
Organization demonstrate the evolution of their ethnic identity.  They describe the 
process of developing an individual Chicano/Mexican American ethnic identity and an 
ethnic group consciousness, then using ethnicity to assess their social and political 
position and relations.230  The evolution of their ethnic identity then progressed to a 
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Latino pan-ethnic identity and group consciousness.231   MAO’s members describe the 
benefits of being Latino as belonging to a larger population group that shares similar 
concerns for personal and/or strategic economic, political, and social reasons.  A result 
that is consistent with Felix Padilla’s observations that membership in Latino 
organizations aids individuals from different Latin American national origins to consider 
themselves Latino.232  
Ethnicity, however, does not form the only basis for one’s identity and this is 
evident among MAO’s members.  The intersection of race, ethnicity, class, and gender 
plays a key role in determining a person’s identity and identities.233  One’s identity or 
identities may reinforce or weaken the likelihood of political participation for any person.  
In the case study of MAO, ethnicity and class provide additional factors aiding in the 
formation and continuation of MAO.   
Considering that Midwestern State owned and operated Urban Inc., the state 
definitely played a role in defining power relations within a racial and ethnic context.  As 
African Americans, Asian Americans, and women made inroads into Urban Inc.’s 
workforce, Latinos or Latinas were not included among the increasing population of 
workers.  Through hiring, the role of culture, race, and ethnicity effects how the state 
defines what is racial or ethnic appropriate labor.234  The members of MAO were not free 
from this bias either, very few of the people they recommended for jobs at Urban Inc. 	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were women or of a different Latin background.  The result of these forces combined and 
created multiple obstacles of gender, ethnicity, and class.235  
The role class played in the following events is more difficult to discern, because 
several members of MAO were in supervisory or managerial roles.236  In the forthcoming 
case study, traditional views of class are complicated, because one of the unofficial 
leaders of MAO voluntarily steps down from a higher managerial position for reasons 
both related and unrelated to class.   
 
Social Structures 
Social structures (i.e. political, economic, and social institutions) shape and 
influence MAO and Urban Inc.   This dissertation and the following chapter seek to 
connect the interactions of the Communication Cadre Theory with decision-making, 
motivations, and initiatives, in order to better understand how democracy operates within 
social organizations, society, and the federal system of government.237 
Political Science’s analysis of electoral participation provides rich data for 
studying the United States’ electoral systems.  An electoral system based on a plurality, 
winner-take-all system with at-large elections, off-year, and non-partisan elections and 
multi-member districts, and the difficulty for third political parties to be competitive are 
structural factors that have affected the number of Latino candidates (successful or not) in 
elections, racially polarized voting and campaigning, representation, and governmental 	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responsiveness.238  De la Garza, DeSipio, Gunier, Rosenstone, and Wolfinger all argue 
for methods to address the problems posed by a plurality, winner-take-all electoral 
system.  The methods they argue for include single member districts, cumulative or 
proportional voting schemes, and community of interest consideration in re-distribution 
of district plans.  Additionally, historically obstacles prevented Americans of Mexican, 
African, Asian, or indigenous backgrounds from voting or running in the electoral 
process.239   
 MAO’s members are aware of these structural factors and historical obstacles in 
the United States’ electoral system.  In the following case study, it will be shown that 
MAO engaged in a democratic decision-making process that mirrors the country’s 
electoral system.   
Individual factors that contribute to Latino political participation and power focus 
primarily on the individual resources Latinos possess, as evidenced by their SES or 
linkage between individuals, organizations, and leaders.  The SES, or socioeconomic 
status, variables focus on level of education, income level, and occupation and served as 
the main approach to understanding why individuals participate in politics.240  The strong 
correlation between SES and on the types and level of political participation by 
individuals are well documented.  The relationship between SES and Latino political 
participation is not as strong.  The work of John A. Garcia highlights how the inclusion of 
group consciousness, ethnic identification (e.g. Chicano in place of Mexican American), 	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provides further variables towards explaining Latino political participation.241  In the case 
of MAO, the additional factors Garcia highlights point towards a greater understanding of 
why MAO’s members became politically active at Urban Inc., also, MAO’s members 
overwhelmingly possessed experience in politically organizing. 
 MAO’s political empowerment includes structural factors, which influence the 
how, why, and to what extent MAO’s members participated.  Political Science 
traditionally focused on voting systems and representation.242  The case of MAO is no 
different; MAO’s members believed that the system they practiced, while flawed, 
enabled them to have an important voice in what MAO did as an organization.  
Additional structural variables that encouraged MAO’s members to participate are the 
ability to meet on company time and property, as well as access to high-ranking officials 
at Urban Inc. 
 
Coalition Building    
Recent work on how and to what level Latinos at the mass and elite levels interact 
across Latino and non-Latino groups are now available.243  The works point out that 
Latinos cooperating across Latino sub-groups and with non-Latino groups is more 
apparent at the elite level, than at the mass level.  The coalition building appears to be 
more practical, than the creation of a new pan-Latino or pan-community of color identity.  
As the Latino population grows and becomes more concentrated in urban areas, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
241 Garcia 1997c 
 
242 Hero 1992 
 
243 Jackson 1991, Sonenshein 1993 
	   120	  
opportunities for coalition building with non-Latino groups increases.244  Other 
communities of color such as, African Americans, Asian Americans, and Native 
Americans, are struggling for increased economic, political, and social power and they 
share similar policy concerns.245  Electoral coalition building and competition at the local 
and municipal level forms the main area of coalition building research, as coalitions form 
across groups and work for greater political power or competition between groups drives 
them apart.246   
As it will be shown, MAO engaged in coalition building with African Americans 
and Asian Americans in MAO’s initial organizing efforts.  In this case, the high level of 
previous political experience among MAO’s members might serve as a proxy for 
considering them elite.  While coalition efforts among the different communities of color 
at Urban, Inc. existed at the initial stage, two overwhelming opinions existed among 
MAO’s members.  First, MAO’s members believed that there was not enough support 
from other groups to merit continued coalition efforts.  Last, Mao’s members believed 
that Urban Inc. actively engaged in pitting the different groups of color in competition for 
jobs and company resources.   
 The following sections were structured to reflect the successive negotiation 
rounds between Urban Inc. and MAO.  Organizing the chapter in this manner, best 
demonstrated how the organization and communication cadres developed and the 
relationship between the communication cadre to oligarchy and co-optation.   	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Protest and Organize 
The Mexican American Organization 
 The Mexican American Organization (MAO) advocated for Mexican Americans 
at Urban Inc.247 The organization's goals were for Mexican Americans to have the same 
rights and opportunities as their Caucasian co-workers and to end racial discrimination 
against Mexican Americans at Urban Inc.  MAO's members strongly displayed unity in 
their purpose, goals, and egalitarian beliefs.  All of MAO's members, except one, claimed 
that no leader or group of leaders controlled the group.248  Indeed, MAO members 
purposefully sought to avoid having a single leader or leadership cadre by not holding 
elections leadership positions and meeting at least twice per month.  The stated purpose 
of the frequent meetings was to decrease the opportunity for leaders to develop or 
become entrenched and to increase the access and flow of communication and 
information.  MAO meetings did not have a formal chairperson to regulate meetings.  
Group members engaged in open discussion and collectively solicited comments from 
silent members.  A majority vote determined MAO's course of action after an issue was 
discussed.  Thus, MAO's structure and membership critically tested the Communication 
Cadre Theory.  
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unions and several members worked in management and were not eligible to belong to a union. 
 248  The lone exception came from Jim, who claimed that he was the leader.  Information from all the 
other interviews, however, did not support his claim.   
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 Fewer than twenty Mexican Americans worked at Urban Inc., of those, sixteen 
belonged to MAO.249  They originally organized from 1981 through 1982 and joined 
other workers of color to combat racial discrimination in wages, job opportunities, and 
work environment.  The state government controlled Urban Inc. and the initial 
administrative response created an advisory board charged with investigating and 
handling the situation.  A slow state investigation, accompanied by little administrative 
activity to address the complaints, gave the loosely organized Mexican Americans time to 
become more organized.  Member participation was high and almost all of them 
volunteered and served in leadership activities (e.g. committee or individual tasks).  In 
order to accommodate this organizational structure, the administration sat down and 
mediated with almost all of the Mexican American workers, (while only negotiating with 
representatives from other racial groups).  MAO’s organizing led to the promotion of a 
Mexican American employee, Joe, to be the company's first civil rights officer.  Group 
members identified Joe as belonging to a core group of five MAO members who initiated 
the protest.  The state then promised to implement and enforce new work practices that 
addressed MAO's concerns.   
 MAO members quickly stopped organizing after their initial success.  Almost ten 
years later, in 1990, they believed that Urban Inc. failed to honor their previous 
agreement and reorganized.  Once again the company sat down to mediate with MAO.  
This time, however, the administration told MAO to pick members to represent their 
group.  MAO conceded and members estimated that at least twelve of sixteen members 
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actively participated in the second round of negotiations.250  MAO threatened Urban Inc. 
with a class action, civil rights lawsuit and the first settlement was reworked with new 
figures for promotions, hiring, and plans to improve the work environment by decreasing 
racial discrimination.   
 Several different unions represented different segments of MAO’s membership.  
During the early 1990s, several MAO members received pay raises.  The pay raises, 
however, resulted from different union contracts and only applied to those MAO 
members who belonged to those specific unions.  The majority of MAO members, 
however, were represented by different unions, whose members were not due pay raises.  
Consequently, the majority of the Mexican American employees did not receive wage 
promotions.  Furthermore, Urban Inc. failed to hire additional employees of Mexican 
descent and none of the members of MAO received job promotions, as Urban Inc. had 
promised to do in the previous negotiations.   
 Once again, the Mexican American employees stopped organizing.  In 1996 and 
1997 racial tensions increased between Caucasian and Mexican workers, in part, because 
Mexicans were not promoted nor hired in accordance with the previous settlement.  The 
Mexican American civil rights officer, Joe, resigned and accepted a lower level position.  
When asked why he did this, he responded that the pressure was too great and that Urban 
Inc. had not honored its agreement with MAO.  MAO wanted substantial and faster 
change, while Urban Inc. wanted to keep the workers of Mexican descent from 
advocating for change.  As the civil rights officer, Joe constantly balanced the interests of 
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MAO and Urban Inc.  He was forced to fend off accusations from both organizations that 
he favored the other group.  Sam, a Puerto Rican American, was hired in his place and 
MAO changed its membership policy to include all Latinos.   
 During this time, Peter, a MAO member, began filing a civil rights violation 
against Urban Inc.  The employees of Latino descent once again re-organized.  As 
predicted by the Communication Cadre Theory, Urban Inc. insisted that MAO decrease 
the number of their representatives involved with negotiations.  MAO responded by 
decreasing the original twelve to sixteen representatives to the first ten members to 
volunteer.  The management of Urban Inc. disliked dealing with such a large group, but 
MAO insisted that they had honored Urban Inc.'s request and negotiations continued.  
Once again the mediation procedure resulted in the original settlement being re-worded 
with different statistical goals for new hires and promotions.  Peter dropped his civil 
rights lawsuit.  Unfortunately for MAO, the new settlement would only be partially 
honored by Urban Inc.   
 The third round of negotiations differed qualitatively from the preceding two 
rounds.  Urban Inc. encouraged Latino employees to continue participating in MAO, by 
allowing them to meet on company time.  At this time, MAO began exhibiting strong 
evidence of a communication cadre.  Meetings between Urban Inc.'s administration and 
the at-large Latinos stopped.  All communication between MAO and Urban Inc. took 
place via official and unofficial groups.  A permanent, “official” Latino Advisory Board 
composed of MAO members Joe, Job, Al, and Sam (the Puerto Rican civil rights officer) 
met with Urban Inc.'s advisory council.251  The Advisory Board met with Urban Inc. 	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every two weeks.  In addition to the official Advisory Board, MAO members Aldo, 
Carlos, and Ben formed a second unofficial Latino Advisory Board that communicated 
with Urban Inc.’s administration.   
 Almost all of members of the official and unofficial Advisory Boards formed the 
official and unofficial communication cadres.  The two communication cadres were 
composed of Joe, Aldo, Carlos, and Ben.  Joe, Aldo, Carlos, and Ben initiated MAO in 
the very early 1980s.252  The four MAO founders were continually involved in 
communication and information flows and strongly influenced MAO's policies.  Ten of 
the eleven MAO members interviewed identified these four founders as the people who 
communicated the most with Urban Inc. and the persons who provided them (the 
interviewee) with most of their information.  Furthermore, the members considered these 
four people the ones who most influenced and lead MAO.  The two communication 
cadres controlled communication and information between MAO and Urban, Inc.  As 
Urban Inc. limited direct interaction with MAO’s members, MAO’s members 
increasingly relied on the official and unofficial communication cadres for their 
information and to communicate for the organization with Urban Inc..  Consequently, 
MAO’s membership relied increasingly on the official and unofficial cadres to represent  
their needs, interests, and opinions.    
 MAO leadership became based on who was part of the two communication 
cadres.  MAO accepted the first three volunteers as their members on the official Latino 
Advisory Board.253  Urban Inc. filled the fourth board position with Sam, the civil rights 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
252 Ten of the 11 people interviewed identified four people as the founders of MAO:  Joe, Aldo, Carlos, 
and Ben.   
 
253  Some of MAO's members voiced displeasure with the volunteer method for choosing the Board 
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officer.  When MAO protested this move, Urban Inc. forced them to accept Sam as one 
of their representatives by threatening to withdraw from all negotiations.  All of MAO’s 
members felt wary of Sam, due to his perceived unwavering support of Urban Inc.’s 
position and expectation by MAO members that he should be supportive of their position.   
 Once Urban Inc. appointed Sam to the Latino Advisory Board, MAO’s entire 
membership considered him a company man and declared him persona non grata.254  
They accepted his membership, however, for three stated reasons: 
 
1) To continue negotiations,  
2) He could be outvoted by MAO’s members in MAO and on the Latino Advisory 
Board, 
3) They could feed him false information, and  
4) They would hold secret meetings without his presence to discuss sensitive 
material. 
 
 Neither faction of MAO considered Sam a supporter of their position.  The stated 
reason from members of both factions indicated that he was not to be trusted.  Almost all 
of the members interviewed, though, considered him more closely aligned with the 
official cadre’s position.  As Joe stated, the position of civil rights officer and MAO 
member was difficult to balance.  Urban Inc. definitely made the tough balancing act 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
positions and pushed to elect the advisory board.  The organization implemented the majority decision to 
use volunteers to fill MAO’s positions on the Latino Advisory Board. 
254 Sam’s continued MAO membership and position on the Advisory board was extensively debated.  Of 
critical importance, is the fact that the two opposing factions in MAO, to be discussed shortly, accepted 
Sam for the reasons listed.  
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more difficult when they forced MAO to accept him as one of their representatives on the 
Advisory Board.   
 Among MAO’s three positions on the Latino Advisory Board volunteers, Joe, 
embodied the official cadre.  He, also, was the only member of the official cadre.  He was 
an established MAO leader and founder with connections to the administration from his 
previous role as Urban Inc.’s civil rights officer.  He was politically ambitious and 
experienced, as evidenced by his influential role and aspirations in the local Republican 
Party and at Urban Inc.  The other Latino Advisory Board members, Al and Job, testified 
they received the majority of their information from Joe who often served as their go-
between with Urban Inc.  In their interviews, they were very upfront about furthering 
their careers as they advanced MAO’s goals.255   
 The unofficial cadre consisted of Aldo, Carlos, and Ben, all of whom founded 
MAO with Joe.  The trio possessed an unobtrusive political style and preferred to act 
from behind the scenes.  They often met individually with Urban Inc.'s administrators to 
insure that the Mexican American Organization’s goals and interests were represented 
and met.  The unofficial cadre took a strong stand against receiving personal perks, 
patronage, or any offer that could be construed as such.  The unofficial cadre strongly 
advocated for an end to lower, discriminatory wages and lack of promotions compared to 
their Caucasian counterparts and an end to discriminatory hiring practices.256  Ben and 
Aldo were eligible for retirement and Carlos was within “two to three years” of 
retirement.  They felt their retirement status enabled them to place the interests and goals 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
255 Al and Job often commented on how they were “looking out for [themselves]” and believed that all 
currently employed MAO members should receive benefits and promotions before addressing hiring 
discrimination and work conditions. 
 
256 The issue of discriminatory hiring practices will be discussed later in the chapter. 
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of MAO and their local Latino community above their personal interests.  The effect was 
a strong commitment to create change before they retired.  Their strong commitment 
appeared to be based on a feeling of financial security due to their retirement status.  
They believed that Urban Inc. could not threaten them with unemployment.   
 Why did two distinct communication groups exist?  MAO members provided few 
answers, because they assumed that no individual or group of individuals controlled 
communication, information, or MAO.  Answers from non-cadre members identified the 
membership of the communication cadres and, most importantly, which leaders they 
aligned themselves with.  MAO members on the official Latino Advisory Board 
advocated that Latino equality in on-the-job treatment and job opportunities (i.e., 
promotions) begin with current Urban Inc. employees.  I termed this group the official 
cadre to recognize their “official” status as Latino Advisory Board members with Urban 
Inc.  Furthermore, the official cadre did not push for rapid changes like their unofficial 
counterpart.   
 The unofficial cadre, however, drew majority support in MAO and was 
historically MAO's power brokers.  The unofficial communication cadre benefited from 
long term, established relationships with some of Urban Inc.’s management and support 
staff.  The relationships went back almost 20 years to MAO’s founding and lasted 
through several rounds of negotiations between the two sides.  In this scenario, the 
unofficial cadre was too influential for Urban Inc. to ignore.  
 The official and unofficial cadres represented the two factions within MAO.  Each 
cadre advocated different policies to address the discriminatory environment against 
Latinos at Urban Inc.  The official cadre totaled 6 supporters (1 cadre member, 4 
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supporters, and Sam).  The unofficial cadre totaled 9 supporters (3 cadre members and 6 
supporters).  One person, who self-identified as belonging to neither group, ridiculed the 
official cadre.  He then said in an angry voice that he planned on supporting the official 
cadre, which would increase the official cadre’s supporters to 7.   
 The Communication Cadre Theory predicted that the cadre's size would decrease 
as relations increased between MAO and Urban Inc. and as MAO aged.  As predicted, a 
communication cadre developed despite the egalitarian views and efforts of MAO 
members.  During the first round of negotiations in 1981 and 1982 almost twenty 
Mexicans were directly involved in negotiations and communication flows with the state.  
By 1997, official and unofficial communication cadres consisted of four people who 
controlled communication and information between MAO and Urban Inc.  The two 
cadres comprised MAO's unofficial political leadership, because they did not represent 
elected or appointed leadership positions of MAO.   
 Prior to the third round of negotiations, patronage was isolated to Joe's promotion 
as the newly created civil rights officer in the early 1980s.  A couple of MAO members 
received overdue wage and salary promotions to the next higher government pay grade, 
also.  During the third round of negotiations, a member of Urban Inc.’s administration 
informed MAO that Sam, the Puerto Rican civil rights officer, received a $60,000 a year 
salary.257  A salary that was $20,000 greater than the maximum his government 
employment level was entitled to.  The large discrepancy in pay confirmed the members’ 
feelings that Sam was acting on behalf of Urban Inc. and being subsidized for it.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
257  This person has access to Urban Inc.'s payroll records and confirmed the civil rights officer 
employment level and salary.  To protect this person's identity, no reference is made to race, gender, or 
position, this person is sympathetic to MAO's cause and regularly offers assistance to the group.   
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 Once again, the Communication Cadre Theory's prediction came true, in regard to 
co-optation.  Urban Inc., the stronger organization, forced MAO to accept Sam as one of 
their representatives on the Latino Advisory Board.  Arguably, Sam was not co-opted by 
the state, since he was always identified as an advocate of the state’s position, but he 
received patronage for his support.  The state, however, had definitely begun to co-opt 
MAO by forcing them to accept a representative whom they did not want.  Sam’s 
continuous support for Urban Inc.’s position among his fellow MAO members may also 
be looked at as his and the state’s effort to co-opt MAO.   
 The third round of negotiations was particularly bitter, as the Latinos demanded 
immediate and substantial efforts to honor the two previous pacts.  The third round's 
settlement resulted in several pay raises and job promotions, which decreased the 
demands and legal threats of several MAO activists.  The less vociferous MAO activists 
then represented MAO on the Latino Advisory Board during the fourth round of protests 
in 1998 and 1999.  The unofficial cadre, however, continued to advocate for rapid 
changes that included both current and potential Latino employees.   
 The fourth round of protests revolved around increased discrimination against 
Latinos on the job and no new Latino employees hired since 1987.  The lack of new 
Latino hires became important, because Urban Inc. had hired substantial numbers of 
African Americans and Asian Americans, since 1997.  Latino employees were 
specifically upset that they had recommended qualified Latino applicants who were not 
hired despite Urban Inc.'s promises to hire a qualified Latino if one applied.258  Latino 
workers linked this policy to a discriminatory environment against Latinos, which 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
258  MAO members knew they sent qualified applicants, because they knew the job qualifications from 
experience and from reading job postings.  
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included "mysteriously" changing job qualifications when Latinos became eligible for 
promotions or as job applicants, and greater disciplinary action against Latino employees 
than Caucasians.  MAO continued to negotiate for their inclusion (or an employee of 
Latino descent) to be on the applicant screening and interviewing committees.  MAO also 
wanted Urban Inc. to enforce a non-discriminatory work environment and to account for 
how and why job classifications changed every time Latinos came up for promotions or 
employment.  The last issue particularly angered the members of the Mexican American 
Organization, because when Latinos applied for promotion or employment they would 
fail to meet the new requirements.  The only exception to this occurred when union 
contracts stipulated specific pay raises and the promotions of the members on the Latino 
Advisory Board. 
 
The Communication Cadre, Leadership, and Co-Optation 
 The fourth round of protests and negotiations continued after research on MAO 
ended in 1999, but several facts were evident.  First, MAO's leadership was in the hands 
of an official and an unofficial communication cadre of four people.  The two cadres 
formed MAO's unofficial leadership.  Second, the number of people in the 
communication cadres decreased with each successive negotiation round and MAO's 
members interacted less and less with Urban Inc.  Consequently, the communication 
cadre’s size decreased from MAO’s sixteen organizational members in 1981 to four out 
of 16 MAO members in 1999. 
 The next fact was the presence of patronage.  As defined earlier, patronage was a 
reward for service or punishment for disobedience and indicated a favorable environment 
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for co-optation to occur.  Urban Inc. dispensed promotions and pay raises to members of 
the communication cadre and their supporters, as they decreased their level of activism or 
support of the unofficial cadre.  In response, the official cadre member and his supporters 
negotiated their influence in MAO for personal gain.259  The most obvious example of 
patronage was Peter's $60,000 annual salary that was $20,000 greater than his 
government position was allowed to receive.  Joe provided another example of patronage.  
He was hired as a civil rights officer and then negotiated a favorable demotion with 
excellent job security.  Job, meanwhile, used his position on the Advisory Board to 
garner a pay raise and then a job promotion with a corresponding pay raise.  Finally, the 
newest supporter of the official cadre, Al, a union pipe fitter was promoted to foreman.   
 Unofficial communication cadre members also encountered patronage, as well as 
one of their supporters.  Carlos reported that Urban Inc. offered him a pay raise and later 
a promotion for his cooperation, which he refused.  He stated that his position in the 
union precluded favorable salary treatment and that he lacked seniority to be eligible for 
promotion.  He believed that if he accepted either offer, he would eventually encounter 
problems with his union.  He also stated that he ideologically refused to be “bought-off” 
or to accept favorable treatment.  Ben stated that he was offered a promotion he refused.  
After his refusal, Urban Inc. supervisors implied his job might be eliminated by 
government cutbacks.  Ruben, a MAO member not previously discussed, represented the 
only supporter of the unofficial cadre who faced patronage.  He and a Caucasian co-
worker fought at work and Urban Inc. fired both employees, although Urban Inc.'s 
regulations required that they be suspended.  Within one week the Caucasian worker was 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
259  The administrative informant confirmed the following promotions and pay raises through his/her 
access to job classification and payroll records.   
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reclassified as suspended, but Ruben remained unemployed when research on MAO 
ended.260   
 The final point was that a power struggle occurred in MAO between the official 
cadre and the unofficial cadre.  The official cadre advocated institutionalized ethnic 
group advancement over time with immediate promotions from within, while the 
unofficial cadre advocated for immediate institutionalized guarantees of ethnic group 
advancement and hiring of Latino employees.  When this research ended, it was too early 
to know the outcome, but Urban Inc. was using patronage to encourage support for the 
official cadre’s position.  The unofficial cadre, meanwhile, was using legal counsel to file 
a civil rights lawsuits against Urban Inc.261  The stakes of the struggle within MAO were 
high, control of MAO and the ability to determine what policies the organization as a 
whole would support and advocate for.  Despite the outcome, the size of the 
communication cadre would more than likely decrease to one or three members 
depending on which cadre won the internal struggle.   
  
The Cadre, Leadership, and Co-Optation of Mao  
 The Latino experience at Urban Inc. was consistent with the Communication 
Cadre Theory, even though MAO was a small organization composed of dedicated and 
politically experienced members who actively attempted to avoid entrenched leaders.  
The size of MAO's communication cadres decreased and the cadres' importance increased 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
260  Ruben based his claim on information from his union business agent and a lawyer whom he hired to 
represent him. 
261  Aldo was the first MAO member to advocate a civil rights lawsuit in the fourth round of negotiations.  
Several other MAO members joined him.  They were incorporating former, qualified Mexican applicants 
who were disqualified when job requirements changed after they applied for employment. 
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with the expansion of negotiations with Urban Inc.  Concurrently, a favorable 
environment for Urban Inc. to co-opt MAO was created through patronage and 
communication cadres.  The communication cadres and their supporters became 
appealing targets for Urban Inc. to co-opt, because the communication cadres controlled 
the Mexican American Employee Organization .  The official communication cadre and 
its supporters benefited from patronage.  Urban Inc., meanwhile, targeted the unofficial 
cadre for patronage in exchange for a decrease in their activity level or change in their 
policy position.  Finally, supporters of the unofficial cadre were offered patronage to 
change their support and position.   
 Sam was identified by almost all MAO members as the proponent of the state's 
position.  As indicated earlier, Peter is considered part of MAO.  MAO allowed all 
Latino's to join and the state mandated that all "Hispanics" could be part of the group.  
Urban Inc. forced MAO to allow Sam to represent them on the advisory board.  
Consequently, Urban Inc. placed their advocate in the communication cadre and 
positioned him to be one of MAO's leaders.  If Urban Inc. could place someone in 
another group's communication cadre, one group can influence the composition of 
another group's cadre.  Once again, the Communication Cadre Theory's prediction came 
true.  Urban Inc., the stronger group, used force to place one of their members, Sam, in 
MAO's cadre and rewarded him with an illicit pay raise for his loyalty.  An act of 
patronage, and hence co-optation, was performed.   
 While the communication cadre and a co-optive environment were present in 
MAO, alternative strategies to avoid these problems found little support.  For example, a 
large organization would have an even harder time avoiding a communication cadre and 
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a co-optive environment.  Michels and Olson argued that the larger an organization was, 
the greater its need for a division of labor and bureaucracy, which would compound the 
problem.262  A highly structured group with well defined rules encourages hierarchy, 
which separates the group and actively creates a communication cadre and the 
opportunity for co-optation.   
 Two possible solutions to the problem exist:  a charismatic leader and strict rules 
that prevent a communication cadre from forming with an active membership.  Michels 
concluded that oligarchy was unavoidable, that co-optation was the greatest threat, and 
that a strong charismatic leader committed to an organization's ideals was the solution to 
co-optation.263  The obvious problem with this approach is that it appears to prevent the 
problem of co-optation, but in reality, it does not eliminate the communication cadre or 
the favorable environment for co-optation.  The temptation for a competing group to offer 
a charismatic leader patronage is very high, because he is the sole ruler of his 
organization.  In turn, the temptation for a charismatic leader to accept patronage is great, 
because he controls communication and can prevent his group from finding out.  Indeed, 
the danger of co-optation looms even greater, because once a charismatic leader is 
patronized or eliminated by force, an organization would probably lack the structure to 
remain true to its purpose and goals.   
 The other solution was first posed by Seymour Martin Lipset in Union 
Democracy.264  In his study he found that oligarchy and a co-optive environment could be 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
262 Michels 1962, Olson 1971 
 
263 Michels 1962, p.20. 
264 Lipset 1956 
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avoided by an organization that had strict term limits in leadership and communication 
positions.  The strict term limits had to be accompanied by an extremely participatory 
group membership to limit the likelihood that a communication cadre would form.  The 
only problem with this scenario is that it rarely occurs, even when groups try to 
implement this structure.  To date, the International Typographers Union, mentioned in 
Lipset's book, remains one of the few documented exception.  Lipset even acknowledged 
this union as an exceptionally rare occurrence.265 
 
 
Summary 
 This paper outlines and reviews a case study that supports the Communication 
Cadre Theory.  The theory proposes that communication networks are mechanisms for 
the development of oligarchy in organizations and the creation of an environment 
conducive to co-optation.  Throughout the process of testing the Communication Cadre 
Theory, a question continually lingers in the background.  To what extent can democracy 
and representation exist in the presence of communication cadres?  The Communication 
Cadre Theory provides a substantial explanation for the lack of greater political power by 
disadvantaged groups.  The theory explains how leaders come to power in disadvantaged 
groups and why oligarchy and a favorable environment for co-optation develop.  The 
Communication Cadre Theory accounts for why groups of the elite seek to co-opt 
disadvantaged groups, why leaders are in a position to be co-opted, and for the various 
methods elite groups use to accomplish co-optation.  The relationship between the control 
of communication, leaders, oligarchy and co-optation must be understood for an 
organization to avoid oligarchy and co-optation.  If disadvantaged groups want to prevent 
leaders from "selling them and their goals down the river," placing time constraints on 
the terms of communicators is essential.   	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 The huge normative concern with this research is the need for groups of the 
disadvantaged to implement organizational rules that insure a communication cadre does 
not develop.  The alternative is to follow a strong, charismatic leader and risk the danger 
that a successful organization will terminate or become unsuccessful with the leader's co-
optation or demise.  The implementation of rules that prevents a communication cadre 
from developing will aid an organization or movement in maintaining their goals.  For 
example, rotating leaders and communicators cultivates new leaders who will stay true to 
the organization's or movement's ideals and goals.   
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CHAPTER 5 
 
Rebuilding and Inspiring the Labor Movement: 
The Cases of United Labor Activists and  
Northstar Artists Collective  
 
 
 
 The following chapter focuses on two small organizations, Northstar Artists 
Collective and United Labor Activists, located in the same large metropolitan area and 
Midwestern state as the Mexican American Employee Organization case study in 
Chapter 4:  Protest and Organize.  This chapter continues the focus on how the control 
of communication and information flows influences organizations, their leaders, their 
members, and co-optation.  I apply the Communication Cadre Theory to study these two 
organizations, which provide two additional critical case studies.    
 By continuing to focus on the control of communication and information within 
organizations, a broad basis for comparison between the three different populations and 
organizations used for the case studies is created.  The two organizations and their 
members studied in this chapter’s two case studies face communication and information 
needs, which transcend race, ethnicity, gender, and class.266  While people of different 
racial, ethnic, gender, and class backgrounds share different histories and experiences 
based on their differences, the case studies used in this dissertation focus analysis on the 
communication and information goals, needs, and practices these organizations share.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
266 Pachon and DeSipio 1994, Garcia 1997b 
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This chapter focuses on the Northstar Artists Collective and United Labor 
Activists, because the research on these two organizations did not indicate or suggest any 
instances of co-optation currently occurring or having occurred.  As it will be shown, 
however, Northstar Artists Collective (Northstar) and United Labor Activists (ULA) do 
exhibit environments conducive for co-optation to occur.  Several factors contribute to 
the lack of co-optation in these two organizations: the beliefs of Northstar’s and ULA’s 
members and unofficial leaders, organizational practices, and organizational 
environments contribute.   
 
Methodology 
Northstar and ULA as Two Critical Case Studies  
Unlike the previous chapter’s concentration on a small, predominantly male 
Mexican American Employee Organization (MAO), this chapter focuses on two 
organizations identified as Northstar Artists Collective (Northstar) and United Labor 
Activists (ULA).  As I will explain shortly, Northstar’s and ULA’s members possess 
different ethnic, gender, and, in some cases, socio-economic standing, than MAO’s 
members.  Additionally, Northstar and ULA operate in different organizational 
environments, than MAO does.  Despite these differences, Northstar and ULA share with 
MAO a similar non-hierarchical structure, as well as a dedication to participatory 
democracy and labor issues.  Furthermore, all three organizations met the criteria used for 
selecting critical case studies.   
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Northstar Artists Collective is a small, business collective seeking to instigate 
radical social change through art, while functioning as a participatory democratic 
workplace.  Northstar strongly relates to and associates with the labor movement.  United 
Labor Activists is an umbrella organization of labor activists rebuilding the labor 
movement in a progressive direction.  The membership composition of these two small 
organizations differs from the case study of the preceding chapter.  Northstar contains a 
75% female membership and greater racial and ethnic diversity than MAO, while ULA is 
composed of 38% women and only one non-white member.  Additionally, Northstar and 
ULA differ from MAO because neither organization operates in an environment where 
they currently or directly struggle for power and influence with an employer or co-
workers.  The obvious and immediate power struggles these two organizations possess 
pertain to Northstar struggling in a competitive market and ULA organizing across 
different unions to rebuild and energize the Labor Movement.   
The Northstar Artists Collective and United Labor Activists critically test the 
Communication Cadre Theory, as described in the Methodology section of Chapter 2:  
The Communication Cadre, Leadership, and Co-Optation.  Both organizations are 
located in a large metropolitan area of a midwestern state and the organizations are small. 
Four members comprise Northstar, while ULA contains fifteen members.  The two 
organizations possess no elected or appointed leaders and both organizations practice 
participatory democracy.  Members claim no individual or groups control internal or 
external communication and information flows.  Furthermore, the members actively 
participate in organizational affairs.  All of these preceding factors critically test the 
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Communication Cadre Theory’s theoretical foundation that the control of 
communication, information, leaders, and co-optation are inter-related.    
 Many additional factors increase the rigor of these two case studies.  First, 
Northstar’s and ULA’s members are politically aware and experienced individuals who 
consciously strive to make their organizations leaderless with open and transparent 
communication and information flows.  All of Northstar’s members are politically active 
in different organizations, communities, and movements with common interests in the 
local and national labor and peace movements.  Similarly, ULA’s members are all active 
in the labor movement at the local and national level.  Second, both organizations strive 
to prevent any one person or small group from controlling their organization’s 
communication and information flows.  Third, members of both organizations stay 
informed about local and national economic, political, and social issues.  Fourth, 
Northstar’s and ULA’s members exhibit strong commitments toward rebuilding the labor 
movement and adhere to a progressive labor platform.  A platform that includes 
transparent lines of communication and information, as well as transparent decision-
making processes.  Fifth, ULA has operated for eleven years and the members believe 
they have avoided the problems of entrenched leadership and individuals controlling 
communication and information flows.  Northstar, meanwhile, has existed for twenty-five 
years while seeking to maintain open lines of communication.  Northstar differs from the 
other two case studies, in that they periodically recognize an organizational drift towards 
a non-hierarchical structure.  As an organization and individuals they consciously and 
periodically grapple with establishing and maintaining a non-hierarchical organization.    
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 I expect Northstar’s and ULA’s members, who possess political experience, 
commitment to a cause, a strong belief in participatory democracy, and dedication to 
creating a non-hierarchical organization with open lines of communication and 
information to be less likely to allow the development of entrenched leaders or an 
environment conducive for co-optation.  As a final point, Northstar and ULA operate in 
the Midwest, a region where the Populist and Progressive Movements created strong and 
lasting political and social change.  As a result, the Midwest is generally regarded as 
being less politically corrupt than other geographic regions of the United States.  
Consequently, one would expect entrenched leaders and co-optation to be less common 
in the Midwest than other regions, because oligarchy and co-optation represent corrupt 
forms of politics.   
 
On the Lack of Co-Optation 
 This dissertation posits the theory that leaders rise to power and stay in power by 
controlling communication and information networks and that this creates an atmosphere 
conducive for co-optation to occur.  The lack of co-optation in the following two case 
studies does not negate the central theory of this dissertation, because I theorize that the 
Communication Cadre Theory creates an atmosphere conducive for co-optation to occur, 
not that co-optation occurs or must be present.  As the following case studies illustrate, 
the mechanisms for co-optation exist in these two organizations, but these two 
organizations and their members mitigate co-optation’s occurrence through individual 
agency and organizational processes.  Northstar and ULA do not exist in an environment 
where they currently and previously struggle for power and influence with an employer 
	   143	  
or co-workers.  Finally, the benefit of using cases where co-optation is not present 
maintains the objectivity of the study, which is necessary when discussing issues of co-
optation, cooperation, and representation.   
 
Identifying and Gaining Access to the Critical Case Studies 
 As the Methodology section of Chapter 2:  The Communication Cadre, 
Leadership, and Co-Optation outlines, I conducted my search for critical case studies in 
a major Midwestern metropolitan area where my established and new contacts identified 
potential case studies.  I contacted professors who specialized in local politics, unions, 
and community organizing, as well as community leaders and members of local non-
profits and neighborhood organizations.  The community contacts learned my 
dissertation’s topic and the selection criteria used for identifying critical case studies.  My 
contacts provided me with several organizations and contact information, as well as 
permission to use them as personal references.  The ability to use my contacts as personal 
references proved invaluable in gaining access to the members of potential organizations 
for my case studies. 
 Only three organizations fit the critical case study selection criteria.  The first case 
study, the Mexican American Employee Organization, was discussed in Chapter 4: 
Protest and Organize.  The remaining two case studies, Northstar Artists Collective and 
United Labor Activists, are discussed in this chapter.   
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The Interviews 
 I initially gained access to the Northstar Artists Collective through a community 
contact who is active in the labor movement.  I contacted Northstar and Victor, a 
Northstar founder, invited me to meet the organization during lunch.  Due to the non-
hierarchical nature of Northstar, Victor invited me to provide a very brief presentation 
about my research and to make my request to interview them in person.  During our 
lunch meeting they asked me several questions regarding confidentiality, the types of 
interview questions I planned to ask, and if they had to answer all of the questions.  I then 
explained what confidentiality meant, the types of interview questions I wanted to ask 
them, and I informed them they did not have to answer any questions that they did not 
want to answer, and that they could end the interview whenever they desired.  After I 
answered their questions, they all agreed to let me interview them, and I scheduled 
interviews with all four members of Northstar.   
   I gained access to the United Labor Activists through Prof, a community contact 
who was a member of the organization.  Prof invited me to give a brief presentation about 
my research and make a request to interview organizational members at their next 
meeting.  At the meeting I was drafted to help stuff mailing envelopes, while they 
conducted their meeting and I made my presentation.  The members of ULA asked 
several questions about the nature of my research and my background with the labor 
movement.  A member of ULA than asked Prof if he would vouch for me.  When Prof 
answered that he vouched for me and supported my request to interview members of 
ULA, everyone present at the meeting agreed to allow me to interview ULA’s members.   
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 Ten of ULA’s fifteen members were interviewed.  Due to the exceptionally high 
participation rates by ULA’s members, the five members who were not interviewed were 
highly active in the organization.  The interviews did not occur due to scheduling 
conflicts and the time constraints posed for completing this dissertation.  Efforts taken to 
increase the validity of the analysis of ULA included the continued practice of 
confirming communication relationships267 and asking everyone interviewed to identify 
smaller communication and friendship networks within ULA.  The results of this 
approach verified that the five non-interviewed members are very active ULA 
participants and closely linked to other members of ULA through regular interaction.  
What could not be determined without interviewing these five members is if they formed 
their own smaller sub-group within ULA.  While this is a major concern, the high 
response rate by ULA’s members helps offset this weakness.   
 The interview format was the same for all three case studies,268 MAO from the 
preceding chapter and Northstar and ULA from this chapter.  The interviews were 
informal and structured to ask different sets of thematic questions.  To encourage full and 
truthful answers, all of the people interviewed were guaranteed confidentiality.  The 
interview questions were designed to seek information on their socio-economic standing, 
work environment, their organization, their organizing tactics, individual and group 
views, leadership, communication and information flows, and the organizational 
problems they faced.  
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 The case studies relied on interviewing Northstar’s and ULA’s members.  In the 
following case studies, Northstar and ULA correspond to Group A of the 
Communication Cadre Theory.  Unlike Chapter 4: Protest and Organize, there is no 
corresponding stronger Group B of the Communication Cadre Theory present or 
described.  No immediate power struggle between Northstar or ULA with an immediate 
employer or co-workers previously occurred or was currently occurring for power or 
influence nor was co-optation present.  In summary, this chapter’s critical case studies 
analyze the communication and information flows in two small, highly participatory, 
non-hierarchical, organizations concerned with the labor movement.   
 
Concepts and Actions 
 The following two case studies of the United Labor Activists (ULA) and 
Northstar critically test the communication cadre theory.  Before analyzing the case 
studies using the CCT, critical political science elements centering on power, political 
processes, and decision-making will be looked at in light of the cases.269  Considering the 
diverse memberships of ULA and Northstar, we will then compliment the studies using 
ethnicity, race, class, and gender. 
 As research increasingly studies the intersections of race, ethnicity, class, and 
gender,270 racial and ethnic conceptualizations in the social sciences are generally limited 
to race or ancestry.  Political Science appears more limited than other social sciences in 
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relying on two-dimensional definitions of race and ethnicity, Black or White.271  Latino 
American, Asian American, and Native American Studies expanded race and ethnicity 
conceptually and operationally to include culture(s) as attitudes, values, and practices, in 
addition to bi-culturalism, social networks, and identity.  While the conceptualization and 
operationalization of race and ethnicity has increased, the inclusion of multiple racial and 
ethnic groups as units of analysis or areas of study has been rare.  Fortunately, exceptions 
do exist that expand the common two-dimensional use of race (i.e. Black and White) to 
be more inclusive of other racial and ethnic groups (i.e. Asian, Latino, and Native 
American).272  The role Latinos played in President’s Obama’s 2012 election, has seen 
increasing interest and inclusion in recent political studies.  While ULA’s case study 
focuses specifically on a basically all White, majority male organization of labor 
activists, Northstar’s case study focuses on an organization that is diverse across race, 
ethnicity, gender, and sexuality.   
 The role of gender and sexuality are less explored in this chapter and dissertation.  
The limited use of gender and sexuality analysis should not, however, be misconstrued to 
mean that gender and sexuality did not exert an influence on the events that occurred.  
Indeed, the lack of women in local, regional, and national union leadership reflects 
broader social realities in not only the labor movement, but U.S. society and politics, as 
well.  As Vicki Ruiz points out in her groundbreaking, Cannery Women, Cannery 
Lives,273 gendered social roles in the home, society, and work, result in institutionalized 
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effects.  The members of ULA identified strongly with their labor backgrounds, however, 
with the presence of women and their larger and more influential roles in ULA, their 
numbers still reflected the reality of the lower representation of women in union 
leadership.  Northstar, on the other hand, with women comprising 3 of the 4 members 
(including a non-heterosexual), represents a much different organization and leadership, 
than the other 2 case studies and the broader U.S. society.  While looking at and isolating 
the specific influences gender and sexuality played in the case studies and on the CCT are 
necessary, they go beyond the scope of this dissertation.   
 
Social Structures 
Social structures (i.e. political, economic, and social institutions) shape and 
influence ULA and Northstar.  A focus of this dissertation is to connect the interactions 
of the Communication Cadre Theory with decision-making, motivations, and initiatives, 
in order to better understand how democracy operates within social organizations, 
society, and the federal system of government.274 
Political Science’s analysis of electoral participation provides rich data for 
studying the United States’ electoral systems.  An electoral system based on a plurality, 
winner-take-all system with at-large elections, off-year, and non-partisan elections and 
multi-member districts, and the difficulty for third political parties to be competitive are 
structural factors that have affected the number of female, working class, and non-White 
candidates (successful or not) in elections, racially polarized voting and campaigning, red 	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baiting, representation, and governmental responsiveness.275  De la Garza, DeSipio, 
Gunier, Rosenstone, and Wolfinger all argue for methods to address the problems posed 
by a plurality, winner-take-all electoral system.  The methods they argue for include 
single member districts, cumulative or proportional voting schemes, and community of 
interest consideration in re-distribution of district plans.  Additionally, historical obstacles 
prevented Americans of Mexican, African, Asian, or indigenous backgrounds, as well as 
women, from voting or running in the electoral process.276  
 United Labor Activists’ and Northstar Artist Collective’s members were all 
experienced and active members in different social and peace movements, as well as 
formal and informal students of political, social, and labor history.  As such, they were 
aware of structural factors and historical obstacles in the United States’ electoral and 
political system.  In the following case studies, it will be shown that ULA and Northstar 
engaged in democratic decision-making processes through town hall style meetings and 
voting.   
Individual factors that contribute to political participation and power focus 
primarily on their individual resources, as evidenced by their SES or the linkage between 
individuals, organizations, and leaders.  The SES, or socioeconomic status, variables 
focus on level of education, income level, and occupation and served as the main 
approach to understanding why individuals participate in politics.277  The strong 	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correlation between SES and on the types and level of political participation by 
individuals are well documented.  The relationship between SES and political 
participation for ULA’s and Northstar’s membership of Latinos, African American, 
Queer, and strong pro-Union members is not as strong.  The work of John A. Garcia 
highlights how the inclusion of group consciousness and ethnic identification or the labor 
history research of Vicki Ruiz, provide additional variables for explaining the political 
participation of the members in these two groups.278  For ULA and Northstar, the 
additional factors Garcia and Ruiz highlight, such as group consciousness, a sense of 
belonging, and a desire to improve their group’s condition, point towards a greater 
understanding of why their members became politically active.  Additionally, the people 
in these two groups were overwhelmingly politically experienced in organizing in local, 
regional, or national social movements for labor or racial/ethnic causes. 
 ULA’s and Northstar’s political empowerment included structural factors, which 
influenced the how, why, and to what extent their membership participated.  Political 
Science traditionally focuses on voting systems and representation279 and these two cases 
are no different.  The members of these two organizations believed that the system they 
practiced, while flawed, enabled them to have an important voice in what each of their 
respective organizations.  Additional structural variables that encouraged ULA’s and 
Northstar’s members to participate were the ability to meet on company time and 
property, as well as having access to high-ranking officials within their unions and with 
other unions both locally and nationally. 
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Lessons from Artists and Activists 
Coalition Building    
Work on how and to what level Latinos at the mass and elite levels interact across 
Latino and non-Latino groups are now available.280  The works point out that Latinos 
cooperating across Latino sub-groups and with non-Latino groups is more apparent at the 
elite level, than at the mass level, and reflects a more practical approach.  With the advent 
of the Immigrant Rights Movement, however, coalition building by primarily young 
immigrant and Latino activists appears to be a mixture of practicality, idealism, and 
ideology.281  As the Latino population grows and becomes more concentrated in urban 
areas, opportunities for coalition building with non-Latino groups increases.282  Other 
communities of color such as, African Americans, Asian Americans, and Native 
Americans, are struggling for increased economic, political, and social power and they 
share similar policy concerns.283  Electoral coalition building and competition at the local 
and municipal level forms the main area of coalition building research, as coalitions form 
across groups and work for greater political power or competition between groups drives 
them apart.284   
Northstar engaged in coalition building at the local and national level with 
activists in the labor, racial/ethnic, environmental, and anti-capitalist movements.  In this 	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case, the high level of previous political experience in these diverse arenas among 
Northstar’s members, the highly democratic nature of their organization, and the high 
demand for the graphic arts they produced for these causes continually forced them into 
mutually beneficial relationships with other groups and causes.  Collectively, the 
preceding influences may serve as a marker for considering Northstar’s members as elite 
political actors.  While coalition efforts between the different workers at Northstar was 
seen as a workplace necessity to facilitate interpersonal relationships and future sales for 
their cooperative business, the collectivist and cooperative nature of this diverse group of 
workers coalesced into a set of consistent causes (i.e. movements) and set of beliefs into 
action. Northstar’s member-workers exhibited two overwhelming opinions about 
coalition building.  First, their members believed there was enough support from other 
groups to merit continued coalition efforts, which stand in stark contrast to MAO’s 
experience in the previous chapter.  Second, while Mao’s members believed that Urban 
Inc. actively engaged in pitting the different groups of color in competition for jobs and 
company resources, Northstar’s member-workers were  the company because they ran 
their business as a democratic cooperative.  Consequently, they set the agenda.  Finally, 
they recognized that they were not immune to outside forces or internal biases that could 
lead them from their organizational model of a democratic cooperative.  
 While Northstar did not engage in active conflict with an employer, they 
recognized over time they always seemed to drift to less and less democratic and 
cooperative behaviors.  Not unlike SNCC, they anticipated individual and organizational 
tendencies to create hierarchies.285  What sets Northstar apart from MAO in the previous 
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chapter, is that the push for a communication cadre to be created came from within and 
was based on an extreme concern for their founder, Victor, who also had by far, the 
largest financial investment in the group.  Meanwhile, external pressure for a 
communication cadre to develop, came from outside organizations Northstar worked with 
who identified Victor as the owner or “boss” and treated him as such, consequently 
relegating the other cooperative members to employee status.  
 Victor was highly aware of this and took pains to reassure the other members he 
saw them as all equal. He even told outside organizations calling to place an order or to 
seek their assistance in an organizing endeavor that they could do business with anyone 
who worked there because they were all equals at Northstar.  Each member of Northstar 
understood the ideological and organizational reasons for how and why they operated as 
a highly democratic and cooperative venture.  Northstar held regular bi-weekly “all staff” 
meetings to review where Northstar stood financially, what organizations or coalitions 
they were working with and why, as well as to creatively air ideas or questions they had 
about the business, potential new art projects, or about the latest political or organizing 
news.  All their business and political decisions (e.g. which organizations to work with) 
were collectively discussed and made. In an effort to limit work hierarchies from 
developing, they regularly engaged in shadowing one another at work and sometimes, 
even, swapping work duties. Socially and politically, each member had at least one of 
their main political agendas as one of the coalitional areas Northstar was active in.  
 In interview after interview with each and every member of the organization, 
every member of Northstar continually brought up their concern that Victor had a young 
family with children (which no one else had) and he and his family would suffer 
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disproportionately, if their cooperative company went bankrupt.  In the interviews, each 
member of the organization felt their voice was important, but the financial and personal 
reality of who would suffer the most, if they went bankrupt, resulted in them wanting 
Victor to have a greater voice in their collectivist decision making process, even if they 
did not agree with his ideas and decisions. Victor’s role was more than the main financial 
backer (resulting in a 2nd mortgage on his home), he was also the main creative force for 
the graphic arts Northstar produced.   
 The evolving hierarchy was noticed by everyone at Northstar.  As a former 
member of the Young Lords Puerto Rican social movement, Victor was painfully aware 
of it.  Mojo, an anarchist and queer and people of color activist noticed it, Cleo the 
accountant and veteran of labor organizing noticed it, as well as the remaining members 
of Northstar.  What is interesting and unique about Northstar is that each member was 
highly tuned to hierarchies, communication networks, and literally had training sessions 
at work on how to prevent hierarchies of power, privilege, information and 
communication sharing, and decision making from evolving.   
 According to the members, every 2-5 years, someone (usually Victor) would 
realize that once again, the members of Northstar were giving Victor greater and greater 
influence over decision making due to his financial stake and allowing most of their 
communication in-house and with external organizations to be filtered through Victor.  
All of the members realized that they each played a role in letting this communication 
cadre of 1 (Victor) evolve out of guilt and fear for the financial and familial risk he 
possessed. The external pressure for this communication cadre of 1 to evolve, according 
to the interviews, seemingly resulted from the other members wanting Victor as the main 
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nexus of communication and decision making to assume greater and greater 
responsibility.  Mancur Olsen’s, “the exploitation of the strong by the weak,” comes to 
mind here.286  Concurrently, external pressure from external organizations to have an 
“identifiable” leader to talk to, seemingly embraced and maintained Victor in this role.  
While the story could end here, Northstar’s members, including Victor, would 
collectively engage in dismantling this hierarchy and aggressively reinstituting the non-
hierarchical, democratic, cooperative model.  New communication and information 
responsibilities would be created and Victor would remove himself temporarily from 
making decisions or refuse to share his ideas and vote last on everything for several 
months, all in an effort to destroy the hierarchy crated from the control of communication 
and information and decision making.   
 ULA (United Labor Activists) faced similar problems as Northstar, even though 
they were note a cooperative business/organization.  ULA was comprised of volunteers 
from several different unions who wanted to create an umbrella organization of 
progressive labor activists that was not hierarchical to lend support and aid for labor 
organizing and the labor movement.  Given the extremely bureaucratic nature of labor 
unions in general,287 this was radically different from big labor hierarchical traditions, 
like the Teamsters and AFL-CIO.  Once again, we see an organization with highly skilled 
and politically active members who create an organization to be as non-hierarchical and 
democratic as possible, to avoid entrenched leadership and the risk of co-optation.  All of 
ULA’s members were extremely active within their individual unions and in the labor 
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movement.  Additionally, they were all seasoned union organizers with more than 20 
years of experience each.   
 Ten of ULA’s 15 active members were interviewed and several communication 
and information networks were present within this organization. Even with the presence 
of several communication networks and a very strong tendency by everyone interviewed 
to actively seek information from more than one network, all of the communication 
networks had one nexus in common, the man named Prof. In fact, the smaller 
communication networks were heavily dependent on Prof for their information and 
communication needs.  What separates ULA from MAO is political agendas were 
remarkably consistent and outwardly focused on the “labor movement.”  Furthermore, 
with so many different unions represented in ULA and an ultra strong sense of solidarity 
and mutual support among the highly experienced members, it was difficult for outside 
organizations to pressure or strong arm the organization.  
 What separates ULA from Northstar, besides Northstar being a business, is that 
no member felt that another had a disproportionate investment in ULA and ULA 
members appeared more adroit at identifying when and why something might poise a 
threat to their non-hierarchical organization and collectively and more immediately 
discussing and resolving the threat.  Despite both organizations existing for many, many 
years, ULA never waited several years to address a known organizational or interpersonal 
problem.  The problem of a communication cadre developing in Prof, was mitigated by a 
firm commitment among all of the members to create several other communication and 
information networks, and to use them.  While Prof still had an inordinate influence over 
communication and information flows, as identified by the members interviewed, ULA 
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members regularly verified the information he provided with their own knowledge or 
with people outside of the organization.  What is important to see in the ULA case study, 
is that the communication and information cadre developed, but it was mitigated by an 
active and engaged membership that routinely verified said communication and 
information.  Of the three case studies, ULA was the most successful at consistently 
maintaining their non-hierarchical structure and highly participatory membership, all the 
while staying focused on their core goal of advancing the Labor Movement. 
 
Summary 
As the preceding case studies of Northstar and ULA illustrate, individuals and 
organizational structures play crucial roles in providing two critical means for 
organizations to combat the creation of a communication cadre and the threat of co-
optation.  Northstar and ULA demonstrate the difficulty small organizations and 
individuals committed to full participatory democracy face in creating organizations that 
reflect their commitment.  Both organizations grappled with creating and maintaining 
organizational policies and structures that fostered rank-and-file participation and 
guarded against the creation of a communication cadre or oligarchy.  To this end, 
Northstar and ULA employed practices that actively sought rank-and-file input, avoided 
electing or appointing leaders, employed practices and multiple methods for distributing 
information, and diligently worked to ensure transparent lines of communication. 
The diligence and difficult work of building an organization dedicated to full 
participation by all members, without entrenched leaders, highlights the importance of 
individuals.  ULA sought to build and maintain such an organization, but the 
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organizational structure still resulted in the bulk of the communication responsibilities 
falling on one individual.  While ULA’s members knew Prof was at the nexus of 
communication and information flows and heavily relied on him for their communication 
and information needs, the multiple communication and information networks within 
ULA mitigated their complete reliance on Prof.  Despite the members knowledge of 
Prof’s role and their dependence on him within the organization, there was an acceptance 
of this organizational process.  Why?  Because ULA’s members trusted Prof and 
individually they worked hard to participate in ULA’s other communication and 
information networks.   
Northstar’s members, however, went beyond knowing they struggled as an 
organization to avoid entrenched leadership or individual(s) controlling communication 
and information flows.  Northstar’s members periodically grappled with creating and 
maintaining an organization structure that allowed everyone to participate and created 
transparent lines of communication.  While all of Northstar’s members acknowledged 
that Victor and Cleo were the de facto leaders of Northstar due to their financial and/or 
historical stake, all of the members engaged themselves in finding new ways to create an 
organization dedicated to full member participation without established leader(s) or 
controller(s) of communication and information flows.   
ULA and Northstar demonstrate the crucial role individuals play in creating and 
maintaining organizations.  While both organizations exhibit the mechanisms for a 
communication cadre and co-optation to exist, the individual members and unofficial 
leaders in both organizations remain dedicated to and active in achieving their 
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organization’s mission, full member participation, open lines of communication, and no 
elected or appointed leaders.   
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CHAPTER 6 
 
Summary and Conclusions on  
Communication Cadres, Leaders, and Co-Optation 
 
 
This dissertation explored the existence and influence of communication cadres 
within the critical case studies and developed the Communication Cadre Theory (CCT).  
A theory that argued leaders rise to power and stay in power by controlling 
communication and information flows, which creates an environment conducive to co-
optation.  The Mexican American Employee Organization (MAO), United Labor 
Activists (ULA), and the Northstar Artists Collective (Northstar) provided three critical 
cases studies of the Communication Cadre Theory.  The analysis of the case studies 
supported the arguments of the Communication Cadre Theory, even though these three 
organizations challenged the basic assumptions and components of the CCT.  Briefly 
stated, these critical case studies espoused a dedication to non-hierarchical leadership, 
participatory politics, having no identified controllers of communication and information 
within the organizations, and small organizations with fewer than 20 very active 
members.   
 
Summary of Case Studies 
As the preceding case studies of Northstar, ULA, and MAO illustrated how 
individuals and organizational structures play crucial roles in the development and 
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influence of communication cadres on their organizations.  As seen in the preceding 
chapter, Northstar Artists Collective and United Labor Activists provided two critical 
means for organizations to combat the creation of a communication cadre and the threat 
of co-optation.  Northstar and ULA demonstrate the difficulty small organizations and 
individuals committed to full participatory democracy face in creating organizations that 
reflect their commitment.  Both organizations grappled with creating and maintaining 
organizational policies and structures that fostered rank-and-file participation and 
guarded against the creation of a communication cadre or oligarchy.  To this end, 
Northstar and ULA employed practices that actively sought rank-and-file input, avoided 
electing, or appointing leaders, employed practices and multiple methods for distributing 
information, and diligently worked to ensure transparent lines of communication. 
The diligence and difficult work of building an organization dedicated to full 
participation by all members, without entrenched leaders, highlights the important 
influence individuals exert on their organizations.  United Labor Activists sought to build 
and maintain such an organization, but the organizational structure still resulted in the 
bulk of the communication responsibilities falling on one individual.  While ULA’s 
members knew Prof was at the nexus of communication and information flows and relied 
heavily on him for their communication and information needs, the multiple 
communication and information networks within ULA mitigated their complete reliance 
on Prof. Despite the members knowledge of Prof’s role and their dependence on him 
within the organization, there was an acceptance of this organizational process.  Why?  
Because ULA’s members trusted Prof and individually they worked hard to participate in 
ULA’s other communication and information networks.   
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Northstar Artists Collective’s members, however, went beyond knowing they 
struggled as an organization to avoid entrenched leadership or individual(s) controlling 
communication and information flows.  Northstar’s members periodically acknowledged 
and grappled with creating and maintaining an organizational structure that allowed 
everyone to participate and created transparent lines of communication.  While all of 
Northstar’s members acknowledged that Victor and Cleo were the de facto leaders of 
Northstar due to their financial and/or historical stake, all of the members engaged 
themselves in finding new ways to create an organization dedicated to full member 
participation without established leader(s) or controller(s) of communication and 
information flows.   
ULA and Northstar demonstrated the crucial role individuals play in creating and 
maintaining organizations.  Both organizations exhibited the structure of a 
communication cadre that controls communication and information flows, which creates 
an environment conducive for co-optation to exist.  The individual members and 
unofficial leaders in both organizations, however, remained dedicated to and active in 
achieving their organization’s mission of full member participation, open lines of 
communication, and no elected or appointed leaders.   
 The lack of co-optation in ULA and Nstar does not negate the central theory of 
this dissertation that leaders rise to power and stay in power by controlling 
communication and information flows, which creates an environment conducive for co-
optation to occur.  Both organizations exhibited communication cadres positioned at the 
nexus of communication and information networks, which created environments 
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conducive for co-optation to occur.  I never argued co-optation always occurred, only that 
communication cadres create environments conducive for co-optation to occur.   
 The Mexican American Employee Organization (MAO) critical case study 
provided a classic case study consistent with the Communication Cadre Theory (CCT) 
and the manifestation of co-optation.  MAO’s communication cadres developed and 
evolved in importance as the organization aged and engaged in negotiations with Urban 
Inc.  (The state agency that employed MAO’s members).  Despite (or because of) MAO’s 
success, Urban Inc. sought to exert control over MAO’s activities by demanding different 
rules and guidelines for negotiating Latino worker rights at Urban Inc.  While Urban Inc. 
was not initially successful in forcing concessions from MAO, Urban Inc. succeeded in 
forcing MAO to limit who participated in negotiations from MAO's entire membership to 
a smaller and smaller group.  Consequently, Urban Inc. helped create communication 
cadres in MAO and a favorable environment to co-opt MAO through patronage.  The 
communication cadres and their supporters became appealing targets for Urban Inc. to 
co-opt, because the communication cadres controlled the Mexican American Employee 
Organization.  The official communication cadre and its supporters benefited from 
patronage.  Urban Inc., meanwhile, targeted the unofficial cadre for patronage in 
exchange for a decrease in their activity level or change in their policy position.  Finally, 
supporters of the unofficial cadre were offered patronage to change their position.   
 While the communication cadre and a co-optive environment were present in 
MAO, alternative strategies to avoid these problems found little support.  For example, a 
large organization would have an even harder time avoiding a communication cadre and 
a co-optive environment.  Michels and Olson argued that the larger an organization was, 
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the greater its need for a division of labor and bureaucracy, which would compound the 
problem.288  A highly structured group with well-defined rules encourages hierarchy, 
which separates the group and actively creates a communication cadre and the 
opportunity for co-optation.   
 
Conclusions 
If a democratic government and a democratic society are mutually reinforcing and 
reflective, then what conclusions can be drawn from how society practices democracy 
with how that society practices government?  This dissertation, Communication Cadres, 
Leaders, and Co-Optation, offered a new view of political development by coherently 
combining the study of political participation, representation, accountability, network 
theory, cooperation, and co-optation to analyze American political development.  By 
comparing and contrasting how small, democratic, and highly participatory organizations 
governed themselves, this dissertation explored the implications for how these 
organizations practiced democracy with how democracy and participation are manifested 
in the United States.   
 The Communication Cadre Theory (CCT) developed in this dissertation argued 
that leaders rise to power and stay in power by controlling communication and 
information flows, which created an environment conducive for co-optation to occur.  
Furthermore, the dissertation reduced the conceptual stretching of “cooperation” and “co-
optation” and applied the increased rigorous definitions to the case studies used, as well 
as competing political theories and studies.  The results supported the Communication 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
288 Michels 1962, Olson 1971 
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Cadre Theory.  The dissertation subsequently provided insight into competing political 
theories, studies, and biases affecting their research methods, arguments, and results.   
While this dissertation had much to say about competing theories of politics, the 
CCT could not have been developed without other scholars’ theoretical and historical 
work.  As Chapters 2 and 3 on the development of the Communication Cadre Theory 
and the literature review attest, research was and is built upon the earlier works of others.  
Much like the work of musicians and writers was influenced in known and unknown 
ways, this dissertation was influenced in known and unknown ways.  The known 
influences on this dissertation may be found in the footnotes and bibliography.  The 
unknown influences may be found in discussions with and writings by teachers, mentors, 
peers, activists, and the people who graciously agreed to be interviewed for this 
dissertation.   
In this dissertation I argued that leaders rose to power and stayed in power by 
controlling communication and information flows (and networks), which created an 
atmosphere conducive for co-optation to occur.  The dissertation theorized that this 
process occurred through both structural and individual means.  Structurally, a 
tremendous organizational need pushed members of the organization to concentrate the 
organization’s communication and information needs into a narrower and more 
specialized branch of the organization.  The networks between organizational members 
became greater as the organization grew.  Consequently, a smaller and smaller proportion 
of the organization’s members were in contact with their organization’s larger and 
broader communication and information needs and knowledge.  In very large 
organizations and bureaucracies this organizational process was more easily observed, 
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while smaller organizations required a greater level of scrutiny to determine if this was 
the case.  Despite the organizational tendency to decrease the amount of people in the 
communication cadre, individuals exerted a strong influence on who became a 
communication cadre member though choosing to pursue membership in the 
communication cadre or supporting individuals in their bid for membership in the 
communication cadre.   
The role of the individual is often overlooked by structuralists and the role of 
structure is often overlooked by individualists, so much so, that a discussion here is not 
necessary.   
In very small organizations the organizational tendency to limit membership in 
the communication cadre was not so obvious.  Structurally it was easier for individuals to 
be aware of their organization’s micro and macro communication and information needs 
and details.  The need for organizational specialty was less apparent and the free-rider 
problem was more easily overcome.  Individually, the network between organizational 
members was tighter and more complete, as well as the relationship between leaders and 
the rank-and-file.  For very small, highly democratic, and participatory organizations the 
development of and need for a communication cadre that controlled communication and 
information networks appeared unwanted and unlikely.   
The difference between large and small organizations is often one of degree and 
magnitude.  While smaller organizations do not face the often overbearing need to 
centralize communication and information flows, smaller organizations do face a similar 
need.  Several factors can contribute to the need to centralize communication and 
information flows, 3 factors observed in the case studies: 
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1. An individual or individuals sought to gain greater organizational power or 
control within their group, and  
2. The organization was coerced to centralize communication and information 
flows by a stronger external organization that required a centralized person or 
office to communicate with, and 
3. Organizational members decreased their involvement in the group’s 
communication and information flows.   
An additional factor, not seen in the case studies might be  
4. The organization was engaged in multiple relationships with outside actors, 
increasing the organizational need to centralize its communication and 
information flows. 
 
Communication Cadres, Leaders, and Co-Optation analyzed three critical case 
studies that supported the Communication Cadre Theory:  leaders rose to power and 
stayed in power by controlling communication and information flows, which created an 
environment conducive for co-optation to occur.  The Communication Cadre Theory 
proposed that controlling communication and information networks were mechanisms for 
the development of a communication cadre to control an organization by controlling that 
organization’s communication and information flows.  Once a communication cadre 
developed within an organization, an environment conducive for co-optation to occur was 
created, because it was easier and more efficient for an outside organization to co-opt a 
given organization by co-opting the communication cadre within that organization.   
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It must be stressed that co-optation was not an inevitable outcome of a 
communication cadre developing within an organization, merely that an environment 
conducive for co-optation to occur existed.  The conceptual stretching and overlap of 
“cooperation” and “co-optation” was addressed in this dissertation to clarify their 
definitions and establish criteria for their use.  I took a strong stand that biases among 
researchers and their less than rigorous use of these two terms necessitated a rigorous 
account for why a given situation was cooperation and not co-optation or co-optation and 
not cooperation.  The model developed in Chapter 2:  Theory provided an excellent 
start for eliminating the conceptual overlap and misuse of cooperation and co-optation.  
Future work by scholars on clarifying the conceptual overlap of cooperation and co-
optation needs to be done.   
The theory proposed that communication networks were mechanisms for the 
development of entrenched leadership (i.e. oligarchy) in organizations and created an 
environment conducive for co-optation to occur.   
 
Specific points learned  
The Communication Cadre Theory highlighted several consequences resulting 
from the control of communication and information flows.  Briefly stated here, the 
consequences resulting from the control of communication and information flows were: 
 
1. The options available for an organization’s members to choose from may be 
reduced, 
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2. The reduced options available for members to decide between limited their 
free choice (results in limited free choice), 
3. The limits on free choice reduced the power of an organization’s members, 
because an individual’s free will to decide cannot make up for a lack of free 
choice, 
4. Limited free choice limited democracy and democratic action,  
5. An organizational elite took over the organizational function of controlling 
communication and information flows, 
6. Created an environment conducive for the entrenchment of organizational 
leaders (oligarchy), 
7. Created an environment conducive for co-optation to occur, and  
8. Undermined the political power of the organization’s members. 
 
The Communication Cadre Theory highlighted several key factors and their 
impact.   
 
1. Identified the importance of communication and information for political 
power, 
2. Explained the danger of co-optation at an organizational and individual level,  
3. Explained how and why oligarchy occurs, 
4. Identified a reason for the creation of an organizational and communication 
elite,  
5. Identified obstacles to an individual’s freedom of choice, 
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6. Identified an obstacle to democracy and democratization, and  
7. Identified organizational obstacles to communication and information sharing. 
 
Co-optation does not always occur under the Communication Cadre Theory.  
Variables that increased or decreased the probability of co-optation occurring were:   
 
1. Pact-making, relationships, or communication with other groups. 
2. Limiting the amount of membership and leader participation and 
communication or negotiations with other groups. 
a. The appointment or election of individuals to these positions did not 
matter. 
3. When GROUP A opposed GROUP B’s policy or position. 
4. GROUP A was deficient in resources vis-à-vis GROUP B that a leader or 
communication cadre craved or feared. 
5. Patronage existed. 
6. The organization was dependent on other groups or individuals for crucial 
resources. 
7. A leader or communication cadre member was also in control or oversight of 
an influential subgroup or sub-function of GROUP A. 
8. Static or entrenched leaders, communication cadre, or controllers of 
communication and information. 
9. A dedicated, charismatic leader. 
10. Term limits. 
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11. The oversight of communication and information controllers. 
12. The presence of an environment open to ideological or practical change and 
evolution. 
13. Organizational size. 
 
Throughout the process of testing the communication cadre theory, a question 
continually lingered in the background.  To what extent does democracy and 
representation exist in the presence of communication cadres?     
 
Implications for Other Literature 
The communication cadre theory helps us in identifying processes that occur within 
organizations. 289  
 
1. The identification of organizational problems through members and leaders 
demands for action, 
2. The formulation of solutions through policy initiation and development, 
3. The legitimation of those policies, 
4. The implementation of the chosen policies by the organization, and  
5. The evaluation of the implemented policies by organizational leaders and 
members.  
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APPENDIX A 
 
Interview Questions 
 
 
Background Information  
1. What is your job?  
a. (If unemployed) What profession or type of job did you work in? 
2. Where have you gone to school? 
3. What is your age? 
4. What organizations are you--or have you been--a member of? 
5. Are you a member of Organization A? 
6. How long have you been a member of Organization A? 
7. What do you do in Organization A?  
8. What is the purpose of Organization A? 
9. How often does Organization A meet? 
10. How is Organization A structured? 
11. How many people are in Organization A? 
12. How would you describe the members of Organization A? 
 
The Leaders? 
13. Who were the founders of Organization A? 
14. Who does a lot of work for Organization A? 
a. What do they do? 
15. Who are the leaders of Organization A?  [If no one is named, “Who do you 
consider a leader(s)? Who do you think people consider a leader(s)?] 
a. How were the leaders of Organization A chosen? 
b. How long have they lead Organization A? 
c. What are their qualities and skills? 
d. What is there leadership style? 
e. Are you comfortable with (the leaders named)? 
f. Do you wish they did things differently? 
i. Why? Or Why not? 
g. What is their communication style like? 
16. Who lead Organization A before the leaders you mentioned?  [If no one is named, 
“Who do you consider a leader(s)? Who do you think people consider a 
leader(s)?] 
a. How were those leaders chosen? 
b. Why are they no longer leading Organization A? 
c. What were their qualities and skills? 
d. What was their leadership style? 
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e. Were you comfortable with them as leaders? 
f. Do you wish that they did things differently? 
i. Why? Or Why not? 
g. What was their communication style like? 
17. What other organizations or groups do you interact with? 
a. What types of organizations are they? 
b. Who leads these groups?  [If no one is named, “Who do you consider a 
leader(s)? Who do you think people consider a leader(s)?] 
i. How long have they held that position? 
ii. Do you know who lead the organization(s) you mentioned before 
their current leader? 
c. Who do you talk to or communicate with from the organization(s) you 
mentioned? 
d. Who talks or communicates with Organization A from the other 
organization(s) you mentioned? 
i. How long have they been doing this? 
e. Who talks or communicates to these other organizations you mentioned 
from Organization A? 
f. What is there communication style like? 
18. Are there other smaller groups or groups of friends in Organization A? 
a. Is there a leader(s) of these smaller groups?  [If no one is named, “Who do 
you consider their leader(s)? Who do you think people consider their 
leader(s)?] 
b. Who are they and how were they chosen? 
c. How long have they lead this smaller group? 
d. What are their qualities and skills?  
e. What is their leadership style? 
f. Do you wish they did things differently? 
i. Why? Or Why not? 
g. What is their communication style like? 
19. Do you consider yourself a leader? 
20. Do you consider yourself a leader in Organization A? 
21. Do other people consider you a leader? 
a. Who are they? 
b. Are they members of Organization A? 
c. What organizations are they members of? 
d. Why do they consider you a leader? 
22. What are your qualities and skills?  
23. What is (or would) your leadership style (be)? 
24. Do you wish you could do things differently in Organization A? 
a. Why? Or Why not? 
25. What is your communication style like? 
 
The Communicators 
26. How much communication is there between Organization A with other 
organizations or groups? 
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a. Is there more or less communication with other organizations now or in 
the past? 
b. Do you have any communication with outside groups? 
i. How frequently? 
ii. Who do you communicate with in outside groups? 
27. Who communicates from Organization A with other groups? 
a. How were they chosen? 
b. What are their qualities and skills? 
c. Are you comfortable with them in this role? 
i. Why or Why not? 
d. Do you wish they did things differently? 
i. Why or Why not? 
e. What is their communication style like? 
28. How do the leaders of Organization A get information from [the communicators] 
with outside groups? 
 
Leaders, Communicators, and Group Views 
29. What would you like to see Organization A do?  
30. If you were in charge of Organization A, what would you do? 
a. How would you do it?  
31. What do the leaders do for you? 
a. How? 
b. Why? 
32. What are the views of the leaders of Organization A you mentioned? 
33. What are the views of [the communicators] of Organization A you mentioned? 
34. What views or beliefs do the other members have about Organization A and what 
Organization A should do? 
a. How do you find out or learn what the members’ views are? 
b. Who do you get this information from? 
35. Who do you talk to in Organization A? 
36. How do you get information about Organization A or things that are happening 
that involve Organization A? 
a. Who do you get this information from? 
b. Do other members in Organization A get their information from the same 
person or people? 
c. Who are they? 
37. What happens when there are different ideas or opinions about what should be 
done or how it should be done in Organization A?  
a. Why do people have these different opinions? 
i. Who, usually, has different opinions? 
ii. How would you describe these different opinions?  Are these 
different opinions about certain areas, issues, or people? 
iii. What would you like to see happen when people have different 
opinions?   
iv. How are you treated when you have different opinions? 
38. What are some of the perks or benefits of being a leader? 
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39. What are some of the perks or benefits of not being a leader? 
40. What problems are there with Organization A? 
41. Who are some members who left Organization A?  
a. Why did they leave Organization A? 
b. How would describe them? 
c. Do you keep in contact with them? 
 
Referrals To Other Members 
42. What other members of Organization A can you refer me to? 
a. How can I contact them?   
43. What former members of Organization A can you refer me to? 
a. How can I contact them?   
44. Is there anything else that you think I should know or that you would like to tell 
me? 
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